Risk assessment of the petroleum exploration and production industry from volcanic hazards in the Taranaki region, New Zealand. by Juniper, Zoë
 
Zoë Juniper i 
 
Risk assessment of the petroleum 
exploration and production industry from 





submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree  
of  
Master of Science 
at the  


















ii Zoë Juniper 
 
CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... VIII 
FRONTISPIECE ................................................................................................................... IX 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ..................................................................................................... X 
1.0 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 1 
1.1 CONTEXT OF THE STUDY ................................................................................... 1 
1.2 THESIS OBJECTIVES .......................................................................................... 2 
1.3 DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT (DRM) ................................................................ 3 
1.3.1 DRM in a global context .....................................................................................3 
1.3.2 DRM in a New Zealand context ..........................................................................5 
1.3.3 Volcanic hazards and volcanic risk assessment in DRM ...................................6 
1.4 PETROLEUM SECTOR ........................................................................................ 7 
1.4.1 The New Zealand petroleum sector ...................................................................9 
1.4.2 Volcanic risk assessment for the petroleum sector in New Zealand ............... 13 
1.5 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK .............................................................................. 14 
1.5.1 Risk context ..................................................................................................... 14 
1.5.2 Risk identification............................................................................................. 16 
1.5.3 Risk analysis .................................................................................................... 16 
1.5.4 Risk treatment ................................................................................................. 17 
1.6 THESIS STRUCTURE ........................................................................................ 17 
2.0 VOLCANIC HAZARDS OF THE MT. TARANAKI FOR THE PETROLEUM SECTOR
 ................................................................................................................................. 19 
2.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 19 
2.2 VOLCANIC HAZARDS ASSESSMENT ................................................................... 19 
2.2.1 Mt. Taranaki hazard assessment .................................................................... 19 
2.2.2 Bounding factors and scope of hazard assessment ....................................... 22 
2.3 SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT ............................................................................... 24 
2.3.1 Mt. Taranaki case study .................................................................................. 24 
2.3.2 Unrest phase for developed hazard scenarios ................................................ 26 
2.4 SUMMARY ....................................................................................................... 30 
3.0 IDENTIFICATION AND CATEGORISATION OF PETROLEUM ASSETS FOR 
VOLCANIC RISK ASSESSMENT ............................................................................ 31 
3.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 31 
3.2 METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................... 31 
3.3 IDENTIFICATION OF PETROLEUM SYSTEMS EXPOSED TO VOLCANIC HAZARDS IN 
TARANAKI ....................................................................................................... 32 
3.3.1 Bounding factors and scope of exposure assessment ................................... 33 
3.3.2 Petroleum lifecycle systems and asset identification for the Taranaki sector. 33 
3.4 CATEGORISATION ............................................................................................ 36 
3.4.1 Result .............................................................................................................. 36 
3.5 SUMMARY ....................................................................................................... 40 
 
Zoë Juniper iii 
 
4.0 DEVELOPING VULNERABILITY MODELS FOR THE PETROLEUM SECTOR FOR 
VOLCANIC RISK ASSESSMENT ............................................................................ 41 
4.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 41 
4.2 DEVELOPMENT OF VULNERABILITY MATRICES FOR THE PETROLEUM SECTOR FOR 
VOLCANIC RISK ............................................................................................... 41 
4.2.1 Methodology .................................................................................................... 41 
4.2.2 Quantifying vulnerability of petroleum assets .................................................. 43 
4.2.3 Literature review .............................................................................................. 45 
4.2.4 Expert elicitation .............................................................................................. 48 
4.2.5 Development of the final vulnerability models for the petroleum sector in 
Taranaki .......................................................................................................... 50 
4.3 RESULTS ........................................................................................................ 53 
4.4 SUMMARY ....................................................................................................... 53 
5.0 DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION OF A RISK ASSESSMENT FOR THE 
PETROLEUM SECTOR IN TARANAKI, NEW ZEALAND ........................................ 58 
5.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 58 
5.2 APPLICATION OF VOLCANIC RISK ASSESSMENT FOR PETROLEUM SECTOR IN 
TARANAKI, NEW ZEALAND ................................................................................ 58 
5.2.1 Overview of the approach used for the volcanic risk assessment for Mt. 
Taranaki .......................................................................................................... 58 
5.2.2 Application of the volcanic risk assessment for Taranaki petroleum sector ... 59 
5.2.3 Results and analysis of volcanic risk assessment results for Taranaki 
petroleum sector. ............................................................................................ 67 
5.2.4 Limitations ....................................................................................................... 70 
5.3 DEPENDENCIES OF THE PETROLEUM SECTOR .................................................. 72 
5.3.1 Development of a petroleum system fault tree ................................................ 73 
5.3.2 Dependency prioritisation workshop session .................................................. 73 
5.3.3 Dependencies analysis ................................................................................... 76 
5.4 SUMMARY ....................................................................................................... 78 
6.0 CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................................................... 79 
6.1 KEY FINDINGS ................................................................................................. 80 
6.2 RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................................................ 81 
6.3 FUTURE WORK ................................................................................................ 82 
7.0 REFERENCES ......................................................................................................... 83 
 
FIGURES 
Figure 1.1 Concept of National Resilience (MCDEM, 2016, p. 7). ................................................................. 4 
Figure 1.2 Potential volcanic hazards (U.S.G.S., n.d.). ................................................................................. 7 
Figure 1.3 The three sectors that make up the Petroleum industry (Energy Education, n.d.). ....................... 8 
Figure 1.4 Map of active Volcanoes (red) (Kerski, 2011), and known petroleum fields (green) (Lujala, Rod, 
& Thieme, 2007). .......................................................................................................................... 9 
 
 
iv Zoë Juniper 
 
Figure 1.5 Location of New Zealand’s producing oil and gas fields (red- gas; green-oil; turquoise-oil and 
condensate) from Petroleum Basin Explorer (GNS Science, n.d.). ............................................ 11 
Figure 1.6 Petroleum industry organisation chart, as of June 2017. ............................................................ 12 
Figure 1.7 Regulatory oversight schematic, see Appendix C (7.0A3.0) for full list and abbreviation guide. 
Blue represents legislation, Orange the regulating agencies, red the emergency management 
sector and green are private companies. ................................................................................... 12 
Figure 1.8 Critical infrastructure tier scheme for the petroleum sector adapted from G. Wilson (2015)....... 15 
Figure 1.9 Relationship between the Australian and New Zealand risk management process (left) and the 
UN natural hazard risk assessment framework (right). ............................................................... 16 
Figure 2.1 Diagram of Mt. Taranaki eruptive cycle from Zernack et al. (2009). ........................................... 21 
Figure 2.2 Volcanic Hazards of Taranaki simplified from (Neall & Alloway, 1996). Annotations of ash 
thickness are from the probabilistic modelling of ashfall for larger eruption sizes by Hurst and 
Smith (2010). Insert map of New Zealand showing the location of the Taranaki Region. .......... 21 
Figure 2.3 Hazard event tree for Mt. Taranaki volcanic eruption events and associated hazards. Colour 
circles represent stage commencement points; red triangles represent branch terminations. ... 25 
Figure 2.4 Potential future Mt. Taranaki eruption timeline, with possible hazard presence impacts. The VAL 
colours are aligned to the official VAL (Potter et al., 2014). Blue identify potential HSE concerns, 
orange- potential short-term disruption to petroleum sector, green – potential evacuation zone 
impacts, pink – potential physical impacts from volcanic hazards. ............................................. 27 
Figure 2.5 Mt. Taranaki - Small eruption scenario using hazard footprints, PDC blue, lahar red, and lava 
brown.......................................................................................................................................... 28 
Figure 2.6 Mt. Taranaki - Large eruption scenario using hazard footprints, PDC blue, lahar red, and lava 
brown.......................................................................................................................................... 29 
Figure 3.1 Petroleum product lifecycle. ....................................................................................................... 35 
Figure 3.2 Final physical petroleum asset groupings for volcanic risk assessment. .................................... 38 
Figure 3.3 Map of the various physical petroleum assets in the Taranaki region, shown by asset type. ..... 39 
Figure 4.1 Volcanic vulnerability assessment option adapted from G. Wilson et al. (2017). Green path 
highlights options used in this study to develop the volcanic vulnerability assessment for the 
petroleum sector. ........................................................................................................................ 42 
Figure 4.2 Conceptual model of the impact states for a volcanic vulnerability model of ash and tephra on 
buildings (G. Wilson et al., 2014). ............................................................................................... 42 
Figure 4.3 Relationship between revised HIMs (right) and volcanic hazards (left). ..................................... 44 
Figure 5.1 Small eruption hazard scenario with locations of the assets and their categories. Note – 
excluded asset categories are displayed with a white colour. .................................................... 61 
Figure 5.2 Risk assessment results for the small eruption hazard scenario, also showing the hazard layer. 
Note – assets are subcategories based on the final impact state assigned. .............................. 62 
Figure 5.3 Large eruption hazard scenario with locations of assets and their categories. Note – excluded 
asset categories are displayed with a white colour. .................................................................... 63 
Figure 5.4 Risk assessment results for the large eruption hazard scenario, also showing the hazard layer. 
Note – assets are subcategories based on the final impact state assigned. .............................. 64 
Figure 5.5 Combined hazard scenario (small and large eruptions in a short time period), with locations of 
assets and their categories. Note – excluded asset categories are displayed with a white colour.
 ................................................................................................................................................... 65 
Figure 5.6 Risk assessment results for the combined hazard scenario, also showing the hazard layer. Note 
– assets are subcategories based on the final impact state assigned. ....................................... 66 
Figure 5.7 Operational petroleum systems fault tree for volcanic hazards. ................................................. 74 
 
 
Zoë Juniper v 
 
TABLES 
Table 1.1 List of New Zealand gas producers (New Zealand Government, 2016). .................................... 10 
Table 1.2 Gas Curtailment bands for New Zealand (Critical Contingency Operator, 2017). ...................... 14 
Table 2.1 Compilation of possible volcanic hazards for Mt. Taranaki, see text in Section 2.2.3 for 
discussion on excluded hazards. ................................................................................................ 23 
Table 2.2 Mt. Taranaki eruption scenario data sources. ............................................................................. 26 
Table 3.1 Source data for identification of petroleum assets for the Taranaki sector. ................................ 34 
Table 3.2 Final physical asset categories for the petroleum industry for volcanic risk assessment. Photos 
and more detailed descriptions of asset categories are in Appendix A (7.0A1.0). ...................... 37 
Table 4.1 Four-level impact state model for the vulnerability models of petroleum assets in respect to 
volcanic hazards. Colours are aligned to the conceptual model presented in G. Wilson et al. 
(2014) (Figure 4.2). .................................................................................................................... 45 
Table 4.2 Summary of the literature review into vulnerability thresholds from similar events and hazards.
 ................................................................................................................................................... 47 
Table 4.3 Vulnerability model for the Well asset category (noting the resilience of this category). Mpa – 
MegaPascals. ............................................................................................................................. 54 
Table 4.4 Vulnerability model for the pipeline asset category (shading highlights lahars as the most 
damaging hazard impacts for this asset). kPa – Kilo Pascals .................................................... 55 
Table 4.5 Vulnerability model for the production facility asset category (shading highlights static pressure, 
lahar and suspended ash as most damaging hazard impacts for this asset). Psf- pounds per 
square foot, gm3 – grams per cubic meter. ................................................................................. 56 
Table 4.6 Vulnerability model of the storage tanks asset category (shading highlights static pressure and 
dynamic pressure as the three most damaging hazard impacts for this asset). ......................... 57 
Table 5.1 Assigned impact metric values for the asset categories and hazards. Colours relate to states 
given in Table 4.1, green- D0, red - D2, black - D3. ................................................................... 60 
Table 5.2 Impacted assets for the small eruption hazard scenario ............................................................ 67 
Table 5.3 Impacted assets for the large eruption hazard scenario ............................................................. 68 
Table 5.4 Impacted assets for the combined eruption hazard scenario ..................................................... 68 
Table 5.5 Comparison of the volcanic hazards that theoretically cause concern (disruption and damage) to 
petroleum assets.  Red – primary hazard impacts causing the most damage, orange are 
secondary hazard impacts causing damage. ............................................................................. 69 
Table 5.6 Table of uncertainties and their sources. .................................................................................... 70 
Table 5.7 Workshop outcomes of critical dependencies. ........................................................................... 75 
 
APPENDICES 
A1.0 APPENDIX A – ASSET CLASSIFICATION EXAMPLES ....................................... 100 
A1.1 WELLS (WELL-HEADS AND STACKS) – TYPE 1 .................................................. 100 
A1.2 PIPELINES – TYPE 2 ...................................................................................... 102 
A1.2.1 Pipelines – Aerial subgroup crossings – Type 2A ......................................... 104 
A1.2.2 Pipelines – Above Ground Assets – Type 2B and 3 ..................................... 106 
A1.3 PRODUCTION FACILITIES – TYPE 3 ................................................................. 109 
A1.4 STORAGE TANKS – TYPE 4 ............................................................................ 117 
A1.5 BUILDINGS – TYPE 5 ...................................................................................... 122 
A1.6 INDUSTRIAL USERS – TYPE 6 ......................................................................... 125 
 
 
vi Zoë Juniper 
 
A2.0 APPENDIX B – EXERCISE PAHU ......................................................................... 126 
A3.0 APPENDIX C – LEGISLATION AND REGULATIONS ........................................... 129 
A3.1 NOTES ON THE AS/NZS AND API STANDARDS ................................................ 130 
A4.0 APPENDIX D – EXAMPLES OF ASH FALL DISTRIBUTION FORECASTS.......... 131 
A5.0 APPENDIX E – EXPERT ELICITATION WORKSHOP ........................................... 137 
A5.1 AGENDA ....................................................................................................... 137 
A5.2 PRESENTATION SLIDES .................................................................................. 138 
A5.3 PARTICIPANTS ............................................................................................... 146 
A5.4 FEEDBACK FOLLOW THE WORKSHOP ............................................................... 146 
A5.5 OUTCOMES THE WORKSHOP .......................................................................... 147 
 
APPENDIX FIGURES 
Figure A1.1 Iconic “nodding donkey” well .................................................................................................... 100 
Figure A1.2 “Christmas tree” wellhead stack ............................................................................................... 101 
Figure A1.3 Multiple “Christmas tree” wellhead stacks and associated gathering pipelines and monitoring 
equipment ................................................................................................................................. 101 
Figure A1.4 Network map of the FirstGas transmission pipeline in NZ (FirstGas, n.d). ............................... 104 
Figure A1.5 Private access bridge carrying various pipelines suspended above the Waitara River. ........... 105 
Figure A1.6 Three pipelines are crossing the Piakau Stream, using trestle crossing construction style. ..... 105 
Figure A1.7 Intelligent pigging pipeline inspection diagram (Intertek, n.d.). ................................................. 107 
Figure A1.8 Above ground Pipeline assets - mixing/in-take point. ............................................................... 108 
Figure A1.9 Mains power junction box. ........................................................................................................ 110 
Figure A1.10 Heat exchange tower with air intake value. .............................................................................. 110 
Figure A1.11 Close-up photo of an air intake on heat exchange showing the honeycomb filter. ................... 111 
Figure A1.12 Air intake for cooling compressor engines housed in soundproof unit (smaller production site).
 ................................................................................................................................................. 111 
Figure A1.13 Multiple air intakes for cooling systems on a larger production site. ......................................... 112 
Figure A1.14 Air intake for larger scale heat exchange units. ........................................................................ 112 
Figure A1.15 Photo showing the complex larger scale production facilities with many kms of pipeline, flare 
stack to the left distance and two cooling towers to the centre-right. ........................................ 113 
Figure A1.16 Further examples of air compressors at a larger production site that are vulnerable to air quality
 ................................................................................................................................................. 113 
Figure A1.17 Panoramic view of a larger production site with ongoing work showing a complex industrial 
workplace that sits within a zone that has high to intermediate risks of lahars and therefore 
sediment burial, dynamic pressure as well as ash fall hazards. ............................................... 114 
Figure A1.18 Complex electronics computer control unit that would be sensitive to fine ash damage note 
limited dust filter capacity on the doors of the cabinet. ............................................................. 114 
Figure A1.19 Air compressor unit for the various pneumatic values around the production site. This unit is 
sensitive to the air quality and should be housed in a building with ash-lock doorways to reduce 
fine ash invasion. ...................................................................................................................... 115 
Figure A1.20 Methanol control units, another example of equipment that is very sensitive to a fine ash and 
requires electricity to operate. If compromised, the whole site becomes impacted. ................. 115 
Figure A1.21 Omata Tank Farm near Port Taranaki (14 tanks in total). ........................................................ 118 
 
Zoë Juniper vii 
 
Figure A1.22 Fixed roof storage tanks at Port Taranaki................................................................................. 118 
Figure A1.23 Paritutu Tank Farm near Port Taranaki (five condensate floating roof storage tanks). ............. 119 
Figure A1.24 Onsite closed lid small water storage tank. .............................................................................. 119 
Figure A1.25 Large onsite water storage tank - open top. ............................................................................. 119 
Figure A1.26 Onsite open, clean water storage tanks required for fire suppression. ..................................... 120 
Figure A1.27 Smaller open, clean water storage tanks for fire suppression. ................................................. 120 
Figure A1.28 Small production site close roof storage tanks. ........................................................................ 121 
Figure A1.29 Large production site floating roof storage tanks. ..................................................................... 121 
Figure A1.30 Production site waste-water tank and oil/condensate storage horizontal tanks. ....................... 121 
Figure A1.31 Onsite accommodation and welfare support structures. ........................................................... 123 
Figure A1.32 Converted storage tank control room. ...................................................................................... 123 
Figure A1.33 Office buildings (from Google Street View). .............................................................................. 124 
Figure A4.1 Large eruption height (15 km), small volume (0.01 km3) 0600 18 September 2017 ................ 131 
Figure A4.2 Large eruption height (15 km), small volume (0.01 km3) 1200 18 September 2017 ................ 132 
Figure A4.3 Large eruption height (15 km), small volume (0.01 km3) 18:00 18 September 2017 ............... 133 
Figure A4.4 Large eruption height (15 km), small volume (0.01 km3) 06:00 19 September 2017 ............... 134 
Figure A4.5 Large eruption height (15 km), small volume (0.01 km3) 12:00 19 September 2017 ............... 135 
Figure A4.6 Large eruption height (15 km), large volume (1km3) 18:00 19 September 2017 ...................... 136 
 
APPENDIX TABLES 




viii Zoë Juniper 
 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis considered the impacts of a future Mt. Taranaki eruption to the petroleum sector, 
with a focus on the gas supply. New Zealand’s petroleum sector is in the Taranaki region, with 
Mt. Taranaki dominating the landscape. Mt. Taranaki is an active andesitic stratovolcano that 
is in a quiescence period, with a 50 - 81% chance of eruption within the next 50 years. The 
research question posed was: what will happen to New Zealand’s petroleum sector and gas 
supply from a future Mt. Taranaki eruption? 
A risk assessment framework was developed for the petroleum sector because of volcanic 
hazards, including literature review, expert elicitation, and geospatial information systems 
(GIS). The volcanic risk assessment for the petroleum sector combined a volcanic hazard 
assessment, an exposure assessment of physical petroleum assets, and a vulnerability 
assessment of petroleum assets to volcanic hazards. The framework was applied to the 
Taranaki petroleum sector as a case study. The thesis aimed to produce a holistic risk 
assessment methodology that can be repeated as data improves, probabilistic hazard 
modelling is completed, or detailed site-specific studies are realised.  
This research has developed a risk assessment framework, including vulnerability models for 
the four-key asset categories of the petroleum sector to volcanic hazards, wells, pipelines, 
production facilities and storage tanks. Additionally, critical interdependencies for the 
petroleum sector have been identified. Findings of this research indicated a large future Mt. 
Taranaki eruption would likely cause widespread volcanic hazard impacts to the petroleum 
sector. This has the potential to cause a significant national emergency, due to the loss of the 
gas supply as a critical lifeline. Enforcement of emergency contingency legislation leaves only 
4-6 days of gas supply in the gas network, with no redundancy for the disruption of the 
extraction sector if all the petroleum sector is disrupted. Major damage to physical assets from 
volcanic hazards requires lengthy recovery periods, beyond the 5-6 days of available supply. 
This research assists the New Zealand petroleum sector to understand the hazards and risk 
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ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY 
 
APA 6 Publication manual of the American Psychological Association 
[APA] (6th ed.). The referencing style used for this thesis. 
Ashfall Volcanic ashfall is tephra of < 2mm in diameter (Brown et al., 
2015; Deligne & Wilson, 2015). 
Block-and-ash flow 
deposits 
The deposits of pyroclastic density currents generated by lava 
dome collapse (Deligne & Wilson, 2015; Sigurdsson, Houghton, 
McNutt, Rymer, & Stix, 2015). 
Debris avalanche A rapid and catastrophic mass movement, originating from a 
landslide that may travel horizontally several times the fall height 
(Sigurdsson et al., 2015). 
Debris flow A water-saturated mixture of debris that moves downslope 
under the influence of gravity, in which the solid and liquid 
fractions are approximately equal volumetrically and in which 
the two fractions move downstream approximately in unison 
(Sigurdsson et al., 2015). 
Disaster risk The potential disaster losses, in lives, health status, livelihoods, 
assets and services, which could occur to a particular 




The systematic process of using administrative directives, 
organisations, and operational skills and capacities to 
implement strategies, policies and improved coping capacities 
to lessen the adverse impacts of hazards and the possibility of 
disaster (UNISDR, 2009). 
Fragility functions A quantitative based model that provides a robust relationship 
between volcanic impact and hazard intensity using 




A descriptive of the intensity of a volcanic hazard at a location 
using a range of properties that convey the intensity but is 
independent of vulnerability or fragility functions. For example, 
the temperature range in °C (G. Wilson et al., 2017). 
Mt. Taranaki The topographic name for the latest cone within the Egmont 
Volcanic Centre, also known as Egmont Volcano or Taranaki 
Volcano in the scientific literature (Alloway, Neall, & Vucetich, 
1995). 
Lahar An Indonesian term most commonly defined as a rapidly flowing, 
gravity-driven mixture of rock, debris, and water from a volcano. 
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A lahar can vary in character with time and distance downstream 
(Sigurdsson et al., 2015).  
Lifelines Lifeline infrastructure includes the transport, energy, 
communications and water services sectors that are 
fundamental to communities and economy (New Zealand 
Lifelines Council, 2017). 
PEPANZ Petroleum Exploration & Production Association of New 
Zealand. The upstream petroleum sectors political lobby group. 
Petroleum sector Refers to the upstream petroleum sector for this document, 
comprising the assets, staff, processes and governance 
involved in the exploration, extraction and processing of raw 
petroleum or hydrocarbons.  
Petroleum Sector - 
down-stream  
Refining and distribution of petroleum products. For example, 
Liquid Petroleum Gas (LGP) is used to produce propane, butane 
and isobutane. Oil is refined into products such as transport 
fuels, naphtha or bitumen (Schlumberger, n.d). LNG products 
(liquified methane/ethane (natural gas)) is not produced in NZ. 
Petroleum Sector – 
mid-stream  
Transmission and storage of petroleum products 
(Schlumberger, n.d).  
Petroleum Sector – up-
stream  
Petroleum exploration, extraction & onsite processing/treatment 
and separation of raw petroleum types of oil, gas and 
condensate (Schlumberger, n.d).  
Pyroclastic density 
current (PDC) 
Hot eruption-derived particulate-gas density current that moves 
laterally along the ground. This term encompasses pyroclastic 
flows and pyroclastic surges (Sigurdsson et al., 2015). 
Tephra Tephra is a term used for volcanic material created via magma 
fragmentation (Brown et al., 2015). 
Volcanic alert level 
(VAL) 
The New Zealand Volcanic alert system that has levels 0-5 to 
notify the public of the scientific activity of volcanoes (Potter, 
Jolly, Neall, Johnston, & Scott, 2014). 
Volcanic explosivity 
index (VEI) 
An eight-point scale used to estimate the explosive magnitude 
for volcanic eruptions globally based on the volume of erupted 
material, the height of the eruption plume and the duration of the 
eruption (Newhall & Self, 1982). 
Volcanic hazard A potential threat to humans and their welfare arising from a 
volcano that may cause loss of life, injury, property damage, and 
other community losses or damage (UNISDR, 2009). 
Volcanic impact The damage or disruption caused by volcanic hazards (G. 
Wilson et al., 2017). 
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Vulnerability The characteristics and circumstances of a community, system 
or asset that make it susceptible to the damaging effects of a 
hazard (UNISDR, 2009). 
Vulnerability matrices A quantitative based model that provides a robust relationship 
between volcanic impact and hazard intensity, using a matrix to 
represent the theoretical response of the physical assets to 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 CONTEXT OF THE STUDY 
Volcanoes represent one of the most damaging although less frequent natural hazards that 
impact human societies and associated critical lifeline infrastructures (Loughlin, Sparks, 
Brown, Vye-Brown, & Jenkins, 2015). Globally and historically, a wide range of volcano types, 
sizes and associated volcanic hazards have impacted human societies (Loughlin et al., 2015).  
Population number and footprint increases of human habitation have increased the number of 
societies that now live in areas vulnerable to volcanic hazards.  As these societies have 
developed, the lifelines services and infrastructure have increased in technological complexity, 
often without resilience to the infrequent volcanic hazards (G. Wilson, Wilson, Deligne, & Cole, 
2014). Volcanic hazard impacts on critical lifeline services are affected by the size, style and 
duration of the volcanic eruption along with the topography of the area. Additionally, the 
exposed assets and dependent populations influence the vulnerability of the critical lifeline 
services. Volcanic risk assessments combine these three elements in a structured approach 
to understand the potential impacts of future eruptions and inform risk reduction and readiness 
actions for the impacted lifeline services and populations (G. Wilson et al., 2014).  
In New Zealand, many lifelines are exposed to volcanic hazards, with the Taranaki region 
being a key area for national lifelines. The Taranaki Volcanic Succession comprises of four 
volcanoes; the youngest is Egmont Volcano/ Mt. Taranaki (Alloway et al., 1995; Neall, Stewart, 
& Smith, 1986). Mt. Taranaki has shaped the Taranaki landscape over the last ~130,000 years, 
through at least 228 eruptions, the last only 150 years ago (Damaschke, Cronin, Holt, 
Bebbington, & Hogg, 2017). Mt. Taranaki is an active 2518 m high andesitic stratovolcano that 
is in a quiescence period, with up to an 81% chance of eruption within the next 50 years (Green, 
Bebbington, Cronin, & Jones, 2013). Despite this, perceptions of volcanic risk are very low 
among many Taranaki locals (Finnis, Johnston, & Paton, 2004). Mt. Taranaki has produced a 
range of eruption sizes, styles and volcanic hazards throughout its history, from small effusive 
eruptions to large explosive eruptions (Neall et al., 1986). Volcanic hazards range from fine 
ash through to large debris avalanches, with these hazards reaching distances many 10’s km 
away and ash distributed over 100’s km (Loughlin et al., 2015). Additionally, Taranaki region 
has been impacted by distal ash deposits from nearby Tongariro Volcanic Centre, 140 km to 
the east. New Zealand’s upstream petroleum sector is strategically placed around the Taranaki 
region, comprising both on-shore and off-shore extraction and production facilities and a 
network of petroleum pipelines (Hull, 1996). All New Zealand’s critical lifeline gas service is 
extracted from the Taranaki region (New Zealand Government, 2017). The gas provides an 
energy source for electricity generation stations, large industrial users, businesses and 
domestic gas supplies (New Zealand Government, 2017).  
There are large gaps in knowledge about how volcanic hazards impact petroleum sector 
infrastructure (Hull, 1996; Johnston et al., 2011). A literature review of published work identified 
only one documented volcanic eruption having impacted a petroleum fuel storage terminal and 
pipeline (Redoubt Volcano, Alaska, 1990 and 2009) (Bull & Buurman, 2013; Dorava & Meyer, 
1994).  The active nature of Mt. Taranaki means New Zealand’s petroleum sector is likely to 
be impacted by a future eruption.  Therefore, understanding what the likely volcanic hazards 
are and impacts is a priority for New Zealand’s critical lifeline sector, which can be achieved 
through raising awareness and undertaking a volcanic risk assessment. This research aims to 
assist the New Zealand upstream petroleum sector to understand the hazards and risks from 
a future Mt. Taranaki eruption, and thus inform potential risk reduction and readiness actions.  
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1.2 THESIS OBJECTIVES 
The overall goal of this work is to develop a risk assessment framework for the petroleum 
sector for volcanic hazards, using the Taranaki region in New Zealand as a case study. The 
objectives of this thesis are to: 
1. Develop a methodology for volcanic risk assessment framework of the 
upstream petroleum sector.  
The initial objective uses standard risk assessment approaches to develop a 
volcanic risk assessment framework for the petroleum sector through the following 
methodological steps:  
a) Hazard assessment (Chapter 2). Past eruptions and analogues of 
similar volcano types indicate the likely hazards and their geographical 
extent. Analysis of the locations of sector assets may determine if some 
hazards are irrelevant to the study based on distance. Maps are compiled 
or constructed for the area and hazards in consideration, and hazard 
scenarios developed to use for the risk assessment.  
 
b) Exposure assessment (Chapter 3).  For the petroleum sector, 
methodologies used to complete the exposure assessment include a 
literature review, expert elicitation and sector engagement, to understand 
the assets and petroleum system. The development of a system map 
helps identify the level of study, in this case, a holistic approach. The 
identification and assignment of categories of the physical assets, based 
on their functionality completes this step.  
 
c) Vulnerability assessment (Chapter 4).  Vulnerability models combine 
the identified hazards and asset categories to identify the hazard intensity 
metrics and thresholds for each asset type. The development of the 
models uses a combination of literature research and expert elicitation. 
For the Taranaki case study, a theoretical approach is taken, due to the 
lack of previous exposure of the petroleum sector to volcanic hazards. 
 
d) Risk assessment (Chapter 5). Risk assessment development combines 
the hazard, exposure and vulnerability assessments for the petroleum 
sector. The developed vulnerability models are used to assign damage 
impact values to the various asset categories and overlapped with the 
hazard scenarios to provide a deterministic risk assessment. Additionally, 
the operational systems and subsystems of the petroleum sector are 
mapped out using expert elicitation and literature review, to produce a 
fault map and identify dependencies on other lifelines.   
 
2. Apply the framework to Taranaki as a case study.  
The second objective utilises volcanic eruption hazard scenarios for the Mt. 
Taranaki to undertake a physical asset risk assessment of the upstream petroleum 
sector in the Taranaki region. At each step of the risk assessment framework the 
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scope of the project is documented and justified for the Taranaki case study, noting 
where exclusions, inclusions or limitations are imposed or encountered. 
 
3. Develop volcanic risk recommendations for building resiliency in the 
upstream petroleum sector through the risk assessment process.  
The third objective considers recommendations for improving resilience, drawn 
from the case study, for the use of the scientific communities and policymakers to 
recognise key focus areas for future work. The experiential process of this thesis 
provides scientific knowledge of volcanic hazards to the petroleum sector. 
Additionally, the science community and Taranaki civil defence gain insight into the 
operational workings and challenges of the petroleum sector.  
 
1.3 DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT (DRM) 
Disaster Risk Management (DRM) is: “The systematic process of using administrative 
directives, organisations, and operational skills and capacities to implement strategies, policies 
and improved coping capacities to lessen the adverse impacts of hazards and the possibility 
of disaster” (UNISDR, 2009, p.10). 
The 4R’s approach is acknowledged globally in the field of emergency management and 
disaster risk reduction when considering how disasters and disruptions impact society (Rovins 
et al., 2015). The 4R’s approach (Reduction, Readiness, Response and Recovery) is used to 
plan and prepare for, respond to, and recover from disruption or disasters from natural and 
human-made events (Coppola, 2011). Identification and risk assessments of hazards underpin 
any actions or decision-making which impacted communities or organisations will make in the 
4R’s approach (Rovins et al., 2015). Volcanic risk assessment can be used to assist the 
petroleum sector in identifying and quantifying risks. The petroleum sector uses such 
information to improve their resilience to future Mt. Taranaki eruptions by developing and 
prioritising reduction and readiness actions and developing response and recovery planning 
for critical petroleum infrastructure. 
1.3.1 DRM in a global context 
In 2015 the United Nations General Assembly endorsed The Sendai Framework for Disaster 
Risk Reduction 2015-2030, setting out seven global targets and four priorities for action for 
pledged governments (Aitsi-Selmi, Egawa, Sasaki, Wannous, & Murray, 2015; Wahlström, 
2015). Priority 1 aims to improve understanding disaster risk and states:  
Disaster risk management should be based on an understanding of disaster risk in all 
its dimensions of vulnerability, capacity, exposure of persons and assets, hazard 
characteristics and the environment. Such knowledge can be used for risk assessment, 
prevention, mitigation, preparedness and response (UNISDR, 2015, p. 14).  
New Zealand has joined over ninety other UN member states adopting the Sendai Framework 
and is working towards goals that include developing a new National Disaster Resilience 
Strategy (Wahlström, 2015). A key aspect of this strategy is understanding disaster risk and 
how it impacts society, by considering six critical areas of society that disasters impact. Of 
 
 
4 Zoë Juniper 
 
interest to this study is the “Resilience of the Built Environment” concept area, which includes 
the provision of essential services, such as energy (Figure 1.1) (MCDEM, 2016). 
 
Figure 1.1 Concept of National Resilience (MCDEM, 2016, p. 7). 
Human-made systems and networks built to facilitate the distribution of goods, services and 
information that human populations rely on for everyday lives are known as critical lifeline 
services or lifelines infrastructure (Giovinazzi et al., 2016; Platt, 1991). Lifeline services vary 
between countries (MCDEM, 2017). Examples of lifelines include: 
• water  
• energy  
• transport  
• health  
• food  
• financial services  
• communications  
• governance. 
The objective of every country is to improve the resilience of their critical infrastructure to 
disasters to reduce the impact on these essential services when disasters occur (Coppola, 
2011; O'Rourke, 2007). The ability to measure resilience remains elusive due to the complex 
nature of predicting a reaction by multiple dynamic components to a future event (Norris, 
Stevens, Pfefferbaum, Wyche, & Pfefferbaum, 2008). However, drawing on links between four 
key characteristics of risk and resilience, Mitchell and Harris (2012) concluded that systems 
that can manage risk effectively are more likely to be resilient. Many critical infrastructure 
service providers are represented as a system of connected components, each with 
vulnerabilities and exposure thresholds. Risk assessment processes are then used as a proxy 
for measuring resilience.  
Major disasters in recent decades have tested lifeline infrastructure across the globe, leading 
to extensive research around lifeline vulnerabilities and the importance of lifelines in DRM 
(UNISDR, 2017). Hazard risk assessment studies consider a range of impacts to lifelines from 
direct physical impacts, indirect impacts, interdependencies between lifelines, or economic 
loss. Interdependencies between lifeline services are recognised as a challenge, as many 
lifeline services share network locations, with systems reliant on and influencing each other 
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(O'Rourke, 2007; Reed, Kapur, & Christie, 2009). For example, water pumps and 
telecommunications both require electricity to work. DRM needs to consider complex industries 
such as the oil and gas sector when undertaking risk assessments and planning resilient critical 
lifeline infrastructures for communities.  
1.3.2 DRM in a New Zealand context 
New Zealand’s DRM framework consists of the Civil Defence and Emergency Management 
(CDEM) Act 2002, supported by a CDEM Strategy, Plan, and Guideline documentation based 
on the 4R’s (MCDEM, n.d.). New Zealand is divided into 16 regional groups that follow local 
and regional council boundaries; each group is responsible for identifying and understanding 
hazards and risks for their region and preparing a plan to manage the hazards and risks based 
on the 4R’s (MCDEM, n.d.). Lifelines form a key part of both the regional plans and the national 
plans, where lifelines such as electricity and gas are national networks, while water networks 
are regionally managed resources. The overarching Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management Act states: “Every lifeline utility must ensure that it can function to the fullest 
possible extent, even though this may be at a reduced level, during and after an emergency” 
(Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002, 2017, Section 60). 
Provisional high-level work has already been undertaken in this area in New Zealand to assess 
the vulnerability of the country’s lifelines (New Zealand Lifelines Council, 2017). This study 
compiles the regional plans into a single national level plan. Currently, the New Zealand 
national lifeline services recognise four high-level critical infrastructure areas: water, transport, 
energy and telecommunications (MCDEM, 2017; New Zealand Lifelines Council, 2017). These 
areas can be broken down into sub-sectors: 
• water 
o water supply (extraction and distribution) 
o wastewater (distribution, processing and disposal) 
o stormwater (distribution, processing and disposal) 
• energy  
o fuel (road, marine and aviation fuels) 
o electricity (generation, transmission and distribution) 
o gas (extraction, transmission and distribution) 
• transport 
o road  
o rail  





o mobile and landline telephone networks 
o internet providers 
New Zealand lifeline groups have traditionally focused on seismic resilience with both the 
Wellington and Alpine fault anticipated to rupture (Wellington Lifelines Group, 2012). Further 
research focused on seismic risk following the Christchurch Earthquakes (2010 and 2011) and 
Kaikoura Earthquake (2016)  (Gerstenberger, McVerry, Rhoades, & Stirling, 2014; Kongar, 
Giovinazzi, & Rossetto, 2016; Robinson & Rosser, 2017; Taylor, Chang, Elwood, Seville, & 
Brunsdon, 2012). Volcanic and tsunami hazards are now additional areas of focus, with the 
Auckland Volcanic Field and the East Coast Tsunami risk in the spotlight. Gaps in knowledge 
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exist of complex industrial sectors such as Petroleum, which are run by corporate 
organisations or private companies, and who are challenging to engage with (New Zealand 
Lifelines Council, 2017). Additional gaps for New Zealand’s lifelines include regional volcanic 
assessments outside Auckland, volcanic hazard modelling, impacts of volcanic hazards, 
lifeline interdependencies, and cascading hazards (New Zealand Lifelines Council, 2017).  
1.3.3 Volcanic hazards and volcanic risk assessment in DRM 
Volcanic risk, while being less likely than other hazards, has large consequences, with even 
small eruptions such as Agung Volcano (2017) and Eyjafjallajökull Volcano (2010) causing 
widespread disruption. Globally over 600 million people and the associated infrastructure that 
support those communities have the potential to be impacted by volcanic hazards (Sparks, 
Aspinall, Crosweller, & Hincks, 2012).  In many instances, volcanoes have a limited but 
valuable warning period as unrest develops into an eruption (Coppola, 2011). Technology has 
advanced to improve monitoring and warning systems, especially for volcanoes close to 
human habitation (Sparks, 2003). However, even with warning systems, communities that live 
in the shadow of volcanoes face long-term disruption and economic losses. Eruptions have 
resulted in disruption, damage and destruction to services, buildings and infrastructure, as well 
as loss of life (Jenkins, Spence, Fonseca, Solidum, & Wilson, 2014; G. Wilson et al., 2014; T. 
M. Wilson et al., 2012).  
Volcanoes produce a wide range of hazards that vary between volcanoes and eruptions 
(Figure 1.2), causing difficulty in predicting future volcanic hazards from individual volcanoes. 
Volcanic hazards are the geological processes produced during an eruption that has the 
potential to disrupt, damage or kill humans. Not all volcanic hazards are produced in every 
eruption and vary according to eruption size and style, linked to the geochemistry (Sigurdsson 
et al., 2015). Some volcanic hazards are limited spatially, such as andesitic lavas, while ash 
can travel many hundreds of kilometres and cause widespread disruption to society 
(Sigurdsson et al., 2015). For example, in April and May 2010 Eyjafjallajökull eruption, Iceland, 
shut down the European airspaces and disrupted global travellers for some weeks, causing 
sizeable economic losses to business globally (Lund & Benediktsson, 2011).  
Volcano eruptions are measured using an eight-level scale that includes a volcanic explosive 
index (VEI) that communicates the size of volcanic eruption based on the plume height and 
volumes of tephra produced (Newhall & Self, 1982). The larger the eruption size and footprint, 
generally the higher the risk of impacts, however, smaller eruptions occur with higher 
frequency and are equally capable of substantial disruption and fatalities (Loughlin et al., 
2015). Associated with the size is a description of the eruption type or classification from 
Hawaiian through to Ultra-Plinian, and the magmas geochemical type (Sigurdsson et al., 
2015). 
For countries with volcanoes, understanding the distribution of volcanoes, their potential 
eruption type, style, and size in regions where the volcanic hazards can have direct or indirect 
impacts on human lives is a priority (Loughlin et al., 2015).  Risk assessments of volcanic 
hazards help those countries to reduce risk reduction and increase the readiness of their 
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Figure 1.2 Potential volcanic hazards (U.S.G.S., n.d.). 
 
1.4 PETROLEUM SECTOR 
Energy is an essential part of modern society, encompassing transport fuels, electricity and 
gas. Fossil fuels (petroleum and coal) are fundamental for modern energy needs, contributing 
to electricity generation (coal and gas), road fuels (oil) and gas (piped or bottled). The use of 
petroleum as an energy source rose rapidly in the 1850’s and has since grown into a readily 
available global commodity, replacing limited access and use of alternatives such as whale or 
penguin oil. The world currently consumes approximately 4.3 Mt (metric ton) of oil per day and 
3.6 bcm (billion cubic metres) of gas, presenting over 50% of the world energy supply source 
(International Energy Agency, 2017a). Most nations formally recognise the need to move away 
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from burning high carbon-emitting fuels such as coal and oil to pursue near-zero-emission 
energy systems, reduce pollution, and slow anthropogenic-driven climate change. However, 
petroleum is woven into the fabric of society and global economies, and will likely remain a 
lifeline service in the global energy mix on the medium to long-term, notably with transition 
fuels such as gas (International Energy Agency, 2017b).  
The petroleum sector encompasses exploration for oil and gas resources, extraction, 
processing, distribution and finally retail sales of final products, divided into three sub-sectors 
(Figure 1.3). Petroleum resources are extracted from “fields” or reservoirs buried 3-4 km below 
the surface that take many millions of years to develop (Allen & Allen, 2013). Accumulations 
of organic material are buried in anaerobic environments and maturate at great depths and 
high temperatures in sedimentary basins, eventually expelling oil, gas and condensate into 
surrounding porous rocks (Allen & Allen, 2013). These accumulations are then trapped by 
sedimentary structures or non-permeable rocks in reservoirs or fields until discovered and 
extracted by oil companies.  
 
Figure 1.3 The three sectors that make up the Petroleum industry (Energy Education, n.d.). 
Rapid development and exploration of petroleum were initially undertaken with less concern 
for health and safety and natural hazard risk. However, the petroleum sector has since 
developed comprehensive risk management systems for their operations, especially after 
industrial disasters such as Deepwater Horizon (2010), Gulf War (1991), and Piper Alpha 
(1988) and exposure to natural hazards such as Hurricane Katrina (2004) that disrupted the 
sector and caused damage (American Society of Civil & Wind-Induced Forces Task, 2011; 
Bratspies, 2011; Brinkley, 2007; Hull, 1996; Reader & O’Connor, 2014; Skogdalen & Vinnem, 
2012). These disasters also brought about closer public scrutiny and expectations of higher 
standards, enforced through legislation and regulatory oversight (Bratspies, 2011).  As 
exposure to natural hazards causes increasing impacts on the industrial sectors such as 
petroleum, review the less frequent hazards, such as volcanic eruptions to understand the 
importance of risk (Krausmann, Cozzani, Salzano, & Renni, 2011). However, only one 
example of volcanic hazards impacting the petroleum sector was found during the literature 
review, Drift River Terminal, Alaska (see Section 4.2.3), highlighting the infrequency of volcanic 
hazard impacts on this sector. Volcanoes and modern petroleum extraction industries rarely 
coexist, with volcanism following the tectonic plate boundaries and petroleum resources 
generated in mature sedimentary basins away from active deformation zones (Figure 1.4). 
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Figure 1.4 Map of active Volcanoes (red) (Kerski, 2011), and known petroleum fields (green) (Lujala, Rod, & 
Thieme, 2007). 
1.4.1 The New Zealand petroleum sector  
The Taranaki region of New Zealand is the only petroleum-producing basin in New Zealand, 
supplying all New Zealand’s gas supply. The Petroleum sector contributes $2.5 billion annually 
to New Zealand’s Gross Domestic Product, making it the largest maritime revenue generating 
sector for New Zealand (Petroleum Exploration and Production Association of New Zealand, 
2017). While New Zealand has an active petroleum upstream sector located in the Taranaki 
region, it is tiny on a global scale, producing just 0.12% of the world’s energy production 
(International Energy Agency, 2017a). New Zealand produces 78% of its own energy needs, 
a total of 718 PJ (Petajoules) of Energy, with oil and gas accounting for 178 PJ (New Zealand 
Government, 2017). New Zealand produces 82 PJ of oil, with an additional 355 PJ of light 
crude imported to meet the demands from transport fuels (New Zealand Government, 2017). 
Most of the oil and condensate extracted in New Zealand is exported overseas as the local 
refinery Marsden Point is unable to process the heavier oils from Taranaki’s reservoirs.  
New Zealand produces enough gas to meet all of its domestic demand, with 100% of gas 
extracted in the Taranaki region; 84% from just four fields (Figure 1.5) (New Zealand 
Government, 2017). The extracted gas is used: 
• to produce electricity, for example by Stratford or Huntly Power stations 
• by large industrial users such as Methanex to produce methanol 
• by the dairy industry to process the milk 
• by commercial users such as the hospitality and medical sector  
• by residential users for heating and cooking.  
The “dry” gas is distributed around the North Island by the First Gas transmission pipeline into 
local distribution networks owned by third parties. The petroleum sector uses the gas to 
generate Liquid Petroleum Gas (LPG) products (liquefied propane and butane, which is then 
transported to the South Island or exported and used for bottling for BBQ’s or domestic bottled 
gas supplies for cooking or heating, or process fuels for industrial users. At present New 
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Zealand cannot import “dry” gas from abroad, only LPG, and is too remote for cross-border 
gas pipelines like in Europe. The New Zealand gas market is isolated from the rest of the world, 
which combined with the single geographical region for all gas extraction makes it a vulnerable 
lifeline sector. 
New Zealand’s first petroleum discovery was in 1865 on New Plymouth Beach, with modern 
commercial production following the onshore Kapuni gas-condensate discovery in 1959, just 
22 km from Mt. Taranaki vent. Following this a large offshore petroleum discovery was made 
in 1969. The Maui production commenced in 1979 making New Zealand self-sufficient in gas 
resources (Petroleum Exploration and Production Association of New Zealand, 2017). New 
Zealand currently has 25 producing oil and gas permits/licences around the onshore and 
offshore Taranaki Region, where all onshore facilities are within approximately 55 km of Mt. 
Taranaki (Figure 1.5). There are a total of nine gas production companies in New Zealand, 
processing petroleum at thirteen production facilities (Table 1.1) from twenty different gas 
producing fields or reservoirs all located in the Taranaki Region (Critical Contingency Operator, 
2017; New Zealand Government, 2016). Much of New Zealand’s oil production is transported 
by pipeline or road around the Taranaki region and stored in the New Plymouth Tank farms 
before being exported to overseas refineries.  
Table 1.1 List of New Zealand gas producers (New Zealand Government, 2016). 
Field Operator 2016 Net 
Production % 
Pohokura Shell Exploration NZ 37.0 
Maui Shell Taranaki Ltd. 19.2 
Mangahewa/McKee Todd Energy 14.2 
Kupe Origin Energy 13.0 
Ngatoro/Kowhai/Turangi Greymouth Gas NZ 9.8 
Kapuni Vector Gas Trading/Todd Energy 5.9 
Rimu/Kauri Westside New Zealand 0.4 
Cheal/Sidewinder TAG Oil (NZ) 0.4 
A systems approach is necessary to understand the petroleum production industry in New 
Zealand. The sector is a complex one both in the organisational space and systems processes. 
Figure 1.6 takes a snapshot view of the organisations involved in the industry from the 
regulatory oversight agencies to the many companies involved in exploration, production, 
distribution, storage, processing and some of the contracted companies. Regulatory agencies 
operationalise legislations that govern the petroleum sector, shown in Figure 1.7. The primary 
legislation, regulations and standards cover various aspects of the industry; these are 
summarised in Appendix A (7.0A3.0) and include: 
• minerals rights,  
• construction and design standards,  
• health and safety,  
• business continuity,  
• emergency management,  
• environmental impacts on air, water, ground, 
• industrial operations, 
• products.  
 
 
Zoë Juniper 11 
 
  
Figure 1.5 Location of New Zealand’s producing oil and gas fields (red- gas; green-oil; turquoise-oil and 
condensate) from Petroleum Basin Explorer (GNS Science, n.d.). 
With all legislation, regular revisions occur based on new knowledge and improved working 
practices. Some of the New Zealand’s petroleum infrastructures dates to the start of the 
industry during the 1960’s and 1970’s. Since that time technology has advanced, which 
requires ongoing maintenance and rolling upgrades of the infrastructure. Understanding where 
current risks and vulnerabilities exist allows the petroleum industry to improve planning, long 
lead time upgrades, and/or legislative changes to occur.  
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Figure 1.6 Petroleum industry organisation chart, as of June 2017. 
 
Figure 1.7 Regulatory oversight schematic, see Appendix C (7.0A3.0) for full list and abbreviation guide. Blue 
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1.4.2 Volcanic risk assessment for the petroleum sector in New Zealand 
For the New Zealand petroleum risk context, the midstream and downstream sectors are 
included in disaster resilience planning for lifelines; the New Zealand Government has a 
“National Fuel Plan” and Gas Governance (Critical Contingency Management) Regulations 
2008. However, the upstream extraction industry, especially the smaller companies, does not 
yet have any specific research focus on their resilience to a volcanic eruption. They do have 
adverse event planning but have not yet undertaken a detailed analysis of volcanic risks 
individually.  
Recent studies have indicated the probability of a future Mt. Taranaki eruption within the next 
50 years is much higher than previously anticipated. A variety of methodological approaches 
provide a range of eruption probabilities between 33% and 52% (Damaschke, Cronin, & 
Bebbington, 2017; Turner, 2008; Turner, Bebbington, Cronin, & Stewart, 2009); with one 
isolated reference inferring an 81% probability of unrest in the next 50 years (Green et al., 
2013). A reawakening event of any size will likely impact the entire New Zealand upstream 
petroleum sector both directly and indirectly. Direct impacts may include ash fall, lahar damage 
to the pipeline, while indirect impacts such as helicopter grounding, road closures and 
electricity outage may prevent production, transportation of products and staff availability.  If 
Taranaki’s oil and gas production stopped or products cannot be distributed due to lengthy 
volcanic activity or damaging impacts, the knock-on consequences present a critical risk for 
both the Taranaki region and New Zealand. The Egmont National Park around the Mt. Taranaki 
slopes, out to proximately 12 km, has prevented the development of any industrial or petroleum 
resource extraction within its boundaries. Volcanic hazard risk assessments have not 
previously occurred in detail by the New Zealand upstream petroleum sector, due to a 
perception of an unlikely, remote or hypothetical risk (WorleyParsons, 2014). However, the 
seismic risk assessments are commonplace for the petroleum sector globally (Gehl, 
Desramaut, Réveillère, & Modaressi, 2014; Kongar et al., 2016; Urlainis, Shohet, & Levy, 
2015). Research acknowledges the existence of a volcanic risk to the petroleum sector in New 
Zealand, and studies provide estimates of regional economic impacts (Chapman, Bebbington, 
Cronin, & Turner, 2007; Cronin, 2012; Hull, 1996; Johnston et al., 2011; McDonald et al., 2017; 
Taranaki Civil Defence & Emergency Management, 2015).  
Past experiences of gas supply disruption led to the development of emergency planning 
revisions and an end user curtailment banding for gas dependent users (Table 1.2) and 
comprehensive communications plan, overseen by the Critical Contingency Operator. 
Scenarios for the contingency planning, have tended to be single failure points with a focus on 
rapid restoration and communication. These plans assume continued production of gas 
supplies and have not considered volcanic hazards are impacting the entire petroleum sector. 
Four of the five largest gas users are also based close to the Mt. Taranaki:  
• TCC Power Stations,  
• Methanex NZ Ltd (Methanol plants),  
• Balance Agri-Nutrients (Kapuni) Ltd (fertiliser),  
• Fonterra's Te Rapa dairy factory (Critical Contingency Operator, 2017).  
Other gas dependants include hospitals, residential care facilities, prisons, crematoriums and 
bio-hazard treatment facilities. Domestic users do not get impacted by the curtailment banding 
and will be the last to be impacted if gas supplies become exhausted. No equivalent local 
dependent users exist for the New Zealand extracted oil supplies as this resource is exported 
to overseas markets.  
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Table 1.2 Gas Curtailment bands for New Zealand (Critical Contingency Operator, 2017). 
Curtailment 
Band Consumption Consumption Description 
0  N/A  Gas used for injection into storage 
1 
More than 15TJ per day 
 Consumers supplied directly from the transmission system 
and that have an alternative fuel capability. 
2 
More than 15TJ per day 
 Consumers supplied directly from the transmission system 
and that do not have an alternative fuel capability. 
3 
More than 10TJ per annum and up 
to 15TJ per day Large industrial and commercial consumers 
4 
More than 250 GJ per annum and 
up to 10 TJ per annum Medium industrial and commercial consumers 
5 More than 2TJ per annum  Consumers with essential services designations 
6 250 GJ or less per annum  Small commercial consumers 
7 Any Consumers with critical care designations 
With a high likelihood of a future Mt. Taranaki eruption and the Taranaki Region’s critical lifeline 
network, it is a convenient time to investigate the potential volcanic hazards and their impacts 
on this upstream petroleum sector. Petroleum companies need to enhance and review their 
risk management approaches to volcanic hazards to reduce the volcanic risk to acceptable 
levels or “as low as reasonably practicable” (ALARP) (WorleyParsons, 2014). This thesis 
enables the petroleum sector to begin this risk review process. New Zealand is a unique 
example of where upstream petroleum sector and an active volcano co-exist providing a 
valuable case study. However, in time as petroleum reserves are sought in more technically 
challenging areas or with new or reawakening volcanism, this coexistence of the petroleum 
sectors and volcanic hazards will become a more significant issue for the petroleum sector 
globally. 
1.5 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The risk assessment framework provides a systematic and robust method of conducting 
hazard risk assessments, including volcanic risk assessments. This framework is set out in 
guidelines from the United Nations for global DRM best practice (UNISDR, 2017). The risk 
assessment framework combines hazard, exposure and vulnerability and is applicable for both 
single and multiple hazards (Marzocchi, Garcia-Aristizabal, Gasparini, Mastellone, & Di 
Ruocco, 2012). An example of its application was the volcanic risk assessment of critical 
infrastructure in Auckland, New Zealand (Blake, 2017; Deligne, 2016; Deligne et al., 2017; 
Johnston et al., 2004; G. Wilson et al., 2014).  New Zealand’s risk management standards also 
follow global risk management processes (Standards Australia & Standards New Zealand, 
2009). The relationship between the volcanic hazard risk assessment framework and New 
Zealand’s risk management framework is presented in Figure 1.9. 
1.5.1 Risk context 
The New Zealand petroleum sector has not previously considered the volcanic risk for the 
upstream sector, while some downstream (fuel distribution) has been impacted and considered 
in risk studies. The petroleum sector in New Zealand incorporates two critical lifeline services, 
gas and fuel, where previously consideration in risk assessments was for the transmission and 
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distribution (mid and downstream) aspects of the sector (Section 1.4.2.) and overlooked the 
upstream sector. The upstream sector has been overlooked as many volcanic risk 
assessments have focused on Auckland, where no upstream petroleum sector exists, 
therefore out of scope for these projects (Deligne, 2016). This gap is identified in this thesis 
and addressed through the volcanic risk assessment, where the context for this research 
considers New Zealand’s gas supply and associated upstream petroleum sector. This thesis 
considers the direct physical impact explicitly on infrastructure and the petroleum sectors’ 
ability to continue to function. Additionally, indirect impacts are considered that relate to the 
operational functionality of the petroleum sector.  
For the risk assessment framework, a high-level holistic systems approach is used for the 
petroleum industry.  Figure 1.8 gives the various levels of detail that volcanic risk assessments 
can consider, adapted from an example for the electricity supply network using volcanic hazard 
vulnerability assessments in Auckland, New Zealand (G. Wilson, 2015). The holistic approach 
was used as this is the first known attempt to systematically assess volcanic impact and risk 
to the Taranaki petroleum sector, and considering the range and variation in components, 
companies, and sites. Additionally, this sector is very competitive, and more detailed 
component level studies would compromise disclosure agreements and confidential 
information.  
Close partnership with a group of core petroleum industry representative organisations is 
fundamental the success of the framework as per best practice (Standards Australia & 
Standards New Zealand, 2009b).  This was achieved through engaging the industry 
stakeholders in scoping the project and engaging them throughout the process including the 
review stage of the final thesis.  Additionally, communicating the project and results at 
petroleum industry and lifeline sector conferences and to the Taranaki civil defence 
community.  
 
Figure 1.8 Critical infrastructure tier scheme for the petroleum sector adapted from G. Wilson (2015). 
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1.5.2 Risk identification 
Impact and risk understanding that hazards pose to humans considers a variety of aspects, 
including social, natural, economic, built, and cultural environments (Coppola, 2011). The risk 
identified for this research considers the volcanic hazards and how the characteristics of those 
hazards will impact the physical assets of the petroleum sector, both directly and indirectly. 
The Taranaki region was considered as a case study, applying the methodology developed. 
The project scope was identified, documented and justified at each step of the risk assessment 
framework, noting where exclusions, inclusions or limitations are imposed or encountered. 
 
 
Figure 1.9 Relationship between the Australian and New Zealand risk management process (left) and the UN 
natural hazard risk assessment framework (right). 
 
1.5.3 Risk analysis 
“Risk analysis is the process of comprehending the nature of risk and to determine the level of 
risk” (Standards Australia & Standards New Zealand, 2009, p. 5).  
Volcanic risk assessment frameworks combine hazard, exposure and vulnerability 
assessments in the risk analysis (UNISDR, 2017). A hybrid or mixed methodological approach 
is used for the hazard, exposure and vulnerability assessments of the petroleum sector. Hybrid 
or mixed methodological approaches combine theoretical, expert-judgement or analogues 
from recent eruptions to anticipate impacts from future eruptions on infrastructure. Examples 
include the study of future eruptions of the Auckland volcanic field in New Zealand (Blake, 
2017; Deligne et al., 2017; Houghton et al., 2006; Johnston et al., 2004). The hybrid approach 
has the advantage of reducing uncertainties through combining different approaches (G. 
Wilson et al., 2017). A hybrid or mixed methodological approach for the risk assessment 
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framework is particularly useful when a void of empirical data or numerical modelling exist, as 
is the case when considering volcanic hazard impacts on the petroleum sector.  
The UN guidelines outline that the risk assessment framework should include:  
• Probabilistic analysis – the modelling of many possible scenarios, their likelihood 
and related impacts. This approach relies on the development of complex 
mathematical behaviour models for each hazard, using past eruption data, 
historical losses, or damage data. This approach is also the most useful for 
comparison of multiple sectors, hazards or risks. 
 
• Deterministic or scenario analysis – the modelling of impacts or losses from a 
single scenario. This approach considers one of many scenarios, and multiple 
scenarios are recommended to cover the variety of possibilities. The results 
enable improved resilience when incorporating broad scenarios. 
 
• Historical analysis - empirical data from past events is compiled over an extended 
period to derive trends and frequency information, and potential impacts data. 
This method requires reliable data and extensive databases of frequently 
occurring events. 
 
• Expert elicitation – this approach is used where no knowledge or data of past 
events are available and draws on expert judgement to provide quantitative 
perspectives on risk. However, this comes with a level of uncertainty. 
The risk assessment framework follows the consistent approach demonstrated by G. Wilson 
et al. (2014), and a limited deterministic approach was applied for the Mt. Taranaki due to the 
limited probabilistic hazard modelling available. 
 
1.5.4 Risk treatment 
The limit of the research stops short of risk evaluation and treatment processes. The Standards 
guideline states risk evaluation as “the process of comparing results of risk analysis with risk 
criteria to determine whether the risk and its magnitude is acceptable or tolerable” (Standards 
Australia & Standards New Zealand, 2009, p. 6). It is not for the author to make this 
determination, but the industry either together or individually to determine their level of 
acceptable or tolerable risk and what mitigation or risk reduction methods they will consider in 
the future. This research will give examples of possible risk reduction options, noting that these 
are not comprehensive or necessarily suitable for all assets or locations. 
 
1.6 THESIS STRUCTURE  
This thesis has six core chapters, with the final chapter summarising the key findings and how 
they relate to the original thesis aims and making recommendations for future work. Within 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 the scope of the project is documented and justified, noting where 
exclusions, inclusions or limitations are imposed or encountered. 
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• Chapter 2 characterises the volcanic hazard to the petroleum sector from Mt. 
Taranaki. It achieves this by reviewing the published research of past eruptive 
events from hazard assessments of analogous volcanoes and considering 
ongoing volcanic hazard assessment research. The second part of the chapter 
uses this review to inform the development of two eruption hazard scenarios, 
which is used for undertaking a risk assessment in Chapter 4 (addressing 
Objective 1 of the thesis).  
 
• Chapter 3 identifies and categorises the petroleum sectors physical assets that 
will be exposed to volcanic hazards from future Mt. Taranaki eruptions. The 
chapter describes the methodology used to develop asset inventory, details and 
maps how they link together into a system and categorises the functional utility 
of the assets (addressing Objective 2 of the thesis). The compiled asset 
inventory, system maps and asset categorisation directly inform the risk 
assessment framework within Chapters 4 and 5. 
 
• Chapter 4 presents the development of vulnerability models for the physical 
assets of the petroleum sector for application in a volcanic risk assessment 
(Chapter 5). The vulnerability assessment uses a mixed methodology that 
includes a literature review and expert elicitation to develop theoretical 
vulnerability matrices the petroleum sector. These vulnerability models build on 
the hazard and exposure assessments developed in Chapters 2 and 3, for use in 
the risk assessment for the petroleum sector to volcanic hazards in Chapter 5 
(fulfilling Objectives 1 and 2 of the thesis).  
 
Chapter 5 develops and applies a volcanic risk assessment to the Taranaki 
petroleum sector for the physical assets. The risk assessment uses a 
deterministic approach, combining the hazard scenarios developed in Chapter 2, 
the asset inventory from Chapter 3, and the vulnerability models from Chapter 4, 
for the Taranaki petroleum sector (fulfilling Objectives 1 and 2). Uncertainties 
captured in the application of the risk assessment framework for the Taranaki 
petroleum sector are addressed in this chapter. Additionally, dependencies on 
other lifelines and systems are investigated using expert elicitation, and a list of 
critical dependencies is derived for the Taranaki petroleum sector.  
 
• The final Chapter of the thesis (Chapter 6) concludes by summarising the key 
findings and how they relate to the original thesis aims. It also contains 
recommendations for future work, which may result in the development of a 
volcanic risk assessment framework for the petroleum sector and application to 
the Taranaki sector.  
The content of all chapters in this thesis directly results from my research and studies, under 
the guidance of my supervisory team and with close partnership and collaboration with the 
petroleum sector. Those who assisted with the work are recognised in the acknowledgements; 
attendees of the expert elicitation workshop are listed in Appendix E (7.0A5.0). 
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2.0 VOLCANIC HAZARDS OF THE MT. TARANAKI FOR THE PETROLEUM 
SECTOR 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter characterises the volcanic hazard to the petroleum sector from Mt. Taranaki. It 
achieves this by first reviewing published research of past eruptive events, hazard 
assessments, and hazard modelling of Mt. Taranaki, and analogous volcanoes. The second 
part of the chapter uses this review to inform the development of two eruption hazard 
scenarios, which are used for undertaking a risk assessment in Chapter 5 (addressing 
Objective 1 of the thesis).  
2.2 VOLCANIC HAZARDS ASSESSMENT 
Undertaking a volcanic risk assessment first requires the development of a volcanic hazards 
assessment (UNISDR, 2017). The objective of a volcanic risk assessment is to understand the 
eruptive style, size and frequency of volcanoes and is achieved by examining the geological 
record and volcanoes with similar eruptive styles (Sparks et al., 2012). The outputs of a 
volcanic hazard assessment often take the form of maps, event trees and hazard scenarios to 
represent the range and footprint of the hazards from the studied volcano (Sparks et al., 2012). 
These outputs inform risk specialists, emergency managers and policymakers, and aid 
decision making in planning and mitigating for future volcanic eruptions. 
There are several volcanic hazard assessment approaches from literature, which can be used 
when investigating a study volcano, a list is compiled below (McBirney & Godoy, 2003; Neri et 
al., 2008; Sparks et al., 2012): 
• review historical records and oral history 
• undertake geological mapping of volcanic deposits and past events to determine 
hazard sizes and footprints 
• undertake geophysical modelling 
• undertake geochemical studies 
• undertake chrono-lithostratigraphic studies to characterise the frequency of 
events 
• model volcanic hazard processes 
• identify and study analogous events 
In many cases, existing studies have been undertaken to address the above. In cases without 
existing knowledge, geological mapping and geophysical and geochemical surveys will identify 
the types of hazards associated with the volcano (McBirney & Godoy, 2003). Once the types 
and nature of hazards have been determined using available data, the following outputs can 
be developed: 
• zonation, hazard or exposure maps including the location of communities 
• logic or event trees - these include Bayesian event trees that include probabilities 
• evaluate the eruption magnitude or hazard intensity metrics for volcanic hazards 
• eruption hazard scenarios  
2.2.1 Mt. Taranaki hazard assessment 
The hazard assessment of Mt. Taranaki compiles the identification of the likely style, size and 
eruption hazards for future Mt. Taranaki eruptions from published literature. Previous studies 
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which assess the volcanic hazards from Mt. Taranaki detail existing geological, geophysical 
and geological mapping, chrono-lithostratigraphic studies, modelling for a limited range of 
hazards, and a zonation map (Alloway et al., 2005; Alloway et al., 1995; Cronin, Stewart, Neall, 
Platz, & Gaylord, 2003; Damaschke, Cronin, Holt, et al., 2017; Della-Pasqua, Massey, 
McSaveney, & Townsend, 2016; Neall & Alloway, 1996; Neall et al., 1986; Platz, Cronin, 
Cashman, Stewart, & Smith, 2007; Platz, Cronin, Procter, Neall, & Foley, 2012; Procter et al., 
2010; Torres-Orozco, Cronin, Pardo, & Palmer, 2017; Turner, Cronin, Smith, Stewart, & Neall, 
2008; Zernack, Cronin, Neall, & Procter, 2011). Similar volcanoes are examined, which help 
inform future eruption sizes and styles for Mt. Taranaki.  
Within the last 30,000 years, evidence has identified over 228 tephra-producing eruptions, with 
deposits located at distances up to 270 km from the volcano (Damaschke, Cronin, Holt, et al., 
2017). These studies indicate Mt. Taranaki has a cyclic behaviour with prolonged periods of 
eruptive cycles and quiescent periods and sector collapses, shown in Figure 2.1 (Turner, 
Cronin, Bebbington, Smith, & Stewart, 2011; Turner, Cronin, Smith, et al., 2008; Zernack et 
al., 2012; Zernack et al., 2011; Zernack, Procter, & Cronin, 2009).  Mt. Taranaki has two 
dominant eruption styles: smaller effusive eruptions are more common, where periods of dome 
building and collapse are dominant, interspersed with less frequent larger sub-Plinian 
(explosive) eruptions (Alloway et al., 1995; Damaschke, Cronin, Holt, et al., 2017).  The small 
effusive eruptions represent 80% of the known eruptions in the last 30,000 years, with an 
annual probability of 0.03, while the larger explosive eruptions represent the remaining 20% of 
eruptions have an annual probability range of 0.010-0.015 (McDonald et al., 2017; Turner et 
al., 2011). Additionally, sector collapses have occurred at least 18 times in the past 30,000 
years and are likely to occur again with an annual probability of 0.00018 (Damaschke, Cronin, 
Holt, et al., 2017; Della-Pasqua et al., 2016; McDonald et al., 2017; Zernack et al., 2012; 
Zernack et al., 2011). Studies of the larger eruptions indicate Mt. Taranaki eruptions can 
include multiple eruptive styles from effusive to explosive, that are related to internal changes 
in magmatic factors such as the rate of magma ascent, volume, or dyke formations (Platz et 
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Figure 2.1 Diagram of Mt. Taranaki eruptive cycle from Zernack et al. (2009). 
The previous research and mapping of the geology of volcanic deposits in the Taranaki region 
have been used to inform the existing hazard maps, primarily based on the hazard types and 
footprints of past eruptions(Neall & Alloway, 1993; Neall & Alloway, 1996). Figure 2.2 is a 
simplified version of the volcanic hazard map of Mt. Taranaki, with hazard zones outlined. 
 
Figure 2.2 Volcanic Hazards of Taranaki simplified from (Neall & Alloway, 1996). Annotations of ash thickness 
are from the probabilistic modelling of ashfall for larger eruption sizes by Hurst and Smith (2010). Insert map of New 
Zealand showing the location of the Taranaki Region. 
Table 2.1 is a compilation of the literature review undertaken for Mt. Taranaki for future Mt. 
Taranaki eruptions. An important part of this thesis has been to compile a concise list of 
volcanic hazards from past Mt. Taranaki eruptions.  A review of the published literature 
provided a list of known hazards, a brief description, and the distance ranges that the hazard 
will likely impact. Analysis of these was combined with the bounding factors (Section 2.2.2) to 
determine if the hazard is applicable to the petroleum sector in Taranaki and thus required 
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(included) for the vulnerability and risk assessments (Chapters 4 and 5). The final column of 
the table provides a list of references used in the literature review. 
2.2.2 Bounding factors and scope of hazard assessment 
An important part of this thesis has been to identify and set the boundaries of the study scope. 
Identifying the geological extent and hazards applicable to the petroleum sector is a key step 
in defining the scope of the hazard assessment and any bounding limits. Bounding factors 
applied to this hazard assessment are discussed below: they define the limitations of the thesis 
and scope of the case study.  
The initial bounding factor applied to this thesis is to consider “above-ground” assets and 
impacts only. Therefore, subsurface volcanic hazards are not considered, such as heat flow 
associated with magmatic intrusions. Magmatic intrusions have a limited heat flow range where 
rocks are metamorphically altered (Mathieu, van Wyk de Vries, Holohan, & Troll, 2008; 
Polteau, Mazzini, Galland, Planke, & Malthe-Sørenssen, 2008), which are unlikely to impact 
the petroleum reservoirs 13 km away from Mt. Taranaki and at depths of 2.5 km or greater.  
Hazards that occur within a 12-km radius of the summit are excluded, due to the existence and 
restrictions of the Egmont National Park. The park provides a 12-km bounding factor that is 
applied to Mt. Taranaki, as these hazards will not impact petroleum assets that are prohibited 
within the park. The hazards excluded due to distance include lava, volcanic gases and near-
vent hazards. Volcanic gases generate acid rain when combined with water, which causes 
erosion and corrosion of infrastructure (Johnston et al., 2011). While volcanic gases disperse 
over long distances, the concentration beyond 12-km is unlikely to cause immediate physical 
damage to petroleum assets but may cause short-term disruption from gas monitoring sensor 
alerts or more regular maintenance of assets in the longer term.  
A review of published work found limited probabilistic modelling of hazards outside the 12-km 
National Park extent, with some limited ashfall modelling (Hurst & Smith, 2010; Wild, 2016).  
Ash modelling used TEPHRA2 and the New Zealand Probabilistic Volcanic Hazard Model to 
estimate the likelihood of ash deposits from the statistically most dominant regional wind 
directions. Limitations of these models include local variations in the weather, as the weather 
of Taranaki is known to be highly changeable. A small sampling of forecasts by GNS over a 
period of a few days in 2017, shows how variable the wind direction is, see Appendix D 
(7.0A4.0). GNS currently uses the ASHFALL model, with development underway to change to 
HYSPLIT modelling, to generate ashfall forecasts on a daily basis (Hurst, 1994; Hurst & Davis, 
2017).  
Associated with volcanic unrest and eruptions are seismic hazards, where frequent small 
earthquakes, are caused by the mobilisation of magma below the ground. As the pressures 
inside the magma chamber and vent increase in the weeks and months before an eruption, 
the seismic activity increases giving warning of a potential eruption, as seen in the 2017 Agung 
Volcano eruption (Normile, 2017). Seismic magnitudes associated with volcano seismicity tend 
to be less than magnitude 4 (Sigurdsson et al., 2015). Seismicity starts small and unnoticeable 
to humans and increases as the magma approaches the surface where the buried rock is more 
brittle, producing larger earthquakes or volcanic tremors associated with the eruption (Sparks, 
2003). However, some eruptions give little to no warning, for example, the phreatic eruption of 
Ontake Volcano, Japan in 2014 (Ogiso, Matsubayashi, & Yamamoto, 2015). New Zealand has 
advanced seismic risk codes for critical infrastructure which should mitigate the effects of most 
volcanic earthquakes (Standards New Zealand, 2004; Stirling et al., 2012); it was decided to 
exclude this hazard from the research. 
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Table 2.1 Compilation of possible volcanic hazards for Mt. Taranaki, see text in Section 2.2.3 for discussion on excluded hazards. 





Ashfall  The larger tephra particles fall out of the plume within the 10-km boundary line of 
the National Park. While the small ashfall will fall in directions and distance that 
are heavily influenced by the wind at the time. Additionally, the static load 
increases if ash accumulations become water saturated. 
100’s km   Included  (Blong et al., 2017; Damaschke, Cronin, Holt, et al., 
2017; Deligne & Wilson, 2015; Hurst & Smith, 2010; 
Jenkins, Magill, McAneney, & Blong, 2012; Jenkins, 




Lahars can include both hot and cold lahars. The high rainfall in the Taranaki 
region adds to the hazard. These can occur during and post-eruption and can 
continue for many decades after the eruption. 
10’s km  Included   (Damaschke, Cronin, Holt, et al., 2017; Deligne & 
Wilson, 2015; Neall, 2011; Procter, Cronin, & 
Zernack, 2009; Zernack et al., 2011; Zernack et al., 
2009) 
Lava Mt. Taranaki's andesitic lava has a limited flow range 7-10 km Excluded (Deligne & Wilson, 2015; Neall & Alloway, 1993)  
Near-vent 
hazards 
Including ballistics, lateral blasts, new edifices & atmospheric phenomena 5-7 km Excluded (Deligne & Wilson, 2015; Neall & Alloway, 1993)  
PDC  Occur during both small and large eruptions, with larger eruption PDCs travelling 
further distances. Note fringe properties are not as intense as the primary zone. 
10’s km  Included   (Brown, Loughlin, Sparks, & Vye-Brown, 2014; 
Cronin et al., 2003; Deligne & Wilson, 2015; Jenkins 
et al., 2013; Neall & Alloway, 1993; Platz et al., 2007; 
Procter et al., 2010).  
Sector 
collapse  
Large collapse of the volcano sides producing debris avalanches over a wide area 
related to the direction of the sector that fails, 
10’s km Included (Della-Pasqua et al., 2016; Procter et al., 2009; 
Zernack et al., 2012; Zernack et al., 2011)  
Seismicity Volcanic earthquakes, swarms and volcanic tremors  10's km Excluded  (Hurst, Jolly, & Sherburn, 2014)  
 Volcanic 
Gases 
Volcanic gases can be detected over long distances, with the concentration 
rapidly decreasing with distance.  
10’s km  Excluded (Sigurdsson et al., 2015)  
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2.3 SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT 
Scenario development for the volcanic risk assessment is similar to methods used in 
assessments other hazards, incorporating best practice methods including the use of 
geospatial data (UNISDR, 2017).  For complex multi-hazard events like volcanic eruptions, an 
event tree is useful to express the complexity and associated uncertainty (Neri et al., 2008; 
Newhall & Hoblitt, 2002). Compilation of likely eruption hazard scenarios for the study volcano 
leads to the development of scenarios for the most likely and worst case. These hazard 
scenarios may come from existing hazard scenarios already undertaken for the study volcano 
or inspired by events in the geological record. The geological mapping informs the 
development of hazard scenarios based on past events to produce the hazard extent for 
simplistic models used in deterministic risk analysis. Furthermore, probabilistic hazard analysis 
hazard scenarios are generated using sophisticated computer-based modelling software. The 
output hazard scenarios can then be sense-checked through expert elicitation and comparison 
to analogue eruptions.  Computer generated hazard scenarios are also more likely to be able 
to model the eruption scenarios through time, compared to snap-shot hazard scenarios that 
represent a final accumulation following many hours/days or even weeks of an eruption.  
 
2.3.1 Mt. Taranaki case study 
For the Mt. Taranaki case study, two eruption hazard scenarios have been developed for the 
application of the risk assessment framework to the petroleum sector in Taranaki in Chapter 
5.  A deterministic approach for the hazard assessment is used for the Taranaki case study as 
there is insufficient probabilistic data available for Mt. Taranaki hazards that will impact the 
petroleum sector. Additionally, the hazard scenarios are simple for the expert elicitation 
workshop attendees and partner organisations to understand the impacts of a future Mt. 
Taranaki eruption. The two hazard scenarios developed to represent the most likely and 
maximum credible eruption sizes, but do not provide the full range of potential eruption 
possibilities at Mt. Taranaki.   
For the Mt. Taranaki, the two hazard scenarios are selected from the event tree developed for 
Mt. Taranaki as part of this thesis (Figure 2.3) and mapped using GIS into a two-dimensional 
representation of the extent of the volcanic hazards. A Bayesian event tree is not within the 
scope of this study. The development of this tree draws on published material, similar eruption 
events, and discussions with GNS Science staff. The process of developing the event tree also 
allows the non-volcanic sources of a sector collapse to be identified, which could initiate future 
volcanic activity (Della-Pasqua et al., 2016; Zernack et al., 2012).  
For Mt. Taranaki, some eruption events or episodes have received detailed study, and work 
has been undertaken to fit models to the known geological record. The three eruptions 
comprehensively studied are Inglewood, Opua, and Tahurangi eruptions (Cronin, 2012; 
McDonald et al., 2017).  The smaller Tahurangi eruption is the basis for CDEM Exercises 
Taranaki Blowout, 2008 and Exercise Pahu, 2013. The Pahu/Tahurangi scenario represents 
a small-scale effusive eruption event, producing small debris flows down existing drainage 
channels to the northwest side of the volcano, new lava, small volumes of tephra and ash, 
lahars to the northeast and southeast (Jérôme & Neall, n.d.). The Pahu/Tahurangi scenario is 
chosen in this thesis to represent the most frequent and smaller types of Mt. Taranaki 
eruptions. Unfortunately, no GIS maps were readily available of the extent of the various 
hazards produced from these hazard scenarios. A second scenario is required as the 
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Pahu/Tahurangi scenario represents a very small-scale eruption in comparison to known more 
massive Mt. Taranaki eruptions known to occur. Analogue examples of the larger Mt. Taranaki 
eruptions include Calbuco Volcano, Chile, 2015, Redoubt Volcano, Alaska 1989 and 2009, 
and Mt St Helens Volcano, USA, 1980. These eruptions help inform the development of a new 
large eruption scenario for Mt. Taranaki, based on the Kahui explosive eruption event of Mt. 
Taranaki approximately 8.9 ka ago (Zernack et al., 2011). The Kahui scenario was selected to 
represent the maximum credible Mt. Taranaki eruption and was selected based on the 
distribution of mapped deposits.  
 
Figure 2.3 Hazard event tree for Mt. Taranaki volcanic eruption events and associated hazards. Colour circles 
represent stage commencement points; red triangles represent branch terminations. 
 
The scenario development for Mt. Taranaki utilised the GIS version of the existing QMAP 
(1:250 000 Geological Map of New Zealand) for the Taranaki region (Rattenbury & Isaac, 2012; 
Townsend, Vonk, & Kamp, 2008). The mapped geological formations were selected based on 
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formations associated with past eruptions provided in Zernack et al. (2011). For each of the 
hazard scenarios, Ashfall data was imported into ArcGIS from GNS daily forecasts that use 
the ASHFALL model (Hurst, 1994). Table 2.2 presents the data sources and literature used to 
develop the two hazard scenarios for Mt. Taranaki. Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.6 show the two-
dimensionally mapped hazard scenarios and hazard footprints. 
 
Table 2.2 Mt. Taranaki eruption scenario data sources. 




















4 km plume, 
0.05 km3 
volume using a 
forecast from 18 
September 
2017 at 1800 
0.010-0.012 
annually  
(Hurst, 1994; McDonald et 
al., 2017; Platz et al., 2012; 
Rattenbury & Isaac, 2012; 
Torres-Orozco et al., 2017; 
Townsend et al., 2008; 












15 km plume, 1 
km3 volume 
using a forecast 
from 19 
September 
2017 at 0600 
0.03 
annually 
(Hurst, 1994; McDonald et 
al., 2017; Platz et al., 2007; 
Rattenbury & Isaac, 2012; 
Torres-Orozco et al., 2017; 
Townsend et al., 2008; 
Turner, Cronin, Bebbington, 
& Platz, 2008; Zernack et 
al., 2011) 
 
2.3.2 Unrest phase for developed hazard scenarios 
An unrest timeline was developed for Mt. Taranaki with support from GNS volcanic alert 
specialist Brad Scott, specifically for the petroleum expert elicitation workshop using the New 
Zealand Volcanic Alert Levels (VAL) (Figure 2.4) (Potter et al., 2014). The eruption timeline 
supports the hazard scenarios to visualising how a future Mt. Taranaki eruption will progress 
and at what point the volcanic hazards occur and examples of the possible impacts of those 
hazards on the petroleum sector. In the unrest timeline, it is essential stakeholders do not link 
actions or decisions to the changing of the alert level, as this may lag actual events (Papale, 
2017). Experience shows a lot can change and happen between the level changes, and this 
can happen quickly or gradually over many months (Papale, 2017). Therefore, planned actions 
should consider situational awareness from many sources and a company’s or organisation’s 
ability to sustain the actions it makes. Once an eruption occurs, there will be a period of unrest 
that follows, which may lead to further eruptions in the following days, weeks or years. Figure 
2.4 shows a potential cycle of unrest, with a small eruption followed by a larger eruption, then 
a post-eruption unrest phase for Mt. Taranaki. The eruption phases (VAL 3 and 4) can be 
substituted for a single small eruption (VAL 3) or a single large eruption (VAL 4). 
 
 
Zoë Juniper 27 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Potential future Mt. Taranaki eruption timeline, with possible hazard presence impacts. The VAL 
colours are aligned to the official VAL (Potter et al., 2014). Blue identify potential HSE concerns, orange- potential 
short-term disruption to petroleum sector, green – potential evacuation zone impacts, pink – potential physical 
impacts from volcanic hazards. 
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Figure 2.5 Mt. Taranaki - Small eruption scenario using hazard footprints, PDC blue, lahar red, and lava brown. 
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Figure 2.6 Mt. Taranaki - Large eruption scenario using hazard footprints, PDC blue, lahar red, and lava brown. 
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2.4 SUMMARY 
The key points from the methodology development for characterising the volcanic hazards for 
the risk assessment framework and Mt. Taranaki Case study are summarised as follows: 
• Drawing on a range of methodologies for analysing and determining the eruptive style, 
likely hazards and probable hazard scenarios for specific volcanoes was required to 
meet Objective 1. These involve literature research, review of non-academic sources, 
investigating studies and mapping of the geological record, and eliciting data from recent 
analogous eruptions. 
• For the Mt. Taranaki case study, establish the scope of the study, where only hazards 
beyond 12-km from the summit are included. Chapter 2 identifies the primary hazards 
that are relevant to the petroleum sector as ashfall, PDC, Lahar and sector collapse 
(fulfilling Objective 2). 
• Existing hazard scenarios for Mt. Taranaki have not been adequately captured with maps 
or GIS, leading to the development of GIS-based hazard scenarios for this thesis, based 
on existing geological mapping and literature research of past events. This enables an 
essential component of Objective 2 to be completed for later use in Chapter 5. 
• Probabilistic modelling of volcanic hazards for Mt. Taranaki has yet to be developed, 
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3.0 IDENTIFICATION AND CATEGORISATION OF PETROLEUM ASSETS 
FOR VOLCANIC RISK ASSESSMENT 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter identifies and categorises the petroleum sectors physical assets that will be 
exposed to volcanic hazards from future Mt. Taranaki eruptions. The chapter describes the 
methodology used to develop an asset inventory, details and maps how they link together into 
a system and categorises the functional utility of the assets (addressing Objective 2 of the 
thesis). The compiled asset inventory, system maps and asset categorisation directly inform 
the risk assessment framework in Chapters 4 and 5.  
3.2 METHODOLOGY 
The petroleum sector is organisationally and technically complex, as illustrated by the 
summary of companies involved in the Taranaki petroleum sector (Figure 1.6). The petroleum 
sector, like many other lifeline service providers, is described as a system of connected 
components, each with different vulnerabilities and exposure thresholds. To assess the likely 
impacts of volcanic hazards on the petroleum sector, it is necessary to: 
identify bounding factors and determine the level of detail of the assessment 
map the assets and how the assets interconnect as a system 
map the physical asset locations 
categorise the assets.  
The initial step identifies any limitations and bounding factors that define the scope of work 
and level of detail. Published work on a variety of volcanic risk assessments uses holistic high-
levels assessments through to individual components assessments of specific equipment. For 
holistic-high level assessments, the individual screws and seals are not identified and mapped, 
but rather a collection of equipment that shares the same operational task.  
Secondly, the assets and system are mapped using visual diagrams. The lifecycle system 
maps the assets involved in the upstream petroleum sector from extraction, separation of 
component products and transportation and delivery systems. The assets interlink and work 
as a dependant petroleum system, with assets presenting a group of equipment that shares 
the same function. For example, all wells and their parts perform the same function to extract 
product from the sub-surface reservoir, and this denotes the start of the “above-ground” 
lifecycle of the product. A mixed methodological approach is used that includes expert 
judgement, literature review and site visits. 
Thirdly, the systems physical asset locations are mapped. Key to the exposure assessment is 
building an inventory of assets using best practice methods that include the use of GIS (Remer, 
2011; UNISDR, 2017). The other methods used to understand the asset locations in the 
petroleum sector include: 
- reviewing published material 
- reviewing and extrapolating existing open file datasets  
- reviewing Google imagery  
- reviewing Council consent information 
- existing personal knowledge of locations and asset footprints  
 
 
32 Zoë Juniper 
 
- regular industry discussions  
- site visits 
- expert elicitation workshop. 
The asset inventory builds a spatial distribution of the petroleum assets exposed to the volcanic 
hazards and captures metadata to use in the risk assessment framework in Chapters 4 and 5. 
Finally, petroleum assets were grouped according to their operational functionality. For 
example, all wells that perform the same function were grouped, irrespective of hydrocarbon 
type or if they are extracting or injecting. A mixed methodological approach is used that 
includes expert judgement, literature review and site visits. 
Expert judgement is relied on for sectors with little to no prior exposure to volcanic hazards. 
The expert elicitation process is the most efficient and robust method to engage with experts 
(Evans, 2013). However, expert elicitation workshops need careful and meticulous planning to 
ensure identified aims and outcomes are defined and achieved and the correct attendees 
invited (Evans, 2013; Pattillo, 2017). The workshops' rational aims set out the desired 
outcomes the facilitator wishes to achieve, while the experiential aims set out what the 
attendees should achieve from the workshop. The petroleum sector workshop’s rational aims 
for the exposure assessment are to derive the generic categorisation of the various petroleum 
assets locations in the region. The workshop’s experiential aims are to: 
• ensure all attendees felt their expertise was valuable to the discussions while gaining 
knowledge of the importance and relevance of lifeline security  
• strengthen understanding and relationships between the various attendees, specifically 
the civil defence team and petroleum industry 
• produce a favourable impression of the work, so future research, publications and 
collaborations are achievable 
• ensure a sense of ownership in the industry of volcanic hazard risk mitigation and a 
desire to continue the conversation internally, sector-wide and with civil defence. 
Following the workshop, all invited experts receive a summary of the workshop, feedback, and 
results. Thus, giving all invited experts the opportunity to contribute, and acknowledging the 
more introverted attendees who by their very nature require additional processing time than 
the workshop allows. The resulting categorisations are then used to develop the vulnerability 
assessment in Chapter 4.  
 
3.3 IDENTIFICATION OF PETROLEUM SYSTEMS EXPOSED TO VOLCANIC HAZARDS IN 
TARANAKI 
This study takes a high-level, generic, holistic systems approach to assess the volcanic risk to 
the Taranaki petroleum sector as noted in Chapter 1 and summarised in Figure 1.8. The 
limitations and scope are identified for the Taranaki petroleum sector, followed by mapping of 
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3.3.1 Bounding factors and scope of exposure assessment 
Identifying the petroleum sector systems and assets in Taranaki is a key step in defining the 
scope of the exposure assessment and any bounding limits. The geographic extent of the 
study includes all permanent petroleum extraction, production, processing, refining, 
transmission and storage assets in the Taranaki region. It was decided to only focus on “above-
ground” physical assets and to exclude subsurface assets. This limitation was based primarily 
on the hazard assessment (Chapter 2) that it would be highly unlikely that any magmatic 
intrusions or heat-flow would directly impact the petroleum reservoirs, which typically occur at 
depths of 3-4 km at distances of > 13 km from the centre of Mt. Taranaki (Figure 1.5). The 
downstream petroleum system beyond the storage and pipe networks through to the end-users 
and individual homes is out of scope for this study, due to time limitations. Temporary 
exploration activity and equipment, such as drilling rigs are also out of scope, based on 
discussions with industry representatives who indicated drilling activity would not start or would 
conclude early and equipment shut down or securely stored, should Mt. Taranaki enter a period 
of unrest. Detailed assessments of asset components have not been attempted, which is better 
undertaken by an engineering study and would detract from the high-level holistic approach. It 
was also considered an unnecessary additional complexity in a Master of Science study. 
 
3.3.2 Petroleum lifecycle systems and asset identification for the Taranaki sector.  
A petroleum system map is developed that identifies and details the assets, their relationship 
and the flow of the system (Figure 3.1). The system was validated using expert judgment. The 
system follows the lifecycle of oil, gas and condensates from extraction at the wellhead, the 
various processes to separate the mixed product to individual product streams and then 
treatment to send to end users, either through pipelines or road networks. This map is generic 
for the industry globally, although individual sites will vary in both size and the various 
processes undertaken, and components required. The Taranaki petroleum sector consists of 
approximately thirteen separate systems working in parallel. The actual processes involved 
with each stage are somewhat more complicated than presented for this high-level holistic 
assessment of the industry. Location variability depends on the product type, volume and 
pressures of the reservoir, chemical composition and end use of the final product. The 
petroleum system involves many kilometres of pipes, separation, compression, condensing 
and fractionation units, valves, filters, electrical cabling, administration and control buildings, 
chemicals, flaring systems, and storage tanks/bullets. In addition to this, an experienced and 
well-trained workforce and access to road networks are required to the petroleum systems 
continuously. The variability between individual asset locations raised uncertainty in the risk 
assessment undertaken at a holistic level and captured in the uncertainties table (Table 5.2). 
Further asset descriptions are documented in Appendix A (7.0A1.0), derived from industry 
discussions and site visits. 
Petroleum assets are then identified for the Taranaki sector and compiled as an asset inventory 
in a geospatial database. The data sources are summarised in Table 3.1, compiled from a 
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Table 3.1 Source data for identification of petroleum assets for the Taranaki sector. 




Permit reports.  
Metadata is used to extract details on 
wells that are actively producing or 
injecting compared to old unused wells. 
This site also provides permit 
ownership and details on asset types 







Well locations Locations of producing well sites were 
extrapolated to identify well site 
locations. 
GNS Science https://data.gns.cri.nz/pbe/ 
 
Verification Location verification of some assets is 






Production facility locations and asset 
type information retrieved from 









Asset location and details derived from 
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Figure 3.1 Petroleum product lifecycle. 
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3.4 CATEGORISATION 
The primary methodological approach used to categorise the assets was an expert elicitation 
workshop, which was well attended, receiving high engagement from industry and excellent 
discussion resulting in the categorisation of petroleum assets for volcanic hazards. The 
detailed planning and agenda of the workshop are provided in Appendix E (7.0A5.0). The 
system map produced in the previous section (Figure 3.1) was used in the workshop to prompt 
discussion and for the proposal of asset groupings based on the function of the assets. 
Attendees were divided into five groups with each group having a balanced mix of 
backgrounds. Groups considered an initial strawman asset categorisation followed by robust 
discussion. The concept of grouping assets on functionality challenged many attendees who 
were more familiar with the classical sector view based on geographical location. Examples 
were used to help overcome this challenge, an example provided was that pipelines are all 
group together despite having varied material, burial depth, or diameter, for high-level risk 
assessments they can be considered to respond in the same way. Similarly, compressors 
irrespective of geographical location, i.e. onshore/offshore/on a production site or pipeline 
station, all work in the same way and therefore share a standard response to hazards at a 
high-level. Feedback and comments were captured and discussed in a detailed debrief 
meeting with co-facilitating supervisors. The expert's final asset categorisations were added to 
the GIS asset inventory database. The feedback was consolidated and results shared with the 
attendees and circulated to a broader audience of interested parties.  
 
3.4.1 Result  
Table 3.2 presents the final results of the identification and categorisation the petroleum sector 
assets for volcanic risk assessment. The petroleum product lifecycle is illustrated in Figure 3.2, 
showing the agreed asset category grouping. The inventory was then updated to reflect the 
various asset types at each location resulting in 247 different assets captured in the inventory, 
with a map showing their geographical distribution in Figure 3.3. Several sites around the 
Taranaki region contain multiple asset category types due to the co-location of assets for 
operational expediency. The building asset category is excluded from the development of 
vulnerability models in this thesis (Chapter 4), resulting from expert judgement and availability 
of existing material on volcanic assessments for the building type. Additionally, industrial users 
are out of scope as detailed in Section 3.3.1.  The produced asset inventory and asset 
classification for Taranaki petroleum assets for volcanic hazards is a new contribution to risk 
research.  The holistic level asset inventory is applicable to other hazards such as flooding or 
seismic risk assessments in identifying the various asset locations, although a reclassification 
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Table 3.2 Final physical asset categories for the petroleum industry for volcanic risk assessment. Photos and 










 Standalone Well pad, where the well may be producing, injecting or have been 
either shut-in, suspended or abandoned. Some pads will have a small amount 




Multiple types, diameters and burial depths and content. From mixed product 
gathering lines to high-pressure gas lines, low-pressure lines, or water. A sub-
category includes where pipelines become exposed for aerial crossings, 





These are the most complex of asset locations comprising many kilometres of 
pipeline, cooling and separating towers and storage as the hydrocarbon product 
is separated into components of water, gas, oil, condensate and prepared for 
transportation. They may be small satellite operations or much larger scale. 
They tend to comprise of multiple sub-processors, and storage tanks, flares, 
operation offices, water pits for fire safety and have staff continuously on-site. 




Storage tank, this grouping contains various products and comes in a wide 
range of construction designs, sizes. Most notable are the two sub-sets of fixed 
and floating roof construction types. 
Buildings 
35 
This category includes onsite control buildings and head office buildings. Onsite 
buildings vary from portacabins, converted shipping containers to designed 
structural office buildings. 
Industrial 
users 8 
End users may be Methanol plants, LPG bottling stations, dairy processing or 
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Figure 3.2 Final physical petroleum asset groupings for volcanic risk assessment. 
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3.5 SUMMARY 
The critical points of the methodology developed for the identification and categorisation of 
petroleum assets for the risk assessment framework and the Mt. Taranaki Case study can be 
summarised as follows: 
• A mixed methodology approach was required to understand the petroleum sector that 
includes literature review, expert elicitation, developing industry partners and site visits 
and discussions with asset managers. The development of relationships with the 
petroleum sector of interest was essential to gain an accurate insight of the complexity 
and draw on expert judgement. 
• The incorporation of GIS into the methodology was essential for developing an asset 
inventory that can then be utilised by future stakeholders, scientific studies or risk 
modelling using specialist software, and fulfilling Objective 1. Additionally, the risk 
analysis performed in Chapter 5 relies on the overlay of the GIS scenario developed in 
Chapter 2. 
• The expert elicitation process was vital to validate the development of categorisation, 
especially for complex industries with wide variability and geographical locations of 
assets. For the Taranaki case study, the process of an expert elicitation workshop not 
only helped satisfy Objective 2 but had experiential outcomes for the sector that helped 
to meet Objective 3. 
• A total of 247 physical assets are recorded for the petroleum sector in Taranaki in the 
asset inventory, and six asset groups identified. Only four asset categories are in scope 
for the remainder of the thesis: wells, pipelines, petroleum facilities and storage tanks. A 
holistic system approach was used for the Taranaki sector, compared with an individual 
component level study. 
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4.0 DEVELOPING VULNERABILITY MODELS FOR THE PETROLEUM 
SECTOR FOR VOLCANIC RISK ASSESSMENT 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the development of vulnerability models for the petroleum sector’s 
physical assets, for application in a volcanic risk assessment (Chapter 5). The vulnerability 
assessment uses a mixed methodology approach that includes a literature review and expert 
elicitation, to develop theoretical vulnerability models for the petroleum sector. These 
vulnerability models build on the hazard and exposure assessments developed in Chapters 2 
and 3, for use in the risk assessment of the Taranaki petroleum sector to volcanic hazards in 
Chapter 5 (fulfilling Objectives 1 and 2 of the thesis).  
4.2 DEVELOPMENT OF VULNERABILITY MATRICES FOR THE PETROLEUM SECTOR FOR 
VOLCANIC RISK 
Developing vulnerability models requires building a relationship between the impacts (damage, 
loss of service) from different volcanic hazards and the variable intensities (e.g. dynamic 
pressure for PDC, or static load for tephra fall) that occur, for each of the petroleum asset types 
(G. Wilson et al., 2017). Vulnerability model development is a challenging task when there are 
no known quantitative recorded volcanic hazard impacts (G. Wilson et al., 2014). Such is the 
case for petroleum sector assets where no other previously known attempts at this task has 
occurred. Therefore, developing a robust methodology which could be achieved within the 
timeframe of the thesis has been a critical step. The methodological steps to develop the 
vulnerability models for the petroleum assets are described in Sections 4.2.2 - 4.2.5, followed 
by the results and final vulnerability models presented in Section 4.3. 
4.2.1 Methodology 
Volcanic vulnerability assessments focused on physical vulnerability employ a range of 
methods that incorporate qualitative or quantitative impact data.  Physical vulnerability models 
develop relationships between the hazard intensity and its impact on infrastructure, referred to 
as the impact metric, of which there are five main approaches (Figure 4.1). Impact metrics 
categorise the impacts into discrete states based on physical damage, function or economic 
loss, and associate a hazard intensity range to each category (G. Wilson et al., 2017). A 
conceptual model for such relationships has been developed for the volcanic risk assessment 
of ash and tephra impacts on buildings (Figure 4.2). Impact data can be derived from empirical, 
analytical, expert judgement or hybrid (mixed) methodologies, which inform both the impact 
metrics (IM) and hazard intensity metric (HIMs) that combine to form the vulnerability models 
(G. Wilson et al., 2017; G. Wilson et al., 2014).  
Volcanic vulnerability assessments and models tend to be derived from post-event 
recognisance impact assessments, in some cases supplemented by empirical laboratory 
experiments for individual components (G. Wilson et al., 2017; G. Wilson et al., 2014). 
Examples include research done on the impacts of various volcanic hazards on building types 
following numerous recent eruptions (Baxter et al., 2005; Jenkins et al., 2013; Spence, 
Kelman, Baxter, Zuccaro, & Petrazzuoli, 2005; Spence, Zuccaro, Petrazzuoli, & Baxter, 2004; 
Valentine, 1998). Additionally, examples for a high-level sector-wide approach for the 
agriculture sector consider volcanic impacts and ashfall in depth, from a variety of past 
eruptions and modelled hazard scenarios (Blake et al., 2015; Craig, Wilson, Stewart, Outes, 
et al., 2016; Craig, Wilson, Stewart, Villarosa, et al., 2016; Wild, 2016; T. M. Wilson, Kaye, 
Stewart, & Cole, 2007; T. M. Wilson et al., 2013; T. M. Wilson et al., 2009).  
 
 




Figure 4.1 Volcanic vulnerability assessment option adapted from G. Wilson et al. (2017). Green path highlights 
options used in this study to develop the volcanic vulnerability assessment for the petroleum sector. 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Conceptual model of the impact states for a volcanic vulnerability model of ash and tephra on 
buildings (G. Wilson et al., 2014). 
The methodological steps developed for the vulnerability assessment of physical petroleum 
assets to volcanic hazard in this thesis are: 
1. review of published material for existing or comparable impact data 
2. review available vulnerability model designs 
3. selection of most appropriate model and relevant HIMs (and terminology) to develop a 
template model  
4. review literature for petroleum asset damage from key HIMs from all hazards 
5. develop initial vulnerability matrix with examples of thresholds for key HIMs 
6. run expert elicitation workshop to develop vulnerability models for all asset categories 
and HIMs for relevant volcanic hazards 
7. compile feedback and additional literature review to produce final models 
8. provide results to workshop attendees with an opportunity for additional comments. 
A key part of the methodology approach has been the close engagement with the petroleum 
industry to inform and review the development of the vulnerability (and exposure) models. 
Petroleum sector engagement involved one-to-one discussions and an expert elicitation 
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workshop, bringing petroleum industry representatives together to develop the final 
vulnerability models collaboratively. Four vulnerability models were developed for the Taranaki 
petroleum sector using this methodology, based on the asset types identified in Chapter 3. The 
expert elicitation workshop is discussed in Section 4.2.4, Chapter 3 and details of the agenda 
and attendees are provided in Appendix E (7.0A5.0). The petroleum sector workshop’s rational 
aims for the vulnerability assessment were to:  
• define the damage impact states and threshold categories 
• prioritise interdependencies of the various asset categories. 
The workshop’s experiential aims are the same as stated in Chapter 3, Section 3.2. Following 
the workshop, all invited experts received a summary of the workshop, feedback, and results. 
This gave all invited experts the opportunity to contribute and accommodated the more 
introverted attendees, who by their very nature require more processing time than the 
workshop allowed. The hazards relevant to the petroleum vulnerability models were informed 
from the volcanic hazard assessment (Chapter 2), and the asset categories are requiring 
vulnerability models were defined in the exposure assessment (Chapter 3). The resulting four 
vulnerability models were then used to develop the risk assessment in Chapter 5.  
4.2.2 Quantifying vulnerability of petroleum assets  
The first steps in deriving vulnerability models for the Taranaki petroleum sector were to 
consider any known impact data from published material and determine the methodological 
approach to use. As previously mentioned, the only known qualitative account of volcanic 
impacts on the petroleum sector from international case-studies was observed at the Drift River 
terminal during the 1990 and 2009 Redoubt eruptions in Alaska (Bull & Buurman, 2013; Cook 
Inletkeeper, 2009). The challenge faced by the Taranaki petroleum sector is the lack of 
empirical volcanic hazard impact data, requiring a theoretical approach to derive the 
vulnerability models from (Figure 4.1). Additionally, any results need to align with other lifeline 
volcanic assessments for future interdependency studies, as well as interpretable and practical 
to inform future research for the Taranaki petroleum sector. Reviewing published material on 
the methodological approaches for vulnerability models determined that the threshold 
approach be the most appropriate for the Taranaki petroleum sector. The threshold approach 
allows for the development of a relationship between the hazard impact metrics and the 
theoretical thresholds at which functionality is likely to be impacted, and lends itself well to 
areas lacking in empirical data (G. Wilson et al., 2017; G. Wilson et al., 2014). However, this 
approach may not be suitable for all hazard intensity metrics for the various asset categories 
of this study, and alternative approaches may be required for future more detailed component 
level vulnerability assessments. Examples of the threshold approach include tephra, ash-fall 
and PDCs assessments (Craig, Wilson, Stewart, Outes, et al., 2016; Jenkins, Wilson, et al., 
2014; Spence, Zuccaro, et al., 2004; G. Wilson et al., 2014). There is variation within these 
examples around the number of discrete impact metrics and the terminology used, which 
varies based on the infrastructure sector in consideration. 
As empirical datasets or numerical modelling are not known to be available to inform the impact 
metric data for the relationship, a hybrid or mixed methodological approach was used to derive 
the impact data, utilising expert judgment (G. Wilson et al., 2017). The hazard intensity metric 
data is informed by Chapter 2. A terminology relationship was developed to address the 
variation between volcanic risk professionals and petroleum sector workers and overcome an 
anticipated terminology barrier. Providing this relationship enabled the petroleum engineers to 
understand the physical forces that volcanic hazards pose to the physical infrastructure. 
Petroleum engineers that design and work with the physical infrastructure for the petroleum 
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sector, and related engineering design standards, use different terminology to that used by 
typical volcanic risk professionals. For example, petroleum engineers design for snow loading 
using static pressure, compared to a thickness of snow measurement (Standards New 
Zealand, 2003b). The HIMs and hazard relationship developed (Figure 4.3) allows the 
engineers to relate the relevant HIMs to measurable thresholds for the petroleum sector. This 
relationship is equally relevant for other lifeline infrastructure studies involving engagement 
with engineering professionals. 
 
Figure 4.3 Relationship between revised HIMs (right) and volcanic hazards (left). 
Returning to the development of the impact metric data for this thesis, a variety of options are 
available in published material (Figure 4.1). The impact state option was selected after 
comparison of these options, existing impact data, and the thesis aim to consider functionality 
based on hazard impact. The impact state option allows discrete categories with hazard 
intensity thresholds that define changes in functionality from tolerance, to disruption, to 
damage (G. Wilson et al., 2014). The impact state option works well for the theoretical 
approach required for the petroleum sector, where multiple volcanic hazards are considered 
(Chapter 2). Additionally, the use of impact states is common in published work on volcanic 
vulnerability assessments of critical infrastructure, allowing for comparison with the results 
from this thesis. For this thesis, a four-level impact state model was developed for the Taranaki 
petroleum sector, based on the conceptual model for impact states (Figure 4.2). By 
comparison, other studies have used a greater number of impact states. Jenkins et al. (2014) 
proposed the consistent use of six descriptive states or levels (D0-D5), with varying function 
descriptions based on the infrastructure type. Thus, enabling easier comparison between the 
various infrastructures when considering a regional overview, or multiple hazards.  RiskScape, 
a New Zealand developed software designed for estimating asset impacts and losses from 
single or multiple natural hazards, also uses a six-level damage state (D0-D5) (GNS Science 
& NIWA, n.d.; RiskScape Damage State Working Group, 2016). The use of six states was 
found to be too complicated for this preliminary research, where the theoretical nature of this 
research makes it difficult to determine the delicate details and differentiate the likely impacts. 
Therefore, a simpler four state scale was adopted for the Taranaki petroleum sector (Table 
4.1). Some consistency is maintained with the Jenkins et al. six-level scale, as this study simply 
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omitted the moderate (D2) and severe (D4) states. Additionally, impact damage is binary for 
some hazards. For example, sector collapses create massive debris avalanches and will likely 
destroy any exposed assets. In these cases, the four-scale model is adapted by omitting the 
intermediate steps, leaving a two-level scale. By adopting this structured approach, the four-
level impact state model derived for the Taranaki petroleum sector provides an opportunity for 
refinement in future research, as asset threshold ranges are analysed in detail.  
Table 4.1 Four-level impact state model for the vulnerability models of petroleum assets in respect to volcanic 
hazards. Colours are aligned to the conceptual model presented in G. Wilson et al. (2014) (Figure 4.2). 
D0 No physical damage  
D1  Minor (no structural) damage 
D2  Major (Structural) damage 
D3  
Total physical asset destruction, i.e. catastrophic failure (requires full replacement rather 
than repair). 
4.2.3 Literature review 
The next steps in developing volcanic vulnerability models for the Taranaki petroleum sector 
was to review published material for comparable impact data that can inform the theoretical 
approach and expert elicitation workshop (Section 4.2.4). Here, the damage or impact 
thresholds and states captured for analogous events, hazards and asset types are reviewed 
to extract provisional thresholds to assign to the four-level impact model for the Taranaki 
petroleum sector. The four main asset types, identified in Chapter 3, for the focus of the 
literature research are: 
• wells  
• production facilities 
• pipelines  
• storage tanks 
There is a void of literature and case-studies of where petroleum infrastructure and volcanic 
hazards have interacted internationally, except for one example of the Drift River Oil Terminal, 
Alaska. Lahars and flooding directly impacted the downstream petroleum sector at the Drift 
River Oil Terminal during both the 1990 and 2009 eruptions of Redoubt Volcano, Alaska 
(Brantley, 1990; Dorava & Meyer, 1994; Waythomas, Pierson, Major, & Scott, 2013). 
Numerous flood and lahars breached existing mitigation levees and dykes during both 
eruptions, causing evacuations and the facility to shut down (Brantley, 1990; Dorava & Meyer, 
1994). While the terminal was not an active production or exploration location, the indirect 
impacts of the eruptions resulted in the suspension of offshore production from platforms that 
supplied oil to the terminal (Brantley, 1990). Additionally, the floods and lahars also exposed 
the underground pipelines (Dorava & Meyer, 1994).  
Following the 1990 eruptions, Drift River Oil Terminal improved their risk mitigation by building 
dykes and levees around the facility to reduce direct impacts from lahars, floods and channel 
erosion (Waythomas, Dorava, Miller, Neal, & McGimsey, 1997). However, during the 2009 
eruption, the dykes were still breached, and although the debris did not reach the oil storage 
tanks, it did trigger an emergency evacuation (Bull & Buurman, 2013; Waythomas et al., 2013). 
The debris inundated the facility’s runway, preventing any emergency response to an oil spill, 
which raised concern among the local communities and led to the removal of 6 million gallons 
of oil stored at the facility (Bull & Buurman, 2013; Cook Inletkeeper, 2009). This example 
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highlights some of the risks from lahars and flooding associated with volcanic eruptions to the 
petroleum industry. A primary contributing factor to the high flood levels from Redoubt Volcano 
was the glacial meltwaters derived from the heat flow of the lahars, lava and pyroclastic flows 
(Waythomas et al., 1997). Although Mt. Taranaki does not have glaciers, it does have 
substantial snow caps throughout most of the year, that require consideration when modelling 
flood levels in addition to the regions higher than average rainfall. The rainfall in the region has 
proven to contribute to a heightening likelihood of remobilised debris and lahars (Johnston et 
al., 2011; Neall, 2011).  
Aside from the Drift River example, the lack of documented volcanic impacts on the petroleum 
sector led to a focus on the literature review to consider similar structures and hazards. 
Additionally, observations and research into tsunami washout and scouring impacts can be 
drawn on to give insight into the lahar and PDC dynamic pressure and erosion characteristics. 
For example, the observed gas pipelines and storage tank damage following the 2015 Chile 
Tsunami provided insights into how the sector could improve resiliency (Horspool, Cousins, & 
Power, 2015). Findings from the extensive literature review undertaken are summarised in 
Table 4.2. The buildings asset category is excluded from the scope of this thesis (Chapter 3). 
However, acknowledgement of current volcanic hazard exposure research, including that of 
buildings, informs the literature review for other asset types. Residential building studies of 
tephra and ash fall loading completed in recent years highlights examples of observed damage 
(Baxter et al., 2005; Jenkins et al., 2013; Jenkins, Spence, et al., 2014; Spence, Kelman, 
Baxter, et al., 2005; Spence, Kelman, Calogero, et al., 2005; Spence, Zuccaro, et al., 2004; 
Valentine, 1998; Zuccaro, Cacace, Spence, & Baxter, 2008). Furthermore, where existing 
building compliance contains snow loading engineering, these can be drawn on to give 
preliminary threshold ranges (Standards Australia & Standards New Zealand, 2009a).  
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Analogous hazards, asset 
types, or constraints 






Storage tanks - 
floating roof 
designs  
Similar hazards,  
rainfall changes to ash density 
qualities. 
Other sectors pipelines 
Laboratory studies,  
Snow loading designs 
Rainfall and ash 
Industry standards 
< 1 kPa 
1-1.25 kPa 
1.25 – 2 kPa 
> 2 kPa 
 (American Petroleum Institute, 2013; Efford, Clarkson, & Bylsma, 
2014; Gehl, Quinet, Le Cozannet, Kouokam, & Thierry, 2013; 
Macedonio, Costa, & Folch, 2008; Milazzo et al., 2013; Milazzo et 
al., 2012; Neall, 2011; Standards New Zealand, 2003b) 
Temperature Pipelines - 
aerial 
crossings 
PDC impacts on similar plastics,  
Operational working 
temperatures 
Other sectors pipelines 
 
Merapi eruption, 2010 
Montserrat eruption, 1995 - present 
Mt. Redoubt 1991, 2009 
Volcan de Colima, 2015 
Mt. St. Helens 1980 
< 45 °C 
45-55 °C 
55-500 °C 
> 500 °C 
(Arguden & Rodolfo, 1990; Australian Energy Market Operator 
Limited, 2014; Bredero Shaw, n.d.; Fletcher & Nicholas, 2014; 
Jenkins et al., 2013; JFE Steel Corporation, n.d.; Mullineaux & 






Extreme weather,  
Tsunamis,  
Explosives 
Other sectors pipelines 
Scouring - tsunamis or lahars 
PDCs – fringe effects and 
central zones 
 
Great Japan Earthquake & tsunami 
2011, 
Chile tsunami 2015  
Gulf war 1991, 
Eruptions as above 
Modelling and laboratory studies 
Maui Pipeline failure 2011 
 
< 0.5 kPa 
0.5-1 kPa 
1-2 kPa 
> 2 kPa 
 (American Society of Civil & Wind-Induced Forces Task, 2011; 
Baek, Kim, Kim, Koo, & Seok, 2012; Baxter et al., 2005; Belousov, 
Voight, & Belousova, 2007; Dorava & Meyer, 1994; Jenkins et al., 
2013; Meyer et al., 2013; Ministry of Business, 2012; Pilcher & 
Sexton, 1993; Ramasamy, Hill, Hepper, Bull, & Clasper, 2009; 
Spence, Baxter, & Zuccaro, 2004; Spence, Zuccaro, et al., 2004; 






 Dust storms 
Aircraft engines 
 Other eruptions as above 
Calbuco Volcano, 2015 
 
< 0.5 gm3 
0.5-1.5 gm3 
1.5 - 2 gm3 
> 2 gm3 
 (Bebbington, Cronin, Chapman, & Turner, 2008; Bonadonna & 
Houghton, 2005; Chapman et al., 2007; Hayes, Wilson, Deligne, 
Cole, & Hughes, 2017; Hayes, Wilson, & Magill, 2015; Houghton 
et al., 2006; Jenkins, Wilson, et al., 2014; Johnston et al., 2004; 
Stewart et al., 2006; Williams & Wilson, 2017; T. M. Wilson & 
Kaye, 2007; T. M. Wilson et al., 2009; T. M. Wilson et al., 2012; T. 
M. Wilson et al., 2014) 
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4.2.4 Expert elicitation 
4.2.4.1 Overview of the workshop planning and execution 
An objective of the thesis was to engage with the petroleum industry to raise awareness and 
share knowledge of volcanic hazards (Objective 3). Additionally, discussion and consultation 
with the petroleum industry validated the application of the framework and derived results 
(Objective 2). An iterative approach was used to engage with a small group of core companies 
and develop partnerships. Initial contact was made through existing industrial relationships and 
aided by Petroleum Exploration & Production Association of New Zealand (PEPANZ). Non-
disclosure agreements were drafted to mitigate confidentiality risks. Initial discussions were 
undertaken in company offices (New Plymouth) and involved a combination of office-based 
discussions and site visits with ongoing discussion during the site visits. Follow up email 
correspondence provided clarifications and answers to further questions. These companies 
agreed to collaborate by sharing data, information and organising site visits in addition to 
attending the expert elicitation workshop. Geospatial data derived from the research was also 
shared with some companies to validate site locations and functions (Chapter 3). 
A more extensive group of industry representatives, regulators, civil defence and local and 
regional council staff from the New Zealand petroleum sector, along with members of the 
volcanic impact science community were invited to an expert elicitation workshop, seven 
months into the twelve-month thesis timeframe. The workshop’s facilitation was accomplished 
in conjunction with two members of the supervisory team and presented a personal 
development aspect to the research project. The workshop’s rational aims for the Taranaki 
petroleum sector for the development of vulnerability models to volcanic hazards were to: 
• define the damage impact states and threshold categories 
• prioritise interdependencies of the various asset categories. 
The workshop’s experiential aims were as previously stated in Chapter 3, which reiterating are 
to: 
• ensure all attendees felt their expertise was valuable to the discussions while gaining 
knowledge of the importance and relevance of lifeline security 
• strengthen understanding and relationships between the various attendees, specifically 
the civil defence team and industry  
• produce a favourable impression of the work, so future research, publications and 
collaborations are achievable 
• ensure a sense of ownership in the industry of volcanic hazard risk mitigation and desire 
to continue the conversation internally, sector-wide and with civil defence. 
The workshop was held in Stratford and hosted by the Regional Council. Attendees received 
the provisional vulnerability model template and asset categorisations ahead of time, derived 
in previous sections, which helped them understand the tasks required of them and created a 
focus for discussion. Additionally, the facilitated discussion and structuring of the workshop 
allowed separate sessions to test and discuss the issues and challenges with developing the 
theoretical vulnerability models for each asset, and to capture feedback. Appendix E (7.0A5.0) 
provides a more detailed account of the workshop.  
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4.2.4.2 Summary of volcanic hazard impacts to petroleum assets - discussions from 
the expert elicitation workshop 
In this section, the key discussions and points raised by the attendees during the expert 
elicitation workshop are grouped by hazard type and summarised.  Potential consequences of 
volcanic hazard impacts highlighted by the petroleum sector experts through the discussions 
provided direction for further work.  
Ashfall hazards were a critical concern through static loading, particularly for buildings and 
floating roof storage tanks.  Static pressure and suspended ash concentration were not 
perceived as a concern for pipeline and well assets due to the spherical shape of pipelines, 
the small surface area of wells, and lack of moving parts.  The expert group raised concern 
over how such storage tanks would cope with ash fall and ash loading, with specific concerns 
raised around cleaning.  Floating roof tanks were identified as being difficult to clean under 
normal circumstances, relying on rainwater drainage channels. The experts felt repeated ash 
fall events would be problematic, especially if the ash became wet.  One expert noted that if 
certain construction types of floating roof do not receive annual inspections, reduction in 
performance levels occurs that will negatively impact the load baring thresholds. Upon 
reflection, the current level of inspection may not be sufficient in New Zealand. Various 
locations at risk from volcanic ashfall use floating roof storage tanks for refined oil products.  
For example, floating roof storage tanks are used in Auckland to store aviation fuel. This 
research established that more detailed studies need to be undertaken to evaluate static 
pressure risk from volcanic hazards. It was found that current regulations for building designs 
do not consider volcanic hazards. Therefore, further studies are required to investigate if 
elevating standards for structures in volcanic hazard zones is an appropriate method to 
improve ash loading resilience.  Potential changes to design standards is an area that warrants 
further research to influence building standards the upstream petroleum sector of New Zealand 
and globally.  
The temperature HIM proved to be an interesting discussion topic, with experts surmising that 
gaskets and seals would be vulnerable to temperatures above 80 °C. The experts found it 
challenging to determine exact threshold values for the point at which seals would be damaged 
compared to destroyed. Suggesting future laboratory research may provide such results. The 
experts did note the consequences of gasket and seal failure is critical, requiring them to be 
replaced even with slight damage. Precise inspections of all equipment are required to 
determine damage, which takes a longer time, causing potential delays in restarting 
production.  The timeframes from damage to failure are critical and at this point unknown, 
requiring further research.  This concern was a key take-home point for many of the attendees 
that they had not considered before the workshop. Additionally, the temperature ranges 
proposed by the expert panel were different to literature review findings, especially for 
pipelines, validating the use of expert opinion for such complex industries. In-depth discussion 
around the duration of exposure occurred in the workshop with experts concluding that 
exposure to high temperatures is likely to be short when associated with fringe PDCs or lahars, 
compared to lava or core zone of PDCs, but still potentially significant. 
The dynamic pressures that wellheads are built to withstand, based on internal pressure 
design standards, were found to far exceed dynamic pressures expected from volcanic 
hazards. Extreme dynamic pressures were observed in the Gulf War, where explosive blasting 
of the control valves on the “Christmas tree” or “well stacks” were used to release oil flows 
which were ignited, reaching temperatures of over 1100 °C. Therefore, if internal design 
pressures are a good analogue for external pressure thresholds, wellhead structures are 
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resilient to the volcanic hazards they may encounter. However, the well-stacks and control 
valve units may not be as resilient. For storage tanks and pipelines, the experts determined 
that dynamic pressures from hyper-concentrated lahars would be the most damaging hazard, 
due to the scouring effects of some lahars.  The expert’s lack of knowledge around lahar and 
PDC variations was identified as a constraint on the process, which can be addressed in future 
research. However, the discussion remained robust, identifying critical variables that would 
influence the impacts, such as exposure duration, length of span and alignment to be 
addressed in future research.  Additionally, experts identified that floating roof storage tanks 
designs require a dyke and levee system or bund surrounding them. The experts raised 
concern that while this can offer protection, lahar debris may be elevated by the structures and 
puncture tanks.  Therefore, finding that the assumption dyke and levees provide complete 
protection is an unsafe one.   
The experts concluded that for the production facilities asset type, any damage from static 
pressure and laharic dynamic pressure would be considerable, thus bypassing the minor 
damage state.  For the lahars, the expert's knowledge deficiency, mentioned previously, 
constrained discussions during the workshop, leading to some uncertainty. This uncertainty 
manifested in the matrix through assumptions made on intensity and exposure duration of 
lahar and other volcanic hazards.  The PDC damage review provided thought-provoking 
findings, where wind loading for flare stacks was identified as an example of vulnerability. Wind 
speed designs consider the speed at which damage is caused by resonance. Links between 
PDC dynamic pressure and wind speed design were identified for further research.  
Ash concentration was identified as a critical risk to the production facilities asset type, as 
many components have moving turbines or fans and rely on good quality air.  Experts 
concluded that small amounts, particularly the finer ash, would cause damage by blocking 
filters leading to overheating.  Some assets use turbines, like aeroplane engines, which have 
extensive research into the impacts of ash.  Therefore, inferring from existing studies, 
consequences of direct abrasion of turbines from abrasive ash would cause significant 
damage. However, experts highlighted that the damage would likely require parts to be 
replaced rather than the destruction of the asset unless the damage caused secondary 
hazards such as a fire.  Experts also identified the ash as a concern for water supplies, that 
the petroleum sector requires for fire safety.  The ash can cause operational issues or damage 
to water pumps as highlighted in existing volcanic hazard impact research. However, one 
expert identified that the seal quality on the tanks would also be compromised by the abrasion 
and corrosion properties of the ash. They expanded on this, suggesting damage of this type is 
gradual where replacement is required within 6-12 months depending on the level of damage. 
This collaborated the findings from the temperature discussions, that small seals and gaskets, 
while relatively minor components are widespread across many asset categories.  They are 
expensive to replace and difficult to monitor the gradual damage or shorten lifespan, providing 
an opportunity for future research to aid the petroleum sectors resilience and recovery. 
 
4.2.5 Development of the final vulnerability models for the petroleum sector in 
Taranaki 
The final stages of developing the vulnerability models were to compile the workshop feedback 
and provide results to the invited experts for comment. A debrief with co-facilitators and 
supervisors immediately followed the workshop and was essential for capturing key points. 
Discussion and comments from attendees captured during the workshop provided a focus for 
additional literature reviews and revisions to the vulnerability models. A summary report was 
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then distributed to all participants, with a request for feedback on the developed vulnerability 
models. The next four sections summarise the feedback received during the final steps in 
developing the four vulnerability models for the Taranaki petroleum sector, followed by the final 
vulnerability model results presented in Section 4.3. 
4.2.5.1 Asset benchmarking – expert elicitation discussion and feedback 
Theoretical vulnerability models used the most vulnerable equipment example as a benchmark 
for each asset group, to overcome variations in the equipment between sites and within asset 
groups. Experts and site visits confirmed the variation in asset equipment throughout the 
Taranaki region for the petroleum sector. For example, building variations include shipping 
containers, portacabins, and structurally reinforced office buildings. This variation caused 
uncertainties in the generic threshold range used during the high-level vulnerability 
assessment. Experts identified examples of vulnerable equipment for each asset group and 
used these to determine the generic threshold ranges for the impact states across all hazards. 
For example, storage tank construction variation plays a significant factor in the vulnerability 
assessment. The experts confirmed that annular pontoon floating roof constructions as being 
the most vulnerable, especially if the pontoons are leaking and compromised already (Myers, 
2017). 
4.2.5.2 Static pressure – expert elicitation discussion and feedback 
The expert group confirmed that snow loading standards are a good analogue for static 
pressure and provide maximum design loads. However, the New Zealand Standards only give 
prescriptive coefficients and geographical variations for alpine and sub-alpine conditions 
(Standards New Zealand, 2003b). This information will be more critical for detailed site-specific 
work and did not provide a range of probable values for the generic high-level vulnerability 
models. Instead, the American Petroleum Institute (API Standard 650) provided threshold 
values for snow loading limit designs for welded oil storage tanks (American Petroleum 
Institute, 2013). 
4.2.5.3 Dynamic Pressure – expert elicitation discussion and feedback 
The feedback from the group was clear that dynamic forces of lahars and PDC need 
separating, as PDCs represent a more uniform force, while lahars are more height restricted. 
They considered PDC dynamic force to be more uniform and analogous to wind loading, while 
laharic dynamic forces were felt to be more focused and unbalanced with the potential for 
hyper-concentrated lahars impacting the base of structures only. 
The expert group referenced wind load standards set out under AS/NZS 1170 for many of the 
various categories, as this presented an analogous extreme dynamic force for PDCs. Wind 
loading as a design standard is used in the American Petroleum Institute (API) Standards, from 
which threshold values are inferred. Additional references have been found from other industry 
resource material to revise the dynamic pressures for the various asset types. For more 
complex asset types, such as the production facility, the expert group used flare stacks, as a 
vulnerable example to wind loading. Flare stack design thresholds helped to constrain the 
impact metric thresholds for uniform dynamic forces associated with PDCs. Examples of 
extreme wind damage to storage tanks in the downstream petroleum sector are Hurricane 
Celia (1970), Hurricane Hugo (1989), and Hurricanes Rita and Katrina (2005) also informed 
threshold ranges (American Society of Civil & Wind-Induced Forces Task, 2011). 
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For lahars, a lack of knowledge led to perceptions of the hazard coming from a video shown 
during the workshop and imparted by the co-facilitating supervisor's experience. The example 
provided showed a hyper-concentrated lahar from Curah Lengkong river in Indonesia, which 
had a lahar front-loaded with large boulders and debris (Lavigne, 2002). Given time constraints 
and understanding of the ranges of lahars, the group did not consider the more uniform 
sediment lahars. However, experts raised concern that storage tanks of specific designs (i.e. 
floating roof), tend to have dyke and levee systems or bunds surrounding them. While this will 
offer some protection from hazards, discussion considered that it might elevate debris carried 
by the lahar and puncture the tanks. The Drift River Terminal concrete dyke and levee system 
constructed following the 1991 Mt. Redoubt eruption offered only limited protection in the 2009 
eruption (Cook Inletkeeper, 2009). If these dyke and levee systems become exposed to 
substantial and repeated lahars, then the protection they offer would undoubtedly be 
compromised. Therefore, any assumption that the dyke and levee systems provide complete 
protection is an unsafe one. It is also worth noting that dykes and levee systems do not 
surround most bullet-style, fixed roof, or open water storage tanks. Additionally, the erosional 
qualities of lahars were identified as a key concern in exposing buried pipelines and 
undermining supportive structures, and further study of these impacts was highlighted to 
understand the risks to petroleum infrastructure. Particular concern was raised that buried 
pipelines will become exposed and damaged by lahars, as at the Drift River Oil Terminal. 
4.2.5.4 Temperature – expert elicitation discussion and feedback 
The expert elicitation workshop produced different ranges of temperatures for the thresholds 
compared to the provisional ranges provided. The experts focused on the seals, gaskets and 
other consumable components that are vulnerable to damage. These ranges were consistent 
across most asset types, with 60-80 °C identified as the threshold at which “minor” damage 
would occur with “major” damage/possible destruction at 150 °C and in some cases destruction 
occurring above 450 °C. Discussion occurred around the variability in the duration of exposure 
to temperatures, which was perceived to be short for volcanic hazards. They perceived that 
dynamic forces would cause considerably more damage to assets than short high-temperature 
exposure, but didn’t discount the damage that high temperatures would cause. 
4.2.5.5 Ash concentration – expert elicitation discussion and feedback 
Expert attendees raised dust storms as a comparable analogue to ash fall, based on 
experiences of dust storms in the Middle-East. Petroleum sector experiences of dust storms 
highlight vulnerabilities and reliance on workforce and consumables to maintain assets, 
leading to a pre-emptive shut down for the duration of the storm during inhospitable conditions. 
Co-facilitating supervisors highlighted that volcanic ash would be of a much higher 
concentration and have more abrasive qualities than dust storms, thus likely to cause more 
damage. Research has found similarities between dust storms, volcanic ash hurricanes and 
PDCs such as high mobility rates, with differences such as the particles size, density, 
temperature, run-out dynamics, and concentration (Doronzo, Martí, Dellino, Giordano, & 
Sulpizio, 2016). From an initial response planning perspective, the mitigation actions required 
would be similar, in that consumables and workforce are required dependencies. The current 
plan by the Taranaki industry involves a short-term shut-down of all equipment and production 
during an eruption, to facilitate a recovery period as rapid as feasibly possible and to restart 
production. However, the combination of a hefty ash dose, temperature and dynamic force 
would likely cause damage to wires, gaskets, and seals as well as filters as a minimum. Severe 
damage would likely require a minimum 12-month recovery period. However, as this research 
is still theoretical and will remain untested until a future volcanic eruption impacts the petroleum 
 
 
Zoë Juniper 53 
 
sector or laboratory experiments occur.  An additional note of caution is that remobilisation of 
volcanic ash can cause damage to sensitive components and care will need to be taken to 
mitigate ongoing risks following an eruption. 
4.3 RESULTS 
Using the literature search results and incorporating comments and feedback from the expert 
elicitation process discussed in the previous sections, final vulnerability models have been 
produced for the four petroleum asset categories (wells, pipelines, production facilities and 
storage tanks) (Tables 4.3 to 4.6). 
The results highlight that: 
• Wells are likely the most resilient asset type. However, associated well stacks are less 
resilient due to valves and in some cases electrical wiring or associated air compressor 
units. 
• Pipelines are most vulnerable when exposed for aerial river crossings, and the erosional 
qualities of the lahar hazards are the most damaging for this asset type. 
• Production facility assets encompass a wide range of equipment, for the dynamic 
pressure the flare stacks, and for suspended ash, any air intake equipment, are 
examples of vulnerabilities. 
• The storage tank assets also encompass a wide range of designs, with floating roof 
designs perceived to be the most vulnerable to static and dynamic pressure HIMs. 
• Wiring and gaskets, while small components of many equipment types within numerous 
asset categories are examples of vulnerable components. These are vulnerable to both 
temperature and suspended ash, with implications for recovery timeframes. 
 
4.4 SUMMARY 
The key points from the methodology for developing vulnerability models for the petroleum 
sector for volcanic risk assessment and the Mt. Taranaki Case study are as follows: 
• The methodology includes a combination of literature review, an expert elicitation 
workshop and follows up with industry partners to develop vulnerability models for each 
asset category using a threshold level approach of a volcanic vulnerability assessment 
(fulfilling Objectives 1 and 2). 
• Developing vulnerability matrices for complex petroleum systems at a holistic level can 
be simplified, by considering examples of vulnerable equipment, to benchmark damage 
thresholds. This approach acknowledges that such complex systems are only as 
vulnerable as the weakest part or component, forming the methodological approach for 
the development of theoretical vulnerability models as part of Objective 1. 
• Lahars and ashfall (both static pressure and ash concentration) are perceived to be the 
primary hazards that are likely to cause the most impact on the four physical assets of 
the petroleum system in Taranaki. These two hazards will be the focus for impacts to 
petroleum assets in the Taranaki Region as the risk analysis is concluded in Chapter 5 
(fulfilling Objective 2). 
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Table 4.3 Vulnerability model for the Well asset category (noting the resilience of this category). Mpa – MegaPascals. 
Wells           
    D0 D1 D2 D3 
Hazard Type   








resilience maintained seals/gaskets damaged seals/gaskets destroyed   
Thresholds 




resilience maintained n/a 
depends on wellhead design 
standards 
depends on wellhead design 
standards 
Thresholds 




resilience maintained  n/a 
depends on wellhead design 
standards 
depends on wellhead design 
standards 
Thresholds 
0-13 MPa  n/a 13-34 MPa >34 MPa 
Suspended Ash 
impact/ damage  n/a 
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Table 4.4 Vulnerability model for the pipeline asset category (shading highlights lahars as the most damaging hazard impacts for this asset). kPa – Kilo Pascals 
Pipelines (including aerial crossings and pipelines buried to a maximum depth of 700 mm)     
    D0 D1 D2 D3 
Hazard Type   




impact/ damage  n/a 





Coating damage, sealing, 
gasket failures 
loss of strength of steel   
Thresholds 
< 150 °C 150 - 450 °C 450 - 600 °C  >600 °C 
Laharic dynamic/flow - 
variable pressure 
impact/ damage 
resilience maintained depends on exposure & type of lahar 
catastrophic failure, i.e. 
pipeline/struts destroyed 
Thresholds 
0-0.05 kPa 0.05-1 kPa >1 kPa 
PDC dynamic/flow - 
uniform pressure 
impact/ damage 
resilience maintained Minor Damage Major Damage 
catastrophic failure i.e. 
pipeline/struts destroyed 
Thresholds 
0-0.05 kPa 0.05-1 kPa 1 - 2 kPa >2 kPa 
Suspended Ash 
impact/ damage  n/a 
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Table 4.5 Vulnerability model for the production facility asset category (shading highlights static pressure, lahar and suspended ash as most damaging hazard impacts for this asset). 
Psf- pounds per square foot, gm3 – grams per cubic meter. 
Production Facilities (excluding buildings)         
    D0 D1 D2 D3 
Hazard Type   





resilience maintained  n/a maximum load standard Destroyed 
Thresholds 
0-1.2 kPa (0-25 psf)  n/a 1.12 kPa (25 psf) > 1.2 kPa (>25 psf) 
Temperature 
impact/ damage 
resilience maintained seals/gaskets damaged seals/gaskets destroyed   
Thresholds 




resilience maintained  n/a 
depends on exposure & type of 
lahar 
catastrophic failure i.e. assets 
crumple 
Thresholds 





Flare stack resonance reached, or wind speed high enough 
damage occurs 
catastrophic failure, i.e. assets 
crumple 
Thresholds 
<1.44 kPa (<30 psf) 1.44 - 1.68 kPa (30-35 psf) 1.68-1.92 kPa (35-40 psf) > 1.92 kPa (> 40 psf) 
Suspended Ash impact/ damage 




catastrophic failure i.e. turbine 
destroyed 
Thresholds 
light (0.01-0.5 gm3) Moderate (0.5-2 gm3) Moderate/Intense (1.5-5 gm3) Intense (2-8 gm3) 
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Table 4.6 Vulnerability model of the storage tanks asset category (shading highlights static pressure and dynamic pressure as the three most damaging hazard impacts for this 
asset). 
Storage Tanks           
    D0 D1 D2 D3 
Hazard Type   





resilience maintained n/a  maximum load standard Destroyed 
Thresholds 
0-1.2 kPa (0-25 psf)  n/a 1.12 kPa (25 psf) > 1.2 kPa (>25 psf) 
Temperature 
impact/ damage 
resilience maintained seals damaged seals destroyed   
Thresholds 




resilience maintained  n/a 
depends on exposure & type of 
lahar 
catastrophic failure, i.e. tanks 
crumple/ruptured and flooded 
Thresholds 




resilience maintained  n/a 
depends on exposure & type 
PDC 
catastrophic failure i.e. tanks 
crumple 
Thresholds 
0-0.72 kPa (0-15 psf)  n/a 0.72 - 1.72 kPa (15-36 psf) > 1.72 kPa (>36 psf) 
Suspended Ash 
impact/ damage 
resilience maintained  n/a Filter / seals damage 
 n/a 
Thresholds 
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5.0 DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION OF A RISK ASSESSMENT FOR THE 
PETROLEUM SECTOR IN TARANAKI, NEW ZEALAND 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter develops and applies a volcanic risk assessment to the physical assets of the 
Taranaki petroleum sector. The risk assessment uses a deterministic approach, combining the 
hazard scenarios developed in Chapter 2, the asset inventory from Chapter 3, and the 
vulnerability models from Chapter 4 (fulfilling Objectives 1 and 2). Uncertainties captured in 
the application are addressed in this chapter. Additionally, dependencies on other lifelines and 
systems are investigated using expert elicitation, and a list of critical dependencies produced.  
5.2 APPLICATION OF VOLCANIC RISK ASSESSMENT FOR PETROLEUM SECTOR IN 
TARANAKI, NEW ZEALAND 
The risk assessment methodology used a GIS-based deterministic approach based on the risk 
assessment approach mentioned in Section 1.5.4, and the two hazard scenarios developed in 
Chapter 2. The hazard scenarios represent the two typical eruptive styles of Mt. Taranaki, 
frequent small-magnitude effusive eruptions, and a less frequent large-magnitude explosive 
eruptions.  
The steps taken to combine the three types of assessments (hazards, exposure and 
vulnerability) and apply the risk assessment for the Taranaki region are to:  
a. overlay hazard model (Section 2.3) over the physical petroleum asset inventory 
(Section 3.4.1) 
b. reference the relevant vulnerability models for impacted assets to determine the 
impact metric value for the relevant asset category and hazard intensity measure 
(Tables 4.3 – 4.6) 
i. where relevant hazard intensity measures are not available from the 
hazard models (as discussed in Section 5.2.2), apply arbitrary hazard 
intensity measures (Table 5.1) 
c. assign the highest damage state when an asset is exposed to multiple hazards 
d. plot the assets and hazard models for each scenario, showing the final damage 
state value for all assets. 
5.2.1 Overview of the approach used for the volcanic risk assessment for Mt. 
Taranaki 
The hazard assessment (Chapter 2) developed a methodological approach and application to 
the Taranaki Petroleum Sector to identify the hazards of concern, the styles of a future Mt. 
Taranaki eruption and built GIS hazard scenarios based on past Mt. Taranaki events. The 
results drew on existing knowledge from published material, with more recent work providing 
greater insights into the behaviours of Mt. Taranaki, through the addition of new data and 
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• PDC 
• sector collapses. 
The exposure assessment (Chapter 3) developed a methodological approach to build a GIS 
database of physical petroleum assets and an appropriate classification system. A total of 247 
physical petroleum assets were identified, mapped and classified as one of six different asset 
categorisations, of which four categories (204 assets) are applicable to this study: 
• wells 
• production facilities 
• pipelines 
• storage tanks 
The development of the asset inventory and asset classification was reliant on petroleum 
sector expert knowledge, resulting from building strong partnerships and engagement at the 
expert elicitation workshop.  
The vulnerability assessment (Chapter 4) developed a methodological approach and 
application to the Taranaki Petroleum Sector to produce vulnerability models for the four asset 
types. A theoretical approach was used for the vulnerability assessment, due to the lack of 
previous impacts of volcanic hazards on the petroleum sector and untested nature of the 
results.  Expert judgement was used as a critical methodology alongside literature reviews in 
deriving the models. Intensity scales were selected from a review of the published material, 
while the theoretical damage thresholds were developed using expert judgement.  An expert 
elicitation workshop allowed collaboration of multiple industry representatives to propose 
theoretical thresholds at which damage could occur for the various assets from volcanic 
hazards.  A higher level of confidence in the results was achieved by the involvement of expert 
judgment, compared to a review of published literature only. The vulnerability models represent 
the relationship between the asset category and the hazard intensity to determine the level of 
damage likely.   
The risk assessment applies the vulnerability models and the various hazard scenarios 
produced in Chapter 2. The risk assessment results are presented as GIS maps showing the 
final impact state assigned to each asset. The vulnerability models provide the impact state 
based on the known asset category and intensity of the hazards at each point for each 
scenario. Where multiple hazards occur at one location, the maximum impact state across the 
individual hazards determines the final impact state.  For example, if a PDC destroys the asset 
(impact state D3 – Table 4.1), then any additional damage from ashfall is negligible. For the 
risk assessment, a critical assumption is made that equipment is in full working order at the 
time of the eruption. A further assumption is that the industry has had little to no warning and 
not implemented any volcanic emergency plans. Therefore, no pre-emptive shut down of 
production has occurred, which represents a worst-case impact scenario. 
5.2.2 Application of the volcanic risk assessment for Taranaki petroleum sector 
Potential variability in hazard intensity metrics is challenging to derive due to the absence of 
probabilistic modelling for the PDC and lahar hazards available for use in this thesis. For 
example, variations in dynamic pressures of PDCs between the main flow and fringe effects 
are unable to be determined as they were for the Merapi eruption (Jenkins et al., 2013).  
Therefore, a generic hazard intensity is used in both hazard scenarios, applying a binary 
“presence or not” assumption. Ashfall intensity variation is represented in the hazard scenarios 
using thickness. However, as discussed in Chapter 3, the relation between thickness, static 
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pressure, and ashfall concentration over time requires knowledge or assumptions of additional 
variables, such as ash density, which are absent from available Mt. Taranaki modelling. The 
presence of ash for some asset types, irrespective of the amount has been shown to cause 
“major” damage if the system was functioning at the time of the event. Therefore, both a binary 
and generic value were used, and assets are assumed to be functioning at the onset of ashfall. 
Scenarios involving a sector collapse are omitted for this risk assessment. Sector collapse 
events are known to produce binary results on any impacted petroleum assets, except for 
wells.  
Impact metrics were calculated for the four asset categories based on the final vulnerability 
models (Section 4.2.5) for the hazards of concern to the petroleum sector (Table 5.1). Buildings 
and industrial users were excluded from the risk assessment, reducing the number of assets 
in the risk assessment to from 247 to 204 assets. The assigned impact metric values remain 
the same for the risk assessments of the hazard scenarios, to maintain consistency between 
the results.  
Table 5.1 Assigned impact metric values for the asset categories and hazards. Colours relate to states given 
in Table 4.1, green- D0, red - D2, black - D3. 
Asset type Hazard 
 
Lahar Ashfall PDC Sector Collapse 
Wellsite D0 D0 D0 D1 
Pipelines (above 
ground) 
D3 D0 D2 D3 
Production 
Facilities 
D2 D2 D3 D3 
Storage Tanks D3 D2 D3 D3 
Buildings excluded 
Industrial users excluded 
The second step overlays the asset data with the scenario, maps using ArcGIS to calculate 
the impact assessment values of each of the 204 physical petroleum assets in the Taranaki 
region. This process identifies asset locations that are theoretically exposed to the hazard(s) 
in each scenario and assigns the final impact state for each asset location; conditioning is 
applied where multiple hazards impact a single asset location. This process is done for both 
the small and large eruption hazard scenarios, providing the potential at-risk assets for each 
scenario (Figure 5.2 and 5.4). The entire process was then repeated combining the two hazard 
scenarios as a single time-limited event showing the impacted assets from a fast progressing 
two-phase future Mt. Taranaki eruption hazard scenario. The compounded impact damage is 
presented (Figure 5.6).  Each risk assessment results are preceded by the associated hazard 
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Figure 5.1 Small eruption hazard scenario with locations of the assets and their categories. Note – excluded 
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Figure 5.2 Risk assessment results for the small eruption hazard scenario, also showing the hazard layer. Note 
– assets are subcategories based on the final impact state assigned. 
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Figure 5.3 Large eruption hazard scenario with locations of assets and their categories. Note – excluded asset 
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Figure 5.4 Risk assessment results for the large eruption hazard scenario, also showing the hazard layer. Note 
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Figure 5.5 Combined hazard scenario (small and large eruptions in a short time period), with locations of assets 
and their categories. Note – excluded asset categories are displayed with a white colour. 
 
 
66 Zoë Juniper 
 
 
Figure 5.6 Risk assessment results for the combined hazard scenario, also showing the hazard layer. Note – 
assets are subcategories based on the final impact state assigned.
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5.2.3 Results and analysis of volcanic risk assessment results for Taranaki 
petroleum sector. 
5.2.3.1 Risk assessment results 
The small eruption hazard scenario (Figure 5.2) occurs at a time where the wind direction 
deposits the ash to the northeast, with ash falling across much of the region to the north and 
east of Mt. Taranaki.  Ashfall is thickest within the National Park (up to 100 mm) and coating 
assets from Stratford to Egmont Village in up to 10 mm of ash with small thicknesses reaching 
as far as Urenui and New Plymouth including the Port with up to 1 mm of ash (Figure 5.2).  
The ash causes potential major damage to production facilities and storage tanks through 
abrasion and corrosion impacts. A small PDC runs down an existing drainage channel to the 
northeast as far as two aerial pipeline crossings but losing sufficient dynamic pressure and 
temperature not to affect those assets (Figure 5.2).  Two lahars occur down existing drainage 
channels to the northwest and south impacting a production facility and aerial crossings (Figure 
5.2).  The aerial crossings are destroyed, while the production facility suffers major damage.  
A summary of the impacted assets is given in Table 5.2 and displayed on the map (Figure 5.2). 
Table 5.2 Impacted assets for the small eruption hazard scenario 
Risk assessment for the small eruption hazard scenario  
Asset type Impact State D0 Impact State D1 Impact State D2 Impact State D3 
Wells 94 0 0 0 
Pipelines 34 0 0 5 
Production facilities 10 0 33 0 
Storage Tanks 4 0 24 0 
Total 142 0 57 5 
 
The large eruption hazard scenario (Figure 5.4) occurs at a time where the wind direction 
deposits the ash to the north, however due to the size ash covers the region to the northwest 
and northeast also. Thick deposits of up to 800 mm cover a focused ellipse area as far north 
as the outskirts of New Plymouth, with up to 100mm of ash falling on assets north of Midhurst 
to Urenui and the Port area (Figure 5.4). Stratford and Midhurst areas receive up to 10 mm of 
ash.  The ash causes potential major damage to production facilities and storage tanks through 
abrasion and corrosion impacts and will close impacted road networks. Wells and aerial 
pipeline crossings are not impacted by the ashfall. Major lahars flow to the west and northeast, 
with the northeast lahar running directly through Inglewood and reach the coast (Figure 5.4), 
with impacts likely to compromise road bridges, expose buried pipelines and destroy aerial 
crossings. Wells appear more resilient to the lahar inundations with no damage perceived. 
Additionally, the volumes will top existing drainage channels and flow across neighbouring 
fields, roads and buildings and petroleum assets. Two large PDCs occur to the southwest and 
northeast (Figure 5.4).  The southwest PDC extends beyond the National Park, but no 
petroleum assets are affected. A summary of the impacted assets is given in Table 5.3 and 
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Table 5.3 Impacted assets for the large eruption hazard scenario 
Risk assessment for the large eruption hazard scenario  
Asset type Impact State D0 Impact State D1 Impact State D2 Impact State D3 
Wells 94 0 0 0 
Pipelines 37 0 0 2 
Production facilities 11 0 32 0 
Storage Tanks 6 0 22 0 
Total 148 0 54 2 
 
The combined eruption hazard scenario (Figure 5.6) compounds the hazards from both the 
small and large hazard scenarios and causes significant widespread impacts across the entire 
region with lahars in multiple directs destroying some of the aerial pipeline crossings. Ashfall 
is widespread with up to 800mm affected Egmont Village and up to 300mm falling at the Port, 
New Plymouth and Inglewood (Figure 5.6).  Lahars take out multiple aerial pipeline crossings 
and likely to impact road networks (Figure 5.6). However, the total number of assets impacted 
is very similar to the large eruption except for the additional five aerial crossing destroyed by 
the small eruption hazard scenario lahar. A summary of the impacted assets is given in Table 
5.4 and displayed on the map (Figure 5.6). 
 
Table 5.4 Impacted assets for the combined eruption hazard scenario 
Risk assessment for the combined eruption hazard scenario  
Asset type Impact State D0 Impact State D1 Impact State D2 Impact State D3 
Wells 94 0 0 0 
Pipelines 32 0 0 7 
Production facilities 11 0 32 0 
Storage Tanks 6 0 22 0 
Total 143 0 54 7 
 
5.2.3.2 Risk assessment analysis 
This section considers and analyses the results from the application of the risk assessment 
framework process to the Taranaki petroleum sector. Several volcanic hazards have been 
identified from the vulnerability models that will potentially cause the most damage to 
petroleum assets. Table 5.5 shows the identified trend for ash and lahars as the primary 
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Table 5.5 Comparison of the volcanic hazards that theoretically cause concern (disruption and damage) to 
petroleum assets.  Red – primary hazard impacts causing the most damage, orange are secondary hazard impacts 
causing damage. 






















































Suspended Ash Suspended Ash Suspended Ash Suspended Ash Suspended Ash 
Trends can be seen in the results for the three GIS-based risk assessments run for the 
petroleum sector (Tables 5.2-5.4 and Figures 5.2, 5.4 and 5.6). The pipeline and well asset 
categories show little to no damage from ash impacts, while production facilities and storage 
tanks see potential damage or impacts with very small quantities of ash.  This is based on 
equipment being in full working order and that the qualities of the ash cause abrasion and 
corrosive damage.  The impacts may not be immediate, and require more frequent 
replacement of seals, gaskets and filters, where the increase in replacement is likely to be 
directly related to the amount of ash the equipment is exposed too. Lahar damage of aerial 
pipeline crossings and assets near the affected river/streams are seen to cause major damage 
from all sizes of eruption.  PDCs only reach beyond the National Park in the large eruption 
hazard scenario, and do not affect any petroleum assets.  In both the small and large hazard 
scenario there are at least one production facility system and its associated assets that 
appears to be unaffected by direct impacts. However, indirect impacts may still impact that 
system, but the results allow the sector to identify the least impacted system(s).  This then 
allows the petroleum sector and civil defence and emergency management officials to prioritise 
resources to enable a more rapid resumption of limited production and thus gas supply 
services from that system. The combined hazard scenario impacts all petroleum production 
facilities and related systems, resulting in widespread disruption to the gas supply. 
The deterministic assessment for Taranaki required an assumption that impact data were 
consistent values, as hazard impact metrics were not modelled for the locations of assets. 
Therefore, all assets were assumed to have been impacted by medium to full strength intensity. 
In reality, lower intensity fringe effects are probable given the distances from the vent. The 
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hazard intensity and distance of assets raised further uncertainty in this methodology, which 
probabilistic hazard modelling can reduce in future research. Additionally, the methodology 
developed contained a limited number of hazard scenarios, which were assumed to occur over 
a few hours to days, with no clean-up or remedial action taken between the events.  
Improvement of the hazard scenario timeframes will benefit future research focused on 
recovery of the petroleum sector to a future Mt. Taranaki eruption.   
5.2.4 Limitations 
All risk assessments will contain uncertainties, from aleatoric (inherent), epistemic (systematic) 
to ontological (unknown) (Marzocchi & Jordan, 2014). The importance of documenting 
uncertainties when developing a framework for volcanic fragility and vulnerability functions is 
highlighted by G. Wilson et al. (2017). Aleatoric uncertainties are associated with the hazard 
themselves and are beyond the control of the risk manager, as their reduction is not an option.  
Further research, sampling or data capture can reduce epistemic uncertainties derived from 
the data, modelling and associated processes and methodologies. Ontological uncertainties, 
not often mentioned, are the unknown and unexpected uncertainties that are unknown until 
they occur. For this research, ontological uncertainties are outside the scope of the research. 
Additionally, consideration of chaos is suggested when applying risk assessments to any 
industrial sector or systems that involve human decision-making processes (Kirchsteiger, 
1999). However, this is difficult to quantify, and while acknowledged, it is beyond the scope of 
this assessment. 
Table 5.6 documents the uncertainties captured during the development of a framework for 
volcanic risk assessment of the petroleum sector in Chapter 2, which represent areas for 
reduction in uncertainties in this methodological approach during future work.  
Table 5.6 Table of uncertainties and their sources. 
Factor Source of uncertainty 
Hazard assessment Lack of observed and measured hazard intensity matrices 
Incorrect values used for hazard intensities  
Incorrect maximum extents used for hazard maps 
Lack of probabilistic modelling 
Exposure assessment Incorrect categorisation of assets 
Variations within asset categories 
Limited number of assets in categories 
New or missed asset locations 
Vulnerability assessment Determination of threshold values 
Design standards used, especially for older facilities 
Global variations 
Offshore asset variations  
Multiple or continued eruption compounded damage 
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The hazard scenarios developed are not able to assess risk through time for 
the duration of the event and efforts of clean-up and other risk mitigations 
applied during eruption duration. 
Approach used to apply generic weighting to all assets of the same type 
Dependencies Level of dependency may vary between assets and locations 
Third party assumptions, i.e. contractors 
Uncertainty documentation is an important outcome of the volcanic hazard assessment 
process for Mt. Taranaki. While the “past is a key to the future” for determining future volcanic 
eruption behaviours, their nature does change through time creating uncertainty in the hazard 
scenarios produced for future eruptions. A deterministic approach was used for the risk 
assessment framework, and while this thesis does not address this void in probabilistic data, 
it identifies priority hazards for future probabilistic modelling research of greatest concern to 
the petroleum sector, a large contributor to the Taranaki region’s economy.   
Some of the uncertainties identified in the hazard assessment for Mt. Taranaki include: 
• changes in the geochemistry of eruptions through time. 
• accuracy in estimating eruptive sizes, volumes and durations from geological 
records. 
• accuracy in determining the full range of volcanic hazards from past eruptions – 
especially gas volumes that leave no evidence. 
• smaller eruptions not captured in the geological record. 
• erosion of the geological record by subsequent eruptions, societal development 
or standard weathering processes. 
• accuracy of dating samples and reconstruction of stratigraphic timelines. 
Two GIS hazard scenarios were developed as part of the hazard assessment that is based on 
mapped geological units of past events. This methodological approach came with uncertainties 
and errors that are acknowledged in Chapter 2. Uncertainties here can be reduced by inferring 
timeframes and hazard intensity metrics from current or recent analogous eruption timelines. 
For this initial high-level risk assessment for the petroleum sector, the concern is with the 
presence or not of a hazard. Therefore, more detailed scenario development was out of scope 
for this thesis.   
Uncertainties arose during the development of the asset inventory and were documented as 
part of the framework. Access was not available to all petroleum asset locations, which led to 
assumptions being made as to the asset categories at those locations. For example, offshore 
facilities.  In these cases, information was inferred from photos of the locations from company 
published material, permit documentation or aerial photos (Google images) to reduce 
uncertainties. Additionally, the categorisation of assets at a high-level provided a very generic 
and broad classification.  Uncertainties can be reduced by further detailed assessments of 
sub-category and component of assets, including site-specific assessments to address asset 
variations between locations.  
The exposure assessment and asset categorisation were raised in the expert elicitation 
workshop discussions and with individual company discussions, identifying which assets were 
included in asset groupings or excluded from the study altogether. For example, the industry 
decided that aerial crossings are a subset of pipelines and should not be a categorised 
separately. Additionally, the attendees perceived that the risks for exploration drilling from 
volcanic hazards would lead to postponement of exploration activity during any volcanic unrest.  
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Temporary exploration activity and equipment, such as drilling rigs were therefore deemed out 
of scope. Petroleum industry discussion concluded that drilling activity would not start or be 
suspended, and equipment shut down or securely stored, should Mt. Taranaki enter a period 
of unrest.  
The expert elicitation process is a valuable way to generate discussion and capture views from 
a broad range of industry members but are a limited timeframe. To achieve focused and 
effective workshops, setting context, expectations, and identifying potential challenges prior to 
the workshop is critical. One of the most significant barriers encountered during the workshop 
was detaching the system function from operational dependencies and geographical location.   
For example, many attendees initially considered the same assets onshore and offshore 
should be categorised separately.  Other groups rapidly grasped the concept of the physical 
functionality of the assets, irrespective of location.  Therefore, concluding that onshore, 
offshore and pipeline compression stations all contained physical assets that performed the 
same process and therefore would respond similarly to whichever hazard it encountered.  
Another example was onshore and offshore wellheads, fundamentally they do the same 
function, although design variations exist which are based on numerous factors including 
reservoir pressures.  In the same way, groups identified storage tanks and containers are all 
performing the same process irrespective design, construction or size of the asset.  In 
retrospect, more effort could have been made to help workshop attendees overcome their 
natural preferences to consider operational aspects or geographical location. There was an 
incorrect perception that this alternative way of thinking would not be challenging for the 
attendees; pre-warning attendees and explaining this differing view could have been done 
before the workshop. 
Care was taken during the risk assessment not to focus on the outcomes of the risk 
assessment or any single scenario, to enable an appreciation that hazards may occur in 
multiple directions. Additionally, deflecting risk from an individual or specific petroleum assets.  
Concern was raised that for a single scenario, those members of the industry not impacted 
would incorrectly assume that they were not at risk from future eruptions.  Conversely, a single 
scenario approach can highlight assets that may not be impacted at all during a future eruption, 
leading to unnecessary reputational risk to that asset owner.  Communicating uncertainty and 
risk will need to be the focus of future research, gaining a better balance between focusing on 
a single scenario versus multiple directional risks while managing reputation and public 
perceptions. 
 
5.3 DEPENDENCIES OF THE PETROLEUM SECTOR 
Interdependencies are a key focus for lifeline organisations in disaster risk management, 
incorporating knowledge of both who relies on the service and whom the service relies on. 
Rapid recovery post-disruption relies on the clear understanding of lifeline priorities to allocate 
resources, achieved by identifying dependants of that lifeline, and those whom lifelines depend 
on to maintain functionality (O'Rourke, 2007). Understanding of lifeline services and their 
interdependencies has already progressed in New Zealand, with the release of a national 
lifelines infrastructure vulnerability assessment (New Zealand Lifelines Council, 2017). 
However, this report highlights gaps in knowledge and understanding of some sectors remain, 
which this thesis addresses for the upstream petroleum sector. Dependencies on the 
petroleum sector have been identified through the Critical Contingency Operator (Section 
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1.4.2). Dependents of extracted oil are overseas markets, and not considered further in this 
thesis. This thesis identifies the dependencies of the petroleum sector in Taranaki. 
Petroleum system dependencies were identified by mapping the various processes that the 
petroleum sector requires to maintain functionality. A system fault tree visualises such complex 
systems that have many hidden dependencies. The fault tree approach was used for the risk 
assessment of a similarly complex sector in the UK, (nuclear power generation) and highlights 
how quickly complex systems can be impacted at multiple points (Aspinall et al., 2016). The 
fault tree development requires the use of literature review and expert judgment methods, 
including individual discussions and site visits. Dependency confirmation and prioritisation can 
then occur through expert judgment methods such as a workshop to get a sector-wide and 
generic view for the petroleum sector. Here the hazard scenarios developed in Chapter 2, aid 
discussions and hazard footprints from a future Mt. Taranaki eruption. Additionally, the expert 
judgement methodology allows knowledge and sharing of results to be imparted to the 
petroleum sector, fulfilling Objective 3. 
 
5.3.1 Development of a petroleum system fault tree 
The petroleum sector fault tree methodology for the Taranaki sector required interviews, site 
visits and engagement with industry representatives and some expert judgement. Figure 5.7 
illustrates the complexity of the petroleum sector operational systems at a holistic level and 
highlights the multiple points and volcanic hazards that can impact the petroleum system in 
Taranaki. Not all the petroleum sector failure points are physical assets, with many operational 
functionalities impacted through human systems or loss of other critical lifeline services. Fault 
tree analysis uses top-down logic diagrams to graphically represent pathways within a system 
that can lead to failures (Clemens, 1993; Larsen, 1974). This analytical technique is commonly 
used in safety systems analysis to assess risk and identification of undesirable threats or 
outcomes. The petroleum sector fault tree analysis (Figure 5.7)  identified several systems and 
subsystems which share dependencies on mains power, air quality and distribution networks. 
These systems will theoretically become disrupted in a future Mt. Taranaki eruption by one or 
more hazards. Vulnerability models developed in Chapter 4 informed the likely impact of 
hazards to physical systems, with a review of company emergency management plans and 
broader literature review informed the likely impacts of volcanic hazards on non-physical 
systems.  
5.3.2 Dependency prioritisation workshop session 
The identified dependencies for the Taranaki petroleum sector was prioritised in a session at 
the expert elicitation workshop (Section 4.2.4). The session included non-technical/engineers, 
for example, civil defence and other regulatory agencies. Hazard scenarios developed in 
Chapter 2 were supplemented with an unrest phase preceding the eruption, which was outlined 
in an eruption timeline for each eruption scenario (Figure 2.4). The intention of this was to allow 
attendees to assess the indirect impacts of future Mt. Taranaki unrest and eruptions on the 
petroleum sectors ability to continue to function (fulfilling Objective 3 of the thesis).  
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Figure 5.7 Operational petroleum systems fault tree for volcanic hazards.
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The workshop considered dependencies of the Taranaki petroleum sector relies on, and 
prioritised these on the three levels in the New Zealand dependency scale, (given below) 
developed for the national vulnerability study (New Zealand Lifelines Council, 2017, p. 38 ): 
1. the minimal requirement for service to function 
2. important but can partially function and has a full backup  
3. required for service to function.  
The session produced a list of critical (level 3) dependencies for the Taranaki petroleum sector, 
Table 5.7. The experts developed a holistic sector approach compared to identifying 
dependencies for each asset type, which is complex due to the variations between assets at 
different locations. This approach proved to be more appropriate for the high-level and generic 
assessment in which the thesis considers the sector. The session enabled spontaneous 
discussions on response actions and regulation impacts between attendees, allowing greater 
understanding of decision making impacts the petroleum industry would face in the future 
unrest of Mt. Taranaki. For example, the impact on assets, access and staff availability from 
self-evacuations or enforced evacuation zones. Discussions were directed to a more generic 
discussion as there was a tendency for detailed identification of the specific location of concern, 
for example, a single bridge in the road network. However, discussions and identification of 
specific critical points in the networks have been recognised for follow-up work by the Taranaki 
Civil Defence. Table 5.7 presents the results of the brainstorming session and discussion. 
  




1 Staff/resources Availability of staff and contractors, which the industry relies heavily on 
2 Electricity Networks Electricity supply/generation network 
Electricity distribution network 
3 Water Supply 
Disposal - sewerage 
Potable water (drinking) for staff 
4 Fuel Diesel & Petrol for road transport 
Integrity of gas and product supply pipelines 
  Road networks Internal and external road systems.  
Weak points in the road network identify bridges as a primary concern. 
  Telecommunications 
Networks 
Network Operability - Towers on mountain 
UPS - limited battery supply (hrs) 
  AirPort & Sea Port Servicing of rigs 
Export of product - critical to prevent storage reaching capacity 
Staff transfers and resource supply to rigs 
  Regulatory conflict Conflict of regulations or expectations 
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The top four dependencies are critically required by the industry to continue to function in a 
“business as usual” capacity. Disruption to any of the identified dependencies will cause a 
reduction or halt to the industry’s ability to function and thus continue to provide gas into the 
national network. These assumptions come independently of any physical damage caused by 
volcanic hazards to the various assets.  The session also identified regulatory challenges as a 
dependency during discussions. Within this topic, a number of key points for further 
discussions include: 
• the impact of evacuation zones on the sector’s ability to continue to function  
• the need for an advanced warning of evacuations to enable safe shutdown of assets 
within the evacuation zone 
• the Government’s expectation of the sector to continue to produce gas,  
• what are the realistic recovery times and impacts for the country  
• the lack of redundancy as a country for the gas supply  
• the interplay of Health and Safety regulations on shutting down facilities pre-eruption and 
recovery 
• lack of volcanic specific hazard assessments or considerations under some of the current 
legislation and regulatory processes 
• the perceived inflexibility of some legislation and regulations in emergencies and 
recovery phases 
• the interplay of industry regulations and legislation with the CDEM Act 2002. 
5.3.3 Dependencies analysis 
The workshop resulted in a list of the most critical non-physical dependencies for the petroleum 
sector in Taranaki.  Identification of these dependencies informs the petroleum sector of areas 
to improve their resilience, fulfilling Objective 3 of this thesis. The dependencies session of the 
workshop provided enlightening discussion for all involved, where the experts identified that 
the sector works as a system, and all parts need to be operational to continue in a “business 
as usual” capacity.  Disruption to any of the identified dependencies will cause a reduction or 
halt to the industry ability to function and thus continue to provide gas into to the national 
network. The experts identified the core dependencies, given in Table 5.7, identifying their top 
four critical dependencies.  This list was also discussed with industry partners who did not 
attend the workshop, validating the results.   
Petroleum sector assets work as an interconnected system, where the failure of a single point 
within the system, can lead to the entire system shutting down. This may not be immediate, 
giving time for repairs and allowing production to continue in many instances.  The fault tree 
(Figure 5.7) showed that volcanic hazards could cause multiple impacts which can overwhelm 
capacity, highlighting the need for more detailed investigations of the petroleum assets at sub-
system or component levels.  Nevertheless, results of this thesis are valid and allow the 
industry to identify potential impact problems, which provide an opportunity to consider optimal 
solutions to mitigate the risks and improve regulations and legislation.  Ultimately leading to a 
more resilient industry, through improved processes, infrastructure design and planning and 
thus fulfilling Objective 3 of the original aims. A further key point found that incorporation of risk 
reduction changes to existing infrastructure for companies is a long-term solution, due to the 
large investment costs. Such changes are frequently adopted over 5/15/30 year development 
plans to spread costs and resource requirements. 
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5.3.3.1 Emergency management  
Emergency management plan comparison of several Taranaki petroleum companies, that 
cannot be named due to confidentiality reasons, highlighted the strong emphasis on the 
protection of staff and the environment ahead of the physical assets.  This finding is consistent 
with New Zealand legislation governing Health and Safety in the workplace.  Plans are varied 
and fundamental at best, due to lack of experience of volcanic events. The overwhelming 
appreciation from the emergency planning across the industry was of risk avoidance, achieved 
by plans to stop production and purge assets and pipelines of hydrocarbon products at the 
onset of a volcanic eruption event, in some case at signs of unrest (VAL 2).  With the aim of 
providing sufficient time for assets to be shut down before ash or other hazards cause damage 
or create an environmental disaster.  However, from analogous eruptions, such as Montserrat 
Volcano, 1995, or Agung Volcano eruption, 2017, unrest periods can last many months before 
an eruption, with the eruption then continuing for months or years (Relifweb, n.d.; Robertson 
et al., 2000; Sparks & Cashman, 2013).  The entire sector cannot take a cautious early-shut 
down approach not knowing if unrest will led to an eruption in days, weeks, months or at all. 
The concern with premptive shutdowns are that there is only 4-5 days of gas supply available 
in the pipeline (WorleyParsons, 2014) and a requirement under the Civil Defence and 
Emergency Management Act 2013 or the Gas Act 1992 to continue the supply of gas as a 
critical service to New Zealand.  The risk is heightened by the current situation where all 
domestic producing gas fields are in the shadow of Mt. Taranaki and exposed directly or 
indirectly to volcanic eruption hazards.  While a short-term (<24 hr) shut down of gas 
production at one or more sites is a frequent occurrence, the country has not fully appreciated 
the implications of a complete shutdown of all gas production for some weeks.  This scenario 
is currently a realistic possibility in the event of a future Mt. Taranaki eruption.   Additionally, it 
is probable that magmatic unrest may occur, where VAL2 reached and maintained for some 
weeks without an actual eruption.  Therefore, the industry will rely on the science community 
to deliver regular updates and close monitoring of Mt. Taranaki, while balancing the need to 
continue production with the safety of staff.  There are no easy answers, and these concerns 
can be flushed out in future studies around response and recovery actions, planning and 
timing, which this thesis provides a springboard for.  
5.3.3.2 Regulatory challenges 
The regulatory challenges identified as a dependency was acknowledged as an important 
factor for recovery. Where the impact that regulatory challenges could hinder rapid recovery 
and smooth governance under emergency powers.  Such policy and legislation challenges 
hindered an efficient recovery in Christchurch following the 2010 and 2011 Earthquakes 
(Wilkinson, Crampton, & Krupp, 2018). Good pre-event recovery and response planning for 
legislative barriers is critical if the same mistakes are to be avoided. This thesis identifies 
recovery challenges as a key future study area for the petroleum sector.  The petroleum sector 
regulatory challenges are an important finding for government and policymakers to consider 
with urgency and highlights pre-event recovery planning for the petroleum sector will be critical 
to improve resiliency and reduce disruption to the nations gas supply. A specific concern was 
raised about expectations and defining a clear expectation with the government of what is 
anticipated following such an event of the petroleum sector, with input from the sector around 
realistic timeframes.  This will allow improved pre-event response and recovery planning and 
inform the government of potentially lengthy recovery periods leading to consideration of risk 
mitigation options for both the petroleum sector and the government. The dependency results 
also conflict with the results provided by stage one of the national vulnerability study (New 
Zealand Lifelines Council, 2017). However, this is unsurprising, as previous studies have only 
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focused on the mid and downstream aspects of the petroleum sector, while this research 
identifies a gap and results for the previously unstudied upstream sector.  The inclusion of 
these results in future revisions of New Zealand’s vulnerability study is critical. 
5.4 SUMMARY 
The key points from the methodology for development and application of a volcanic risk 
assessment for the petroleum sector of Taranaki are as follows: 
• The risk assessment methodology applied is a limited deterministic approach because 
of hazard scenarios developed in Chapter 2. This meets Objectives 2 and 3 of this thesis. 
• Documentation of the uncertainties and their sources is an essential aspect of the 
framework for a volcanic risk assessment of the petroleum sector, to improve resilience 
understanding for the petroleum sector. 
• The workshop offered an ideal opportunity for collaborative discussion and relationship 
building, especially between civil defence and the industry, (fulfilling Objective 3 of this 
thesis). A key discussion was about evacuation zones and how the emplacement and 
enforcement of these will become a crucial factor for industry planning and consideration 
for civil defence planning.  
• The workshop identified regulatory challenges that require urgent consideration, where 
some critical aspects need to be considered in the short term by policymakers, as the 
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6.0 CONCLUSIONS  
This chapter concludes the thesis by summarising the key findings relating to the thesis aims 
and makes recommendations for future work. 
The sector of interest is the New Zealand petroleum exploration and production, or upstream 
sector, based in the Taranaki region is directly at risk from volcanic hazards from Mt. Taranaki.  
The sector is located on the slopes of Mt. Taranaki, a dormant stratovolcano with a 50-81% 
probability of a new eruption phase beginning within the next 50 years (Damaschke, Cronin, & 
Bebbington, 2017; Green et al., 2013; Turner et al., 2009). The sector provides a vital input to 
the Taranaki and New Zealand economy through exports of petroleum products and the supply 
of the entire North Island residential reticulated gas resource. Additionally, the sector provides 
essential methanol production, supports the dairy industry, and through transformation 
provides 15% of the country’s electricity (New Zealand Government, 2017).  However, there is 
a very low awareness of the volcanic risk within the Taranaki public (Finnis et al., 2004). This 
thesis has found these perceptions extend to the petroleum sector, leading to struthious 
behaviours in planning for volcanic eruptions and hazard impacts (Section 5.3.3.1). The 
petroleum sector in New Zealand considers volcanic hazards as low or “hypothetical” in the 
formal risk frequency class, based on the New Zealand Risk Management Standards 
(WorleyParsons, 2014, p. 83).  Given the revised probability of an eruption, the anticipated 
lifespan of petroleum infrastructure, and the likely consequences to the petroleum industry in 
a future eruption (as assessed in this thesis) the volcanic risk ranking should be considered 
“occasional” or at worst “unlikely”. While the consequences remain the same at “Severe to 
Catastrophic”, depending on the size of the eruption, the change in frequency classes 
increases the risk ranking to categories that now require risk treatment actions 
(WorleyParsons, 2014, p. 84).  Additionally, the 2014 government-led study on potential 
disruptions to New Zealand’s gas supply downplayed the volcanic risk and considered outages 
to main gas producing fields or pipeline in isolation (WorleyParsons, 2014).  Consequently, the 
sector appears to have taken very limited, if any, planning for a future volcanic crisis within 
individual companies or sector-wide. This Master of Science thesis research directly addresses 
this gap. 
This Master of Science thesis research has achieved its objectives (Section 1.2) by: 
• developing a methodology for volcanic risk assessment of the petroleum exploration and 
production sector, using standardised risk management practices at a holistic level. This 
involved developing a repeatable risk assessment framework for the petroleum sector, 
consistent with current best practice methods of risk assessments for volcanic hazards 
(Objective 1). 
• applying the developed methodology, using new volcanic eruption scenarios, for Mt. 
Taranaki to undertake a physical impact assessment of the petroleum exploration and 
production sector in the Taranaki region. This included the development of vulnerability 
models for the petroleum sector (Objectives 2 & 3). 
• engagement of petroleum sector and an expert elicitation workshop that imparted 
scientific knowledge of the volcanic hazards associated with Mt. Taranaki and the likely 
direct and indirect impacts (Objective 3). 
• assessment of volcanic vulnerabilities, likely impacts, and network dependencies for a 
volcanic crisis that can be used to inform volcanic mitigation and resilience development 
strategies in the petroleum sector (Objective 3). 
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The thesis results provide a foundation for future studies, and a catalyst for the petroleum 
sector to undertake their own risk review processes for the development of risk treatment 
activities.  
The research has additionally contributed to the Natural Hazard Research Platform – 
“quantifying exposure to specific and multiple volcanic hazards” project. The results not only 
expedite further research for this sector but fill a gap in knowledge for New Zealand’s lifeline 
infrastructure vulnerability assessment of the nation’s gas supply, a critical lifeline service.   
6.1 KEY FINDINGS 
The thesis results have identified the following key findings: 
• Awareness of volcanic risk, impacts of volcanic hazards and probability of a future 
eruption is low within the Taranaki petroleum sector. 
 
• The risks to New Zealand’s gas supply from a future Mt. Taranaki eruption have 
also been underestimated. 
 
• The impact of regulations on the petroleum sectors’ ability to operate during a 
volcanic crisis and recover rapidly has been identified as a potential risk. 
 
• Future eruptions from Mt Taranaki will likely cause extensive damage and 
disruption to the Taranaki petroleum sector, as found from using a structured 
volcanic risk assessment approach for two Taranaki eruption scenarios. 
 
• Multiple dependencies and interdependences with other essential services, 
components and organisations have been identified for the Taranaki petroleum 
sector with respect to a volcanic crisis.   
The research found that volcanic hazards will impact the petroleum sector in multiple ways. 
The physical petroleum assets around Taranaki work as a system, where volcanic hazards 
cause disruption or damage to individual assets or dependencies. Which in turn disrupts 
production leading to the national gas supply being impacted. Such disruption is more likely 
for prolonged unrest or effusive eruption activity which continues beyond 3-4 days, or if a larger 
explosive eruption occurs. Sector collapse events are directional and have the potential to 
cause either minimal disruption or major disruption, depending on the direction of collapse. 
Recovery of the petroleum sector from a future volcanic eruption was found to be a key area 
for future research, including regulatory challenges identified by the petroleum sector during 
this research (Section 5.3.3). 
Should prolonged unrest occur a “new normal” way of working would likely be adopted by the 
industry, given their commitments and requirement to continue to supply gas.  This new normal 
would require changes to the regulatory regimes to allow ‘business as usual’ to continue during 
the volcanic unrest and prolonged eruption episodes.  Such shifts in work practices tend only 
to occur in the window of opportunity provided by major disruption or damaging impact, as 
seen in many disasters (Birkmann et al., 2010). However, the industry will only be able to make 
effective use of such windows of opportunity if they are prepared in advance through pre-event 
recovery planning.  While this thesis does not address recovery actions, timeframes and 
challenges, it provides a springboard for future research into this area to occur.  Effective pre-
event response and recovery planning will involve the government, regulators and 
policymakers to review legislation and further discussions with operators around the 
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operational challenges identified in the workshop.  The importance of WorkSafe NZ in the role 
of recovery and even pre-eruption shutdowns was the topic of robust conversations that need 
expanding on in further discussions. Additional discussions may also reveal further challenges 
that can be resolved or give clear guidance in advance of a disaster or disruption occurring. 
The challenges already identified are wide-ranging and highlight the vulnerability of the 
country’s gas supply all being from a single region that has very little redundancy built into the 
systems. Additionally, the increased risk from recent research of Mt. Taranaki required a 
change in risk ranking for volcanic hazards and review of the subsequent impacts in urgency 
for the petroleum sector. Petroleum companies need then to enhance and review their risk 
management approaches to volcanic hazards to reduce the volcanic risk to acceptable levels 
or ‘as low as reasonably practicable’ (ALARP).  This recommended change in the risk ranking 
for volcanism in the Taranaki region also has impacts for relevant legislation and regulations 
that deal with risk for this sector.  These changes require an underpinning risk assessment for 
volcanic hazards, which this thesis provides at a high-level. This then allows a spring-board 
for future studies and the development of risk treatment actions.   
The development of relationships with the petroleum sector was essential to gain an accurate 
insight of the complexity of the sector and draw on expert judgement to support the 
development of a risk assessment framework. Similarly, if the risk assessment framework 
methodology developed here is adapted by other sectors, close relationships will remain 
important to successful application and buy-in. The Taranaki Petroleum sector also gained 
from the experiential process by increasing their knowledge and understanding of Mt. Taranaki 
and its volcanic hazards.  In some cases, individuals had an incorrect view that Mt. Taranaki 
was extinct, leading to a struthious approach to volcanic risks in the Taranaki petroleum sector. 
The expert elicitation workshop offered an ideal opportunity for collaborative discussion and 
relationship building, especially between civil defence and the industry. One key point raised 
in discussions was around evacuation zones and how the emplacement and enforcement of 
these will become a valuable factor for industry planning and consideration for civil defence 
planning.   The sector’s understanding of volcanic hazards has grown considerably through 
engagement with this project, and they are now more comfortable with the potential of future 
volcanic unrest and eruption hazards for Mt. Taranaki.  The sector has learnt how volcanic 
hazards impact physical infrastructure, and that the hazards also cause indirect operational 
dependencies.  Recovery actions and timeframes are out of scope for this project. However, 
future research can focus on the interplay between repeated events and how this would impact 
the petroleum sector in the longer term. The sector will benefit further from a multi-operator 
exercise soon, to test their internal procedures and policies and if expanded can consider post-
eruption recovery actions and timeframes. 
6.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
To better mitigate the risks and to further industry resilience, research by academic 
organisations in partnership with industry is a key component of future work.  
Recommendations of key areas for future research are: 
1. Reducing uncertainty and expanding the knowledge base of Taranaki petroleum assets 
by: 
a. Probabilistic hazard modelling for Mt. Taranaki, prioritising ashfall and lahar 
hazards, with a focus on lahar scouring. 
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b. Understanding of thresholds for petroleum infrastructure by undertaking more 
detailed asset and site-specific component level studies. Particularly on key 
assets such as storage tanks, pipelines and components such as wiring and 
seals to identify further risk mitigation options. 
Incorporating GIS is essential for future volcanic risk assessments to enable visual outputs for 
communicating results to stakeholders, scientific communities or as inputs for risk modelling 
using specialist software.  
Further research on risk communication for Mt. Taranaki hazards and impacted industries, 
balancing single scenario versus multiple scenario risk analysis without compromising 
reputational risk.  
Examining recovery processes, regulations and considerations for the Taranaki petroleum 
sector to identify barriers and limitations for rapid recovery. Consider collaborative scenario-
based exercises for the response and recovery phases of an eruption event to inform pre-
event response and recovery planning. Additionally, when planning full facility shut-downs, 
build in company-based exercises that will test eruption response plans and gauge the time 
required to undertake the required actions.  
The industry looks to the scientific community to provide early warning and detailed hazard 
information that can be enhanced through industry-science collaboration around baseline data. 
For example:  
a. Funding maintenance and improvements of the Geonet seismograph and GPS 
stations for seismic, volcanic and landslide hazards.  
b. Gathering and sharing LIDAR survey data and funding surveys to infill gaps in the 
survey to get a full Taranaki peninsula dataset for rapid landslide, earthquake and 
volcanic hazard identification.  
6.3 FUTURE WORK 
This research identifies the upstream petroleum sector as having a vital role in supplying one 
of New Zealand’s critical lifeline services, which overlooked until now, has received little to no 
known volcanic risk assessment research. The research has also developed a risk assessment 
framework for volcanic risk assessment for a new sector. In doing so has achieved valuable 
experiential outcomes for the Taranaki petroleum sector in starting conversations that led to a 
greater awareness of volcanic risks to their staff, operations and physical assets. The key is to 
now continue the momentum of this raised awareness through further research with the 
industry as a key partner in this research and supporting them to consider and action risk 
reduction (mitigation) options, as individual companies or through collaboration as an entire 
sector. The central and local government also have a role in risk reduction, readiness and pre-
event recovery planning actions for the petroleum sector through identification and changes to 
policies, legislation and regulation that will cause barriers to uninterrupted gas supplies for New 
Zealand.  
When determining vulnerabilities and hazard assessments, it is critical to keep in mind that 
results are not static, requiring regular revision as infrastructure changes through time, and 
hazard modelling is improved. As such, it is pertinent to state that this research is a high-level 
first attempt at a risk assessment and should be likened to a springboard to further work and 
improved knowledge of and for the industry. During the research, numerous areas for further 
research were identified as well as suggestions for potential risk reduction and readiness 
actions. However, the lists are not exhaustive, and only a selection of the critical points are 
captured in this thesis.  
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A1.0 APPENDIX A – ASSET CLASSIFICATION EXAMPLES 
A1.1 WELLS (WELL-HEADS AND STACKS) – TYPE 1 
Stand-alone Well pad, where the well may be producing, injecting or have been either shut-in, 
suspended or abandoned. Well pad, head and stack construction vary between the wells 
depending on the depth and product mix. In some cases, artificial lift is required to help the 
product (oil) flow to the surface, and this may require additional equipment. Examples of the 
iconic “nodding donkey” are rare across the region, with the majority of a “Christmas tree” stack 
design, which incorporate hydraulic or pneumatic values. Where pneumatic values are 
present, associated air compression units are required. These can only operate in clean air 
environments as ash fall will clog the filters. Some well sites are designated deep water 
injection sites for wastewater, with associated closed water storage tanks and pumps.  
Where well sites have production equipment located on the pad, a classification of “production 
facilities” is assigned. However, the associated production may just be pre-processing rather 
than full-scale production. The “production facilities” assignment generated some discussion 
around what processing is compared to the full production sites. For this research, well sites 
are nominally stand alone with limited associated equipment. Where processing occurs, these 
have been classified as production sites, noting the vast variation in volumes and scale among 
assets in this category. Consideration was given to a third category, but a more simplistic 
approach was sought for this research noting that the variation is related to the volumes 
managed at each site. In which case, the likely impacts would be similar to the production sites, 




Figure A1.1 Iconic “nodding donkey” well 
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Figure A1.3 Multiple “Christmas tree” wellhead stacks and associated gathering pipelines and monitoring 
equipment 
 
Interdependencies Electricity – for sites with air compressors or water pumps. 
Hazard impacts: Static Pressure (Structural loading) – most well sites are relatively 
robust to ash fall and burial as there is little surface area for ash to 
accumulate upon. Unless burial is with cemented deposits or air 
compressors are used, most wells will be able to be easily cleaned 
and continue to perform.  Closed lid water tanks for deep water 
injection wells will benefit from more detailed further research to 
understand their structural loading capacities. 
Ash concentration - for sites with air compressors units, the finer ash 
will quickly block the filter and cause damage to the pumps due to the 
abrasive nature of ash. 
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Temperature – there will be a point at which the temperature could 
weld/melt valves on a “Christmas tree” structure. Further research is 
required to understand these thresholds. Noting there are very few 
locations where PDCs are likely to impact the current asset stock. 
Dynamic pressure – Well heads are designed to be very robust and 
depending on the design, materials used, and construction a range of 
thresholds at which dynamic pressure could potentially shear off the 
wellhead structures needs to be understood through further research.  
Due to the individual nature of the wells results are likely to vary from 
well to well. Note that where lahars and PDC are smaller and confined 
to the river/stream channels, sites are likely only to be subjected to 
fringe or overflow from the rivers and streams and dynamic pressures 
are less than in the river channels. However, larger flows of greater 
volume will cover wider areas beyond the river/stream channels, with 
high flow rates and speeds.  
For pyroclastic density flows rather than currents, only a limited 
number of the current assets mapped are likely to be at risk. Additional 
research and modelling will further define the risk for each of these 
sites. 
Note however that if subjected to a sector collapse there is likely to be 
considerable damage both above and below ground to any wellhead 
structures impacted. 
 
A1.2 PIPELINES – TYPE 2 
Pipelines associated with the petroleum industry come in a wide variety of sizes, materials, 
diameters and carry a range of products. For this research, we are looking at the production 
pipelines and transmission pipelines up to the offtake or delivery points at which point, pipeline 
ownership is transferred to the distribution network and is out of scope for this research.  
However, despite being out of scope, the buried pipelines have been mapped to give contact 
to the petroleum system. 
Additionally, within the various production sites, there will be many kms of pipeline above 
ground, which are considered under the “production site” asset category. Note that for this 
research, the individual component level detail is not dealt with and suggested as an area for 
further research.  
Around New Zealand and especially the Taranaki Region, buried pipelines form a complex 
network, where ownership and maintenance of the pipelines varies. 
In several places, the pipes come above ground for aerial crossing points above rivers or 
streams. A separate “special pipeline crossing” asset category is used for these. 
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Main Trunk Informal name Lateral lines 
100 Kapuni - South 101, 102, etc 
200 Kapuni - North 201, 202, etc 
300 
Kapuni - Frankley 
road 301, 302, etc 
400 Maui 401, 402 etc 
500 Bay of Plenty 501, 502, etc 
600 South 601, 602, etc 
700 Central 701, 702 etc 
 
In addition to the transmission lines, separate water, condensate and mixed product gathering 
lines also exist within the network. These pipelines have a variety of diameters depending on 
the product and flow volumes, from ~100-500 mm, with a range of pipe thicknesses, materials 
operating pressure ranges, burial depths, coatings and configurations that make a single 
fragility function or vulnerability matrix for all pipelines unrealistic.  
Further research and work are required to understand what are the parameters that affect 
vulnerability to volcanic hazards and then develop specific functions for the relevant pipeline 
groupings. This work will require close work with pipeline engineers. 
Interdependencies Pipelines depend on the supply of gas into the network to 
maintain a minimum operational pressure. 
Hazard impacts: Not investigated in the scope of this research. 
Note however that if subjected to a sector collapse there is 
likely to be considerable damage to both above and below 
ground pipeline in its path. Further research can draw on the 
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Example photo: 
Figure A1.4 Network map of the FirstGas transmission pipeline in NZ (FirstGas, n.d). 
A1.2.1 Pipelines – Aerial subgroup crossings – Type 2A 
As a subset of the pipeline category, where pipelines come above ground for aerial crossings, 
normally over rivers, there are three or four main construction types: trestle (caged), single 
pipe, structurally supported or attached to a bridge. 
Each variety will have a variation in structural strength to dynamic pressures of PDC, lahars 
and flooding associated with volcanic hazards, including the rare but possible sector collapse 
scenario. Therefore, for this research, a range of possible thresholds have been used, and we 
have noted that some crossings do sit within a 20-km zone of the vent (Zone A) where PDCs 
may occur. 
Due to many crossings, crossing types and pipeline, the recommendation of further site-
specific research in conjunction with more detailed PDC, lahar and sector collapse modelling 
for many streams and rivers that are feed from the steep slopes of Mt. Taranaki is made. 
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Interdependencies None 
Hazard impacts: Static Pressure (Structural loading) – Aerial crossings not 
attached to bridges have limited surface area in which to 
accumulate ash deposits. Additionally, given the curvature of the 
pipeline, ashfall is likely to slide off before it creates any issues. 
However, where pipes are attached to bridges like the photo 
above, the structure of the bridge and weight bearing capacity will 
influence the vulnerability to accumulations of ash, particularly if 
wet. A recommendation for further site-specific research for at-
risk sites is made. 
Temperature – From known operational temperature limits for 
pipelines, exposure to temperatures of above 45oC for more than 
15 mins will require reduced pressure and inspections for stress 
fracturing as a minimum. Temperatures of pyroclastic density 
currents and flows will exceed these thresholds. Therefore, the 
crossings identified in the PDC risk zone (Zone A) require further 
detailed risk assessments, with risk reduction changes 
implemented at the earliest opportunity. 
Dynamic pressure – Aerial crossings are exceptionally vulnerable 
to the dynamic pressures achieved with lahars, PDCs and even 
sector collapses. The repeated influx of sediments, water and 
debris (rock and plant material) that combines within a lahar, 
causes dynamic pressures that can damage structures crossing 
rivers and streams that they meet on their routes. Lahars also 
exhibit erosional characteristics that can cause erosion to depths 
well beyond the current industry burial depths. Thus, exposing 
buried pipes that run under rivers when large lahars occur. Further 
risk modelling work is recommended for the numerous Mt. 
Taranaki fed rivers and streams. Examples of lahar erosion and 
pipeline exposure were evident following the 1990 Mt Redoubt 
eruption at the Drift River terminal, Alaska. 
Ash concentration – finer ash is unlikely to be an issue with this 
asset type as the pipeline is static with no moving parts. However, 
larger tephra may cause ballistic like impact on an exposed 
pipeline that requires further investigation depending on the pipe 
material, coating, pressure and if caged or not.  Note that 
interaction between the various coatings and the corrosive nature 
of ash may also cause issues if not cleaned frequently. 
Failure of the main transmission pipelines can create 
considerable widespread economic and social disruption. Without 
the pipeline network intact, some production companies would 
have to curtail production with nowhere to put the gas, due to 
limited onsite storage and lack of alternative uses. 
 
A1.2.2 Pipelines – Above Ground Assets – Type 2B and 3 
Due to components of many of these assets types being consistent with components seen in 
production facilities the expert elicitation workshop suggested these be categorised the same 
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as a seen in production facility. Above ground asset sub-type can be a combination of any of 
the following: off-take, mainline values, delivery points, scraper, mixing or compressors.  
Mainline valves – The purpose of these is to isolate a section of the main transmission 
network by valves either end of the section. These are located at a maximum distance of 32 
km along the pipeline network, with upgrades ongoing to convert manual to remote operation 
monitoring and control. While they use low-volt electricity for the communication and sensors, 
they can operate in a safe mode if mains power fails. To close off a section of the main 
transmission network valves either end of the section will need to be closed either remotely or 
manually. 
Delivery points (off-take) – These allow gas to enter the distribution network, which operates 
at a lower pressure. To overcome the thermodynamic temperature loss when the gas pressure 
reduces, the gas is first heated. The heat generated by a variety of methods including gas 
turbines are susceptible to ash corrosion damage. 
The above ground assets consist of various pressure valves that can be activated remotely or 
manually, with a fail closed designation above ground. The set-up provides resilience in the 
system, where if individual above ground assets are lost the underground buried main 
transmission pipeline remains able to continue to operate. So even with the loss of electricity 
or telecommunications valves can be manually closed or will close if pressure high/low trigger 
thresholds are reached. 
Scrapper Stations – These are locations where “PIG” launchers and traps occur along the 
pipe networks. These are points in the network where “PIGS” enter and exit the pipelines. 
“PIGS” are maintenance devices used to inspect and clean the interior of the pipeline in a 
process known as “pigging”. 
 
Figure A1.7 Intelligent pigging pipeline inspection diagram (Intertek, n.d.). 
Mixing stations (intake) – these are where gas enters the network from company owner 
lateral lines from the various production facilities or at junctions between lines. 
Compressor station – The gas network covers some considerable distances, along which 
the pressure will naturally drop. Compressor stations are strategically placed on the network 
to maintain pressure. These sites consist of either gas turbines, reciprocating engines or 
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electric motor driven compressors, all of which are vulnerable to fine ash due to its corrosive 
and abrasive qualities.  
Other components of gas stations may also include metering systems, odorization plants, 
coalescers and filters, gas chromatographs. Each site will uniquely contain a variety of the 
above-mentioned components. However, for this research, a simplified high-level view was 
taken. Identification and site-specific further research will be required, with prioritisation of 
assets in the PDC and Lahar risk zones, followed by implementation of risk reduction 
improvements at the earliest opportunity. 
 
 
Figure A1.8 Above ground Pipeline assets - mixing/in-take point. 
Interdependencies Electricity and telecommunications are required, but non-
essential to the operation of the main transmission pipeline if 
lost.  
 
Hazard impacts: Static Pressure (Structural loading) – This will vary between 
the individual assets, as they consist of a wide range of 
configurations of pipework with additional aspects. The 
surface area is likely too small in most cases to be a concern. 
Even burial, if it is not cemented, would be relatively easy to 
clean up without harming the integrity of the main buried 
pipeline. 
Temperature – From known operational temperature limits 
for pipelines, exposure to temperatures of above 45oC for 
more than 15 mins will require reduced pressure and 
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inspections for stress fracturing as a minimum. These 
temperatures are likely to be exceeded by pyroclastic density 
currents and flows. Therefore, the small number of assets 
identified in the PDC risk zone should receive furthermore 
detailed risk assessment with any risk reduction changes 
implemented at the earliest opportunity. 
Dynamic pressure – Where above ground assets occur close 
to rivers and streams, new lahar modelling would be 
beneficial to consider site-specific flood and lahar risks. Most 
above-ground assets are self-contained and can withstand a 
range of dynamic pressures. However, if exceeded, the 
above ground assets would be destroyed. However, this is 
unlikely to affect the main buried transmission pipelines, with 
redundancy already built into the pipeline network. One 
exception would be a sector collapse scenario when damage 
is likely to be catastrophic and analogous to landslides which 
have damaged the pipeline previously. 
Ash concentration - Most above ground assets are self-
contained and can withstand the range of tephra deposits. 
The main exception to this is the delivery and compressor 
stations where air-intake is a critical component of the 
equipment. Through air-intakes, ash causes abrasion, and 
associated filters become clogged. In these cases, further 
research is recommended, including drawing on experiences 
from previous central plateau eruptions when fine ash 
contamination compromised some of these asset types.  
 
A1.3 PRODUCTION FACILITIES – TYPE 3 
These are the most complex of asset locations comprising many kilometres of pipeline, cooling 
and separating towers and storage as the hydrocarbon product is divided into components of 
water, gas, oil, condensate and prepared for transportation. They may be small satellite 
operations or much larger scale. They tend to comprise of multiple sub-processes and storage 
tanks, flares, office and control buildings, water pits for fire safety and have constant on-site 
supervision. Depending on scale and product type pipelines or road transport is used to deliver 
the product to end-users or storage facilities for export through Port Taranaki.  
Onsite storage tanks are categorised as storage tanks, and therefore a single geographical 
location may have multiple asset types. 
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Figure A1.10 Heat exchange tower with air intake value. 
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Figure A1.11 Close-up photo of an air intake on heat exchange showing the honeycomb filter. 
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Figure A1.13 Multiple air intakes for cooling systems on a larger production site. 
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Figure A1.15 Photo showing the complex larger scale production facilities with many kms of pipeline, flare 
stack to the left distance and two cooling towers to the centre-right. 
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Figure A1.17 Panoramic view of a larger production site with ongoing work showing a complex industrial 
workplace that sits within a zone that has high to intermediate risks of lahars and therefore sediment burial, 
dynamic pressure as well as ash fall hazards. 
 
Figure A1.18 Complex electronics computer control unit that would be sensitive to fine ash damage note 
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Figure A1.19 Air compressor unit for the various pneumatic values around the production site. This unit is 
sensitive to the air quality and should be housed in a building with ash-lock doorways to reduce fine ash invasion. 
 
Figure A1.20 Methanol control units, another example of equipment that is very sensitive to a fine ash and 
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Interdependencies Electricity, Water, road networks, pipeline integrity, fuel, transport 
(air, road & water), telecommunications. 
Electricity – most production stations are entirely dependent on 
electricity to run. Some generate their electricity from gas turbines. 
However, these can easily be compromised by ash-fall.  
Water – Production sites are required by Health & Safety regulation 
to have access to water for fire suppression. Some facilities store 
water in open pits or tanks (in the ground or above ground), and 
they can become contaminated by ash – causing water pumps to 
block and corrode rapidly. 
Pipeline integrity – Where production facilities output dry gas that 
feeds into the national gas network, the integrity of the pipeline to 
the mixing station and beyond are essential. However, some 
smaller facilities may be able to flare the gas for a limited period 
and maintain production where the remaining product is 
transported via the road networks. 
Road networks – all facilities are manned. Therefore, staff will need 
to access the site via road to enable the site to operate. 
Additionally, some product and consumable are transported by 
road to and from the site. Many sites rely on contractors and their 
equipment which also depend on the road networks.  
Other Transport - for some offshore facilities helicopter access is 
essential for staff and consumables. If the airspace around the 
facilities is shut down due to ash-fall, this will impact operations.  
For exporting of material and importing of fuel and equipment, Port 
Taranaki has become pivotal. If the port had to close due to 
sedimentation or ash fall, this would impact sites in several ways 
from a lack of fuel, storage capacity at Tank farms reaching its 
maximum limits or no fuel arriving creating shortages.  
Telecommunications – some site are critically dependant on 
communications, from monitoring various components around a 
site to monitoring satellite or remote wells and facilities. Without 
these for prolonged periods, risks increase beyond an acceptable 
level, requiring production to cease until the communication 
blackouts are resolved. 
Hazard impacts: Note – due to the variation in these sites further site-specific 
research is required to take a focused component level 
assessment. Impacts here are generalised. 
Static Pressure (Structural loading) – Some sites with flat-roofed 
buildings or large span roofs may become compromised with 
heavier ash fall, especially if it becomes wet. Other aspects may 
not be easily restorable if buried in cemented ash. 
Temperature – for sites in Zone A, in addition to the pipeline 
integrity issues caused by temperatures, sites with explosive 
material still present at the time of impact would pose a large risk 
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to the temperature ranges present in pyroclastic density currents 
and flows. Where sites sit in the PDC risk zones proactive 
evacuation, shut down and purging of the product should be 
considered alongside further site-specific research.  
Dynamic pressure – site inundations of lahars, debris flow or PDCs 
are likely to cause substantial damage given the complex and 
sensitive nature of this asset type. Where assets are within lahar 
risk zones further site-specific research is recommended, with the 
implementation of risk reduction options to minimise damage and 
allow a more rapid recovery at the earliest opportunity. Examples 
of lahar risk reduction implemented following the 1990 Mt Redoubt 
eruption at the Drift River terminal, Alaska includes: a dyke and 
levee concrete bund helped mitigate damage during the 2009 Mt 
Redoubt eruption and lahar. 
Ash concentration – As shown the photographs there are many air 
drawing components on production sites. Additionally, sites are 
also critically reliant on water for fire suppression which may be 
stored in open pits or tanks on site or drawn from nearby streams 
or rivers, which are very sensitive to finer the ash.  Abrasion 
qualities of ash can damage moving parts and larger ash particles 
can block, suffocate or trip the range of equipment that is reliant on 
clean air or water quality. Therefore, any sedimentation in rivers or 
streams, atmospheric air quality reduction or remobilised ash will 
pose hazard impacts. 
For sites in Zone A, larger tephra may present ballistic type damage 
to the assets. However, further research at a site and component 
level will provide more in-depth insight into the risks and methods 
of risk mitigation. 
 
A1.4 STORAGE TANKS – TYPE 4 
 
Storage tanks used by the petroleum sector come in a wide variety of shapes, sizes, materials, 
roof types and contain a range of liquid products from oil, LPG, naphtha, clean water and 
wastewater. These can be divided into two broad categories; fixed and floating roof tanks. 
Under each category, several roof construction types exist along with variations in materials 
and foundations. 
Some tanks store the various products including both clean and wastewater. Clean water 
required for safe operations for emergencies and fire suppression is stored in open pits or 
tanks. Product and waste water tanks are all closed tanks, either upright tanks or storage 
bullets with a variety of fixed or floating roofs. 
Risks for clean water tanks come from ash fall which causes water turbidity and water pumps 
to fail through blockage or rapid corrosion of elements. 
Some work has been undertaken that considers the ash fall weights required to capsize a 
floating roof tank for a Mt Vesuvius eruption (Milazzo et al., 2013). However, the Taranaki 
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regions higher rainfall compared to Italy will require further evaluation when undertaking more 
detailed site-specific studies. 
 
 
Figure A1.21 Omata Tank Farm near Port Taranaki (14 tanks in total). 
 
 
Figure A1.22 Fixed roof storage tanks at Port Taranaki. 
Additional risks peculiar to the Taranaki region are for oil storage tanks – due to the high wax 
content of Taranaki oils, even after blending to the “McKee blend” standard, loss of mains 
power to retain heat and circulate the oils for a prolonged period could result in the oil becoming 
solid. Further research recommended for the wide range of tanks. 
 
 




Figure A1.23 Paritutu Tank Farm near Port Taranaki (five condensate floating roof storage tanks). 
 
Figure A1.24 Onsite closed lid small water storage tank. 
 
Figure A1.25 Large onsite water storage tank - open top. 
 
 




Figure A1.26 Onsite open, clean water storage tanks required for fire suppression. 
 
 




Zoë Juniper 121 
 
 
Figure A1.28 Small production site close roof storage tanks. 
 
 
Figure A1.29 Large production site floating roof storage tanks. 
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Interdependencies Electricity to operate pumps, valves and heating and circulating oil 
through the system. 
Hazard impacts: Static Pressure (Structural loading) – There is a wide variation in the 
types and sizes of storage tanks on the tank farms and those on 
production or well injection sites. Further research is required to 
consider the structural loading risks for the distinct types. However, 
some work on floating roof storage tanks exists from Italy. Studies have 
shown that significant levels of ash-fall would be required to cause 
floating roofs to capsize (Milazzo et al., 2013; Milazzo et al., 2012). To 
mitigate capsize risk reduction of ash-fall build up and rain 
complications, regular cleaning of roofs will be required. 
Temperature – where assets of this type are in Zone A, further site-
specific research is required to understand the risks to the tanks and 
connecting pipelines and valves to PDC temperatures. The impacts 
may include combustion of the product, melting of tank walls or valves. 
Dynamic pressure – Where sites are in sector collapse, lahar or PDC 
zones they will be at risk from integrity failure by the characteristics of 
those hazards. Therefore, pre-emptive purging of tanks pre-eruption 
could be considered depending on the sites location and risk profile. 
Note lahars from the 2015 Calbuco Volcano, Chile displaced LPG tanks 
containing product from a small industrial site downstream, which 
remained intact and was able to be safely recovered (Dussaillant et al., 
2016). Further site and component-specific research will help inform 
more detailed risk assessment and risk mitigation options.  
Ash concentration - ash fall will compromise open water storage tanks 
by blocking water pumps and causing rapid corrosion damage. For oil 
storage dependant on circulation and heating, ash fall is likely to disrupt 
power supply creating risk. Further research is required to consider the 




A1.5 BUILDINGS – TYPE 5 
 
Buildings for the petroleum industry range from the structurally designed office buildings in 
New Plymouth to small porta cabins or converted shipping container units. Some of the onsite 
control buildings use the more temporary building types, which is a large vulnerability for the 
industry as these contain important electrical wiring and computers as well as the staff. Many 
of the onsite control buildings do not have adequate ash lock porches and have filters or air 
vents that could be easily compromised by ashfall. This is an immediate area for improvement 
for the sector.  
Below are some of the different building type examples. 
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Figure A1.31 Onsite accommodation and welfare support structures. 
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Figure A1.33 Office buildings (from Google Street View). 
 
Interdependencies Electricity, telecommunications, water, air quality 
Hazard impacts: Existing building asset types and fragility functions exist 
within RiskScape. Therefore, this asset type has not had a 
vulnerability model developed. However, a few relevant 
comments below are worth making for this sector. 
Static pressure & ash concentration – ashfall penetration can 
compromise contents, especially electrical and computers. 
For more temporary buildings the ashfall may also cause 
static loading damage. 
Temperature – if wooden or temporary structure is exposed 
to very high temperatures this may cause combustion 
depending on the material. 
Dynamic pressure – for the temporary buildings or onsite 
buildings, these may not have solid or robust foundations or 
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A1.6 INDUSTRIAL USERS – TYPE 6 
A variety of end-users exist around the Taranaki region, some take product directly from the 
production facilities and located close to the relevant production sites. End users may be 
Methanol plants, LPG bottling stations, dairy processing or fertiliser factories that rely on the 
various products. Other entities that are considered end users are Port Taranaki who handles 
the import and export of various products and equipment that the sector relies on and manages 
water-based transportation docking. 
Interdependencies Not considered in this research – further site-specific studies 
are recommended. However large-scale gas users are 
subject to the Gas Governance 
(Critical Contingency Management) Regulations 2008 if 
supplies become disrupted. Further research into the 
symbiotic relationships between some production sites and 
end users for risk planning is recommended. 
Hazard impacts: Not considered in this research – further site-specific studies 
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A2.0 APPENDIX B – EXERCISE PAHU 
Taranaki CDEM group developed exercise Pahu in conjunction with the Natural Hazard 
Platform partners of Massey University and GNS Science. The exercise was previously run as 
Exercise Billow in 2008 and developed further for Exercise Pahu in 2013. Based on the 
Tahurangi scenario, small-scale eruption with an associated lava dome collapse event 
producing a small localised debris avalanche down existing drainage channels to the 
Northwest side of the volcano, new lava, small volumes of tephra and ash, and lahars to the 
Northeast and Southeast (Cronin, 2012). This scenario was developed based on research that 
includes the Tahurangi eruption episode deposits dated between ~AD1644 and ~AD1755 
(Zernack et al., 2011). The research concludes that this is the most common known event to 
occur in the Mt. Taranaki eruption sequence (Platz et al., 2012; Procter et al., 2010; Turner, 
Cronin, Bebbington, et al., 2008; Turner, Cronin, Smith, et al., 2008). This exercise uses the 
current topography, and it does not cover the full range of eruption sizes and hazard directions 
that have been known to be produced by Mt. Taranaki in the geological history. Likewise, it 
represents a small-scale eruption in comparison to analogue volcanic eruptions from around 
the globe such as Calbuco volcano, Chile, 2015, Mt. Redoubt, Alaska 1989 and 2009, or Mt. 
St. Helens, USA, 1980.  
Exercise Pahu was developed to test the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management 
Group’s response to a volcanic event. It involved multiple CDEM groups, agencies and lifeline 
organisations. Two phases were used, the first being the leadup which is timed to occur over 
a 19-day period culminating in the first small eruption. Phase two moves through a single day 
on the 20 November, where all agencies were tested in real time with various injects throughout 
the day. 
The exercise objectives were as follows: 
• Objective 1 – To ensure there is a state of readiness for Taranaki CDEM Group. 
• Objective 2 - To demonstrate EOC procedures. 
• Objective 3 - To demonstrate reporting arrangements. 
• Objective 4 - To demonstrate relevant Advisory/ Coordination Group arrangements. 
• Objective 5 - To demonstrate decision-making arrangements in the CDEM Group EOC. 
• Objective 6 - To test communications. 
• Objective 7 - To demonstrate Public Information Management (PIM) systems and 
processes. 
The high-level scenario timeline, taken from the scenario planning documentation, was as 
follows: 
November 1-5: 
An increase in seismic activity recorded by Geonet in the Taranaki region, consisting of 
irregular swarms of moderate (felt) earthquakes and aftershocks along the Cape Egmont Fault 
Line and a few small deeper events under the volcano. 
November 5-11: 
There have been continuing and increasingly shallower earthquakes under the volcano. These 
initial signs indicate that the volcanic unrest is developing into a volcanic crisis where the 
possibility of eruption is likely. The public is aware as many have felt the continuing 
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earthquakes and aftershocks. The occurrence of seismic activity under the volcano triggers a 
change in the Volcanic Alert Level for reawakening volcanoes; raised to Level 1. Evacuation 
of the Egmont National Park is implemented, due to GNS reporting and change in Volcanic 
Alert Level to Level 1. 
November 11-14: 
Increasingly shallower earthquakes under the volcano are continuing. Ground deformation 
appears on the cone, with fissures (large cracks) reported. These initial signs indicate the 
volcanic unrest is developing into a volcanic crisis where the possibility of eruption is likely. 
GNS in briefings to the Taranaki CDEM Group, attribute this to the intrusion of new magma 
(molten rock) into the base of the volcano and movement of magma outward into the conduit 
system in the cone. 
November 14-16: 
Continuing and increasingly shallower earthquakes under the volcano are ongoing. Ground 
deformation continues to develop. These signs indicate that the volcanic unrest is developing, 
and the possibility of an eruption is very likely. Volcanic Alert Level for reawakening volcanoes 
raised to Level 2. 
November 17-19: 
Volcanic unrest develops into small eruptions starting near the summit of the volcano, being 
driven by steam. The continued increase in seismic activity and the minor volcanic activity 
promotes a further change in the Volcanic Alert Level to Volcanic Alert Level 3. Light ash-falls 
are being experienced to the northeast (due to a south-westerly wind), even as far north as the 
Waikato region. The occurrence of a large landslide into the (Hangatahua) Stony River has 
happened on the northwest slope of the volcano due to the increased earthquake activity and 
recent heavy rain. 
19 November: 
Eruptions are continuing near the summit and may be increasing in vigour. Debris flows are 
being reported on the northern slopes of the volcano. 
20 November: 
The main eruption at 2am with shock waves rattling buildings within 2kms of the vent and an 
ash plume that reaches > 10km above the surface. Two large lahars effect two main rivers in 
the area, one to the northeast and the second to the South, with other rivers and streams 
impacted by ash-fall and smaller lahars affecting the water quality. Reports of 15 mm of ash 
fall on State Highway 3 between Inglewood, Stratford and Manaia, with ash fall of up to 10 mm 
occurring up to 50 km downwind of the volcano. 
 
From the exercise results and interagency collaboration, a Taranaki volcanic unrest plan was 
developed in 2015. 
For exercise Pahu or Mt. Taranaki in general, no GIS map of the hazards exists. However, for 
this project, a two-phase scenario was developed.  
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The phases can be used as standalone eruptions, or as labelled a larger two-phase eruption 
with a small phase 1 and larger phase 2 (Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.6). 
For both eruptions, the relevant QMAP formations were selected and edited to remove isolated 
(likely remobilised) deposits and used one of the lahar deposits as a plume collapse PDC for 
the scenario. This assumed that plume collapse PDCs are not always captured well in the 
geological record, due to being reworked and eroded by rain, and then categorised as lahar 
deposits in the geological record. 
To collate eruptions to stratigraphic names of relevant formations, Zernack et al. (2011) was 
referenced.  
The small eruption is based on the Tahurangi eruption using the Hangatahua Formation and 
Peter’s lavas. Plus, a low/medium eruption forecast of 18 September at 1800. 
The large eruption is based on the Kahui eruption using the Kahui formation and Warwick 
lavas. Plus, a high/large eruption forecast of 19 September at 0600. 
In some cases, an artistic licence was taken to modify the shapefiles to extended them back 
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A3.0 APPENDIX C – LEGISLATION AND REGULATIONS 




Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 Health & Safety MBIE/WorkSafe 
Health and Safety in Employment (Pipelines) 
Regulations 1999 Health & Safety MBIE/WorkSafe 
Health and Safety at Work (Petroleum Exploration 
and Extraction) Regulations 2016 Health & Safety MBIE/WorkSafe 
Workplace Exposure Standards and Biological 
Exposure Indices 2016 Health & Safety MBIE/WorkSafe/TRC 
Health and Safety at Work (Hazardous 
Substances) Regulations 2017 Health & Safety MBIW/WorkSafe 
Crown Minerals Act 1991 Mineral rights 
MBIE/New Zealand Petroleum 
& Minerals 
Crown Minerals (Petroleum) Regulations 2007 Mineral rights 
MBIE/New Zealand Petroleum 
& Minerals 




(Critical Contingency Management) Regulations 
2008 Emergency Management MBIE/CCO 
Gas (Safety and Measurement) Regulations 2010 
Operational/Health & 
Safety MBIE/Gas Industry Co 
Plumbers, Gasfitters, and Drainlayers Act 2006 Operational MBIE/Gas Industry Co 
Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 Emergency Management MCDEM/Councils 
National Civil Defence Emergency Management 
Plan Emergency Management MCDEM/Councils 
Resource Management Act 1991 Environmental MfE/Councils 
Environmental Protection Authority Act 2011 Environmental MfE/EPA 
Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 
1996 Environmental MfE/EPA 
Maritime Transport Act 1994 Environmental/operational MfT/Maritime NZ 
Standards and Accreditation Act 2015 Construction and design MBIE/Standards NZ 
AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009 Risk management - 
Principles and guidelines Emergency Management MBIE/Standards NZ 
AS/NZS 2885:2016 Pipelines - Gas and liquid 
petroleum (Parts 1-5) Construction and design MBIE/Standards NZ 
NZS 5435:1996 Specification for liquefied 
petroleum gas (LPG) 
Construction and 
design/operational MBIE/Standards NZ 
NZS 5223:1987 Code of practice for high pressure 
gas and petroleum liquids pipelines  Construction and design MBIE/Standards NZ 
AS/NZS 4130:2009 Polyethylene (PE) pipes for 
pressure applications Construction and design MBIE/Standards NZ 
BS 6843-3:1988 Classification of petroleum fuels. 
Liquefied petroleum gases 
Construction and 
design/operational MBIE/Standards NZ 
BS ISO 12917:2017 Petroleum and liquid 
petroleum products. Calibration of horizontal 
cylindrical tanks.  Construction and design MBIE/Standards NZ 
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A3.1 NOTES ON THE AS/NZS AND API STANDARDS  
 
AS/NZS 1170.0 – General principles (Standards New Zealand, 2002a, 2002b). This sets out 
the design probabilities for the buildings against snow, wind and earthquake events, which 
varies based on the design working life, importance, and if cyclonic wind considerations are 
required.  It is unclear what design life and importance (risk of exceedance of design load) 
each of the various asset categories is built to without further detailed studies.  
 
AS/NZS 1170.2 – Wind (Standards New Zealand, 2011). This design standard is for onshore 
assets only, with regional variation for the research area of Taranaki (region A7) requiring a 
‘Lee multiplier’ for South-east wind. Additional complexities include regional gust wind speeds, 
wind direction multipliers, site exposure multipliers, i.e. Terrain/height, shielding and 
topographic multipliers such as internal and external pressure coefficients. All of which vary 
location to location and are applied based on the building design. The code does not 
specifically consider volcanic hazards. However, there is an additional consideration of impact 
loading from windborne debris that can be applied. It is unsure if any structures in this research 
have been built with this factored. 
 
AS/NZS 1170.3 – Snow and ice (Standards New Zealand, 2003a, 2003b). Petroleum assets 
in the Taranaki region straddle two snow design regions, one which is a sub-alpine 
classification. It is noted that the snow loading design standards do not cover vulnerability to 
avalanche, avalanche blast, landslides, or increased load due to rain falling on snow. 
Additionally, the building location, design and materials play a large factor in determining the 
value, giving each building or asset an individual value that has not been determined by this 
research. 
 
API 650 - Welded Steel Tanks for Oil Storage Twelfth edition (American Petroleum Institute, 
2013). This is the American Petroleum institute’s standard for petroleum storage tank designs, 
while not NZ specific is an industry standard. Concern was raised about the earlier tenth edition 
of this standard having limitations around the maximum wind speeds (100 mph) and not 
accounting for snow loading which was revised for edition eleven (Kissell & Myers, 2003). 
However, the most recent standard (2013) has larger load limits and wind strength designs; it 
is unknown if older tanks are required to be retrofitted to the newer standards. Additional 
standards may also apply (API 620 and API 12D) depending on individual tank design and 
purpose. 
 
API 6A - Specification for Wellhead and Christmas Tree Equipment. This sets out the 
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A4.0 APPENDIX D – EXAMPLES OF ASH FALL DISTRIBUTION FORECASTS 
 
Figure A4.1 Large eruption height (15 km), small volume (0.01 km3) 0600 18 September 2017 
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Figure A4.2 Large eruption height (15 km), small volume (0.01 km3) 1200 18 September 2017  
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Figure A4.6 Large eruption height (15 km), large volume (1km3) 18:00 19 September 2017 
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A5.0 APPENDIX E – EXPERT ELICITATION WORKSHOP 
As the main part of the thesis, discussion and consultation were required with the petroleum 
industry. Some companies agreed to collaborate by sharing data, information and organising 
site visits in addition to attending the expert elicitation workshop. A wider group of industry 
representatives, regulators, civil defence and local and regional council staff, were invited to 
an expert elicitation workshop facilitated by myself, seven months into the research timeframe. 
The workshop required careful and meticulous planning to ensure the key aims were identified 
and the outcomes achieved. 
The rational aims of this workshop were to: 
• derive the generic categorisation of the various petroleum assets locations in the region 
• define the damage impact states and threshold categories 
• prioritise interdependencies of the various asset categories. 
The experiential aims of the workshop were to: 
• ensure all attendees felt their expertise was valuable to the discussions while 
gaining knowledge of the importance and relevance of lifeline security  
• strengthen understanding and relationships between the various attendees, 
specifically the civil defence team and petroleum industry 
• produce a favourable impression of the work, so future research, publications and 
collaborations are achievable 
• ensure a sense of ownership in the industry of volcanic hazard risk mitigation and 
a desire to continue the conversation internally, sector-wide and with civil 
defence. 
The workshop was held in Stratford and hosted by the Regional Council. In preparation for the 
workshop, a straw-man was compiled of suggestion of asset categories and provisional 
damage states from previous discussions and literature research. These were then tested 
during the workshop and revised based on discussions and feedback captured. The initial 
literature review and revisions following feedback from the workshop are discussed in the 
relevant sections. 
A5.1 AGENDA 
• Introductions & icebreaker 
• Aims and overview of the research  
• What are Mt. Taranaki’s hazards? 
• How to assess the damage from these hazards? 
• Step 1 – classification of Taranaki’s petroleum asset types 
• Morning tea 
• Step 2 – Thresholds for damage 
• Step 3 – What are the operational dependencies for this industry? 
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Craig Campbell-Smart Taranaki Civil Defence  
Gary Bedford Taranaki Regional Council 
Fred McLay Taranaki Regional Council 
Graham Alexander Critical Contingency Operator 
Nick Dawtry  WorkSafe New Zealand 
Brad Scott GNS Science 
Tanya Hansen Greymouth Petroleum Ltd. 
Michael.Ellem Shell Taranaki Ltd. 
Melanie Sole TAG Oil (NZ) Ltd. 
Kate McCready WestSide Corporation Pty Ltd 
Stephen Dobson  Todd Energy Ltd. 
Nicole Allen University of Canterbury 
Thomas Wilson  University of Canterbury 
Alana Weir University of Canterbury 
Natalia Deligne  GNS Science 
Al Den-McKay First Gas Ltd. 
Ricky Hann Port Taranaki 
Esther Tippett Shell Taranaki Ltd. 
Blair Odowda Shell Taranaki Ltd. 
George Hooper WorleyParsons (Advisian) 
Zoe Juniper University of Canterbury 
Paul Roberts Lattice Energy 
Julie Langford CCO/Langford consulting 
Dan Tan Vector Ltd 
Amy McSporran University of Canterbury 
Rod Briggs Contact Energy Ltd 
Katie Hogg Taranaki Civil Defence  
 
A5.4 FEEDBACK FOLLOW THE WORKSHOP 
Comment fed back following the workshop included: 
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“I enjoyed the workshop. Thought you did a great job at putting the information together and 
as well as impressed with the buy-in you achieved from the industry participants. Hopefully, it 
goes well – I will be pleased to contribute as I can, but the industry players will be able to offer 
up more specific comment.” 
“Just a short note to thank you for the invitation to the volcanic activity workshop last week. I 
thought that the session went well and everyone attending participated fully and got something 
out of it. In closing well done on your behalf, as I can imagine the amount of work that you 
have put in thus far on your thesis.” 
“Thank you for sharing this presentation. It is for sure that further study update would be great.” 
A5.5 OUTCOMES THE WORKSHOP 
Below are the key findings from the workshop as presented to attendees in a follow-up report. 
Petroleum Sector assets 
Summary: The workshop had great discussions at the small and wider group level on how to 
group petroleum assets at a high level. 
Key findings/conclusions: 
• Consider physical asset functions and detach physical properties from the 
geographical location or operational dependencies for this study. Both other 
aspects can be considered in future studies 
• Consider aerial crossings and pipelines to 0.7 m, as subsets of pipelines 
• For this high-level study, group all storage tanks together irrespective of design 
or location 
• Add buildings to a separate asset category. 
Vulnerability Matrices 
Summary: Some very robust detailed discussion that was cut short by time and lunch! 
Key findings/conclusions: 
• Buildings have been extensively covered by other research, and a matrix has not 
been developed here. Industrial users are out of scope 
• Workshop suggestions led to me undertaking further literature review to 
understand asset design standards 
• For slides 7-10, the shading on the left identifies the most and second most 
concerning hazards for each asset type 
Dependencies 
Summary: While the strawman put up considered each asset type separately, discussions 
converged on a single sector-wide appreciation. 
Key findings/conclusions: 
• The top four critical dependencies are what are critically required by the industry 
to continue to function in a ‘business as usual’ capacity. 
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• These assumptions come independently of any physical damage caused by 
volcanic hazards to the various assets. 
• Additional constraints on the sectors ability to continue to function were discussed 
under the regulatory challenges, which was a cause for concern. 
Regulatory challenges 
Some of the key areas for further discussions: 
• the impact of evacuation zones on the sector’s ability to continue to function  
• the need for an advanced warning to enable safe shutdown of assets within the 
evacuation zone 
• the Government’s expectation of the sector to continue to produce gas,  
• what are the realistic recovery times and impacts for the country  
• the lack of redundancy as a country for the gas supply  
• the interplay of Health and Safety regulations on shutting down facilities pre-
eruption and recovery 
• lack of volcanic specific hazard assessments or considerations under some of 
the current legislation and regulatory processes 
• the perceived inflexibility of some legislation and regulations in emergencies  
• the interplay of industry regulations and legislation with the CDEM Act 2002 
 
